CAG’s Governance Reform Push, Deepening Institutional Crisis In AMU: Lessons From History

Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India proposed a major shift in university oversight. On 9 March 2026, it moved to replace post-facto “reactive compliance” with proactive risk management. Traditional audits often uncover misuse only after funds have been diverted. To address this, the CAG introduced the Risk-Controls Maturity Scorecard (RCMS), a real-time, evidence-based self-monitoring framework that acts as an early warning system rather than a retrospective audit with little accountability.

The RCMS focuses on key risk areas such as procurement irregularities, ghost purchases, and the under-utilisation or diversion of grants. Its aim is to safeguard the ₹75,645 crore distributed annually to higher education institutions. Crucially, responsibility is shifted to university leadership, especially Vice-Chancellors and Registrars. Poor scores would serve as formal red flags, inviting stricter audits and limiting claims of ignorance. Drawing on data-led models used by Oxford and Harvard, the CAG seeks to evolve from recording financial failures to preventing them.

The current CAG, Sanjay K. Murthy, also served as Education Secretary from 2021 to 2024. Given that experience, his push to strengthen university governance through sharper financial auditing is timely. It also invites scrutiny of the troubled financial and administrative state of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU).

The AMU’s Massive Financial Chaos

The CAG’s new approach is particularly relevant to AMU. Its finances are reportedly in such disorder that, in a recent case, the university could not furnish precise figures for students enrolled in self-financed courses, including paramedical programmes, or those admitted under the NRI quota, where fees are charged in US dollars. As a result, it was unable to compute total collections from these categories over the past five years.

AMU constituted a three-member inquiry on 23 August 2025 comprising the Finance Officer and Controller, though both offices were themselves central to the allegations. No visible progress has since been reported.

The mismanagement is said to be so serious that some students, including children of employees and influential internal groups, did not pay fees, yet obtained degrees and left. One alleged defaulter is said to be the Officer on Special Duty to successive Vice-Chancellors since 2012, who until recently also served as Director of AMU-run primary and secondary schools. He is reportedly continuing de facto in that role while also receiving benefits allegedly without entitlement, including a driver and security staff at a private residence.

It is alleged that unpaid or diverted fee collections from self-financed courses and the NRI quota may exceed ₹100 crore since 2020–21.

Further concerns relate to the AMU schools, where there are claims of disproportionate representation from one sub-region, said to be the Director-cum-OSD’s native district. Critics argue this may point to a nexus of sub-regional patronage and ideological interests.

Other unresolved issues include the so-called revolving fund of the schools, similar funds in other AMU sectors, and money collected from pupils under Vidyalay Vikas Nidhi, allegedly in breach of the Right to Education Act 2009. The possible misuse or diversion of these funds, and the affairs of the AMU-maintained schools generally, require a detailed and independent audit.

A significant number of teachers recruited on a regular basis after 2004 are reportedly enrolled in the Old Pension Scheme (OPS), despite Government of India rules requiring the New Pension Scheme (NPS). This is said to violate the Gazette notification dated 22 December 2003 (F. No. S/7/2003-ECB&PR) as well as AMU statutes. The Delhi High Court, in its judgment of 4 July 2025 (Letters Patent Appeal No. 418 of 2025), reportedly held such OPS claims unjustified and endorsed a copy to Aligarh Muslim University. Those employees should therefore be shifted to NPS without delay.

It is further alleged that influential groups, including some faculty members on the Executive Council, have unlawfully secured annual increments for temporary service and counted such service towards substantive promotions. This is said to breach UGC rules, government rules and AMU Statute 29(2)(b)(i).

There are also claims of appointments to unadvertised posts in violation of AMU Statute 29 and in disregard of Supreme Court rulings. AMU is accused of inaction, while the Executive Council and other bodies remain silent because alleged beneficiaries dominate them. A large-scale review and recovery of wrongly paid public funds is needed.

AMU’s special structure provides for a Treasurer, senior to the Finance Officer and also a member of the Court and Executive Council. The post has reportedly remained vacant for years. Critics ask why a retired bureaucrat with finance and accounts experience has not been appointed, while insiders allege attempts by entrenched internal groups to capture the office.

The university has also functioned with ad hoc Finance Officers, often drawn from internal teaching staff. Despite UGC norms and repeated directions from the Visitor through the Union Ministry of Education, AMU is said to have resisted appointing a Finance Officer from relevant Union civil services, despite persistent financial disorder.

Similar concerns are raised over the posts of Registrar and Controller of Examinations and Admissions. The present Controller, an Associate Professor, has reportedly held office since 2018. The current Pro Vice-Chancellor, also an internal professor, earlier served as Proctor and Finance Officer. Vice-Chancellors since 2017 have likewise come from within the teaching staff.

With all top offices occupied for long periods by internal academics, critics argue a closed power structure has emerged, operating with little regard for rules or reform.

An independent and comprehensive inquiry is needed into whether favoured groups linked to powerful teacher-administrators have influenced contracts, construction, supplies, recruitment, promotions, fee collections and fund management. Questions have also been raised over possible benami firms connected to food supplies for resident students and procurement in AMU’s medical and health departments.

The BHU Instance of the 1950s

Such a state of affairs, marked by sub-regional “warlordism” among teacher-administrators who allegedly blackmail and paralyse Vice-Chancellors, was also evident at Banaras Hindu University (BHU) in the 1950s. The then Visitor and President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, set up an inquiry committee in July 1957 chaired by Dr A. L. Mudaliar. The 1958 Mudaliar Committee Report remains a sharp indictment of the “teacher-politician” phenomenon in Indian academia. Read alongside present conditions at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), it reveals a troubling continuity.

Dr Ram Manohar Lohia described the situation as “filth” in the 1950s. University of Allahabad also faced similar entrenched networks of teacher-administrators, as noted in Prof Syed Ejaz Husain’s 1965 Urdu memoir, Meri Duniya.

At present, AMU is described as having deteriorated into an “incestuous club” marked by unaccountable power and impunity. The Mudaliar Report had identified a class of “teacher-politicians” who abandoned teaching for administrative control, manipulating Executive Councils, influencing recruitment, and mobilising students as “foot soldiers” in factional struggles. It observed that such groups functioned like “miniature political parties”, where merit was replaced by loyalty, resulting in “gross indiscipline”.

Lohia, while critical of the Mudaliar Report, argued that in the extreme poverty of eastern Uttar Pradesh, such distorted networks also performed a perverse social function by facilitating access to admissions.

The Case of Institutional Decay

In the 21st century, the discourse around Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) strikingly mirrors mid-20th century concerns about institutional decline at other universities. The prevailing “politics of patronage” is reflected in several recurring patterns.

(a) Inbreeding of mediocrity: Local Selection Committees (LSCs) are said to enable “blind inbreeding”, where recruitment perpetuates kinship and factional networks rather than academic merit.

(b) Teacher-administrator complex: As in earlier critiques of “teacher-politicians”, AMU is said to have entrenched “teacher-administrators” who become permanent power holders in administrative roles. These groups allegedly exercise authority without accountability, sometimes mobilising student unrest to resist vigilance scrutiny or administrative change.

(c) Engineered upsurges: Student agitation is often described as a proxy for internal faculty rivalries. By manufacturing volatile issues, factions allegedly ensure Vice-Chancellor dependence on their support, weakening governance and disrupting the academic mission.

The comparison drawn is between the 1950s crisis at Banaras Hindu University and present-day AMU, suggesting a shared institutional pathology. What is described as “filth” in 1958 BHU and “shady affairs” in AMU is framed as structural decay: universities reduced to employment exchanges and local fiefdoms.

Where earlier analyses cited moral decline or sub-regional pressures, AMU is presented as an “incestuous club” where governance bodies are dominated by internal networks that prioritise protection of insiders over merit-based external recruitment.

A core irony is that institutions founded for “new civilisation” (BHU) or “modern learning” (Sir Syed’s vision for AMU) are argued to have drifted towards narrow, self-serving objectives. The “teacher-politician” is identified as the central actor in this decline, using student discontent as a shield for entrenched tenure and influence.

Governance Structure and Need for Reform

The 1958 suspension of the Banaras Hindu University Act through an emergency ordinance and subsequent reconstitution of its Executive Council is cited as precedent for intervention where autonomy degenerates into systemic internal rot. It is argued that AMU’s internal governance has similarly become unaccountable, with elected teacher representatives largely silent on administrative failures and expecting unchecked public funding without rigorous audit or compliance.

The current Executive Council (EC) is described as being dominated by internal faculty, shifting from autonomy to insular hegemony. A restructured EC with a majority of external, independent members is proposed as corrective measure to break what is termed an “incestuous loop” in recruitment and governance. Internal dominance is said to create inherent conflicts of interest in appointments, promotions, and disciplinary action, particularly where senior faculty are themselves implicated.

External members, such as retired judges, industry leaders, or eminent academics, are argued to provide neutrality, reduce local factional pressures, and strengthen transparency and fiscal discipline. They may also help curb “engineered upsurges”, where internal factions allegedly mobilise student unrest as leverage against administrative decisions.

It is further argued that long-term residence of internal power groups around campus entrenches fear of retaliation, even after retirement, reinforcing resistance to reform and strengthening the case for externally dominated governance structures.

A rebalanced EC is expected to reduce campus power politics and restore focus to academic governance. Inclusion of diverse external representation, including under-represented regions, is also suggested.

Ultimately, internal domination is criticised for prioritising staff-centric interests such as promotions, housing, and seniority over student outcomes, including curriculum modernisation, placements, and infrastructure. Universities, it is argued, must remain accountable primarily to students and parents as their true stakeholders.

The Nehru-Rajendra Solution for BHU 1958 and a Way-out for AMU Today

The “special circumstances” cited by the Nehru government in 1958 for Banaras Hindu University now apply to Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). When a university’s internal bodies (Court and Executive Council) fail to self-correct, the Visitor (the President of India) has a moral and legal duty to intervene.

At AMU, successive Vice-Chancellors since 2017 have been drawn exclusively from internal faculty, with all key statutory posts (Pro Vice-Chancellor, Finance Officer, Registrar, Controller, Proctor, Treasurer, etc.) also held internally. This has deepened institutional crisis. These positions, it is argued, should be filled externally without delay.

A “Reconstitution Clause” is proposed, limiting internal faculty representation on the Executive Council to 25–30%, with the remainder drawn from a national pool of eminent external members. This would help shift AMU from a localised power structure to a national institution.

Any such reform is likely to face resistance from entrenched insiders, with claims of “Qaum in danger” and appeals to exceptional autonomy. Critics note that these same groups have resisted internal reform while expanding representation for affiliated internal interests, including an additional EC member from an off-campus centre, and opposing nomination of a member by the Union Government’s Education Secretary, despite it being the principal funder.

Questions are therefore raised about whether an ED, IT, CBI or CVC inquiry should examine alleged misconduct, wealth accumulation, and administrative irregularities involving long-standing internal power holders. A special audit by the CAG is also suggested to review AMU finances and statutory compliance.

It is further urged that the Visitor and the Union Government take serious note of alleged misgovernance since 2017, when internal faculty dominance intensified. These concerns, it is noted, have already been submitted to the Ministry of Education, UGC, CAG, and CVC.

Such measures, it is argued, are necessary to strengthen governance in higher education. Without them, the objectives of the CAG’s 9 March 2026 reform initiative risk being undermined.