Kerala’s Political Shift: BJP’s First Assembly Wins and the Limits of Hindutva in South India

One of the reasons frequently cited by political observers for the BJP’s limited success in Kerala is the state’s demographic composition. Nearly 48 per cent of Kerala’s population belongs to minority communities, with Muslims accounting for around 28 per cent, a factor often viewed as constraining the BJP’s electoral expansion. Yet, despite this demographic reality, the BJP has continued its long effort to break the electoral jinx, an attempt that has now translated into three Assembly seats in the recently concluded election.

According to available data, the BJP secured a vote share of 11.42 per cent, translating into 24,66,178 votes in the recently concluded election. In comparison, the party had polled 11.30 per cent and 23,54,468 votes in the 2021 Assembly elections. Interestingly, the BJP had performed better in other recent contests, securing a 16.68 per cent vote share in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections and 14.6 per cent in the 2025 local body polls.

What has changed, however, is the party’s ability to convert votes into seats. For the first time in Kerala’s history, the BJP managed to win three Assembly seats. The party had opened its account in the state Assembly in 2016, but failed to retain the seat in 2021. In the 2026 election, despite only a marginal increase in vote share, the BJP succeeded in winning three seats, all from southern Kerala.

“If we analyse electoral trends over the past few years, one thing is clear: the BJP is steadily growing in Kerala. A major reason is its increasing success in consolidating Hindu votes,” says P.K. Yasser Arafath, a historian at the University of Delhi. “While minority votes play a decisive role in many constituencies, there are still around 30 to 40 seats where minorities alone cannot determine electoral outcomes,” he adds.

A key element of the BJP’s strategy in Kerala has been its attempt to make inroads into the Ezhava community, a prominent OBC group that had traditionally been a strong support base of the CPI(M). Recent elections, particularly the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, indicated signs of a shift, with a section of Ezhava voters moving away from the Left and towards the BJP.

The 2024 Lok Sabha election was significant for another reason as well: it saw the BJP win a parliamentary seat in Kerala for the first time in the state’s history. The party secured the Thrissur constituency in central Kerala, where actor-turned-politician Suresh Gopi emerged victorious. The win was widely projected by the BJP as validation of its outreach towards sections of the Christian community in the state. Though the BJP’s vote share has remained relatively stagnant, its victory in three Assembly seats marks a significant rupture from its past, when it had no meaningful presence in the state legislature.

If Kerala’s demographic composition is often cited as a structural roadblock to the BJP’s expansion, Tamil Nadu presents a contrasting case. Despite being a predominantly Hindu-majority state, Tamil Nadu too has remained resistant to the BJP’s growth. Unlike in Kerala, the BJP has, at different points, allied with both the major Dravidian parties: first with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee era, and later with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Yet, these alliances failed to help the party establish itself as a major independent political force capable of challenging Tamil Nadu’s entrenched Dravidian order.

Political scientist Vignesh Karthik argues that differences in religious imagination and political culture have limited the penetration of Hindutva ideology in Tamil Nadu. “The intimate and emotional traditions of bhakti in Tamil culture do not neatly fit into the standardised and exclusionary religious framework promoted by Hindutva politics,” he says, adding that “in Tamil devotional culture, Murugan is revered as a deeply local and cultural deity, while Hindutva discourse often emphasises the idea of a Sanskritised Subramania as the spirit of Murugan. Similarly, the Dravidian understanding of religion stresses access and participation rather than ritual purity.”

In the recently held election, the BJP, contesting as an ally of the AIADMK, won just one seat with a vote share of 2.97 per cent, down from four seats earlier. Ramu Manivannan, former head of the department of politics and public administration at the University of Madras, argues that despite the BJP’s poor electoral performance, the party may still see an opportunity in Tamil Nadu’s shifting political landscape. According to him, actor Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) has, for the first time in decades, disrupted the entrenched dominance of the Dravidian parties. “The BJP will, in all likelihood, seek to capitalise on this volatile situation,” he says. “However, the enduring strength of the Dravidian movement will remain a significant challenge to its expansion. The rise of the TVK presents an opening and the BJP is likely to explore ways to leverage it.”

Unlike other southern states, Karnataka is where the BJP has built a strong and sustained base across the state. It remains the only southern state where it has had its own chief minister. “There are several factors behind the BJP’s rise here,” says senior journalist B.S. Arun, pointing in particular to the deep organisational presence of the RSS. And it has been able to play with the caste equation prevailing within the state. He also recalls a key political moment involving Rajiv Gandhi and former Chief Minister Veerendra Patil. “When Rajiv Gandhi announced at the Bengaluru airport that Patil would be removed—without any formal consultation— the Lingayat community, to which Patil belonged, saw it as an affront to their dignity. The resulting alienation of Lingayats from the Congress was effectively leveraged by the BJP to consolidate its influence,” he adds. Unlike Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu, Karnataka lacked a dominant regional political force. As a result, the BJP, on its own organisational strength, challenges its principal rival, the Congress. It manages to do so through the extensive grassroots network of the RSS and by carefully navigating the state’s caste equations.

In Andhra Pradesh, however, the BJP never witnessed the kind of growth it achieved in neighbouring Karnataka. The Congress, which once enjoyed overwhelming dominance in the state, lost its supremacy after N.T. Rama Rao launched the regional Telugu Desam Party (TDP), mobilising Telugu sub-nationalist sentiment against the Congress establishment.

In 1982, when Rajiv Gandhi, then a general secretary of the Congress, arrived in Andhra Pradesh on a private visit, the incidents that followed enabled NTRto whip up an “anti-Delhi” sentiment and catapult his party to power.

When Rajiv Gandhi arrived at Begumpet airport, Chief Minister T. Anjaiah stood waiting, having marshalled a sea of Congress workers to greet the prime minister’s son with thunderous applause. But the spectacle backfired. Irritated by the orchestrated welcome, Gandhi, in full public view of party leaders and the press, sharply rebuked Anjaiah, an episode that quickly came to symbolise not just personal humiliation, but a deeper political slight.

What might have remained a fleeting moment soon ignited a larger sentiment. The humiliation of a Telugu chief minister was recast as an insult to Telugu pride itself. Seizing this charged atmosphere, NTR transformed outrage into political momentum. With the launch of the TDP, he invoked the powerful call of “Telugu vari atma gouravam” (self-respect of the Telugu people). The slogan struck deep, turning wounded pride into a sweeping political force that would soon unseat the Congress from power in the state.

NTR then went on to become one of the regional leaders who fought to bring a non-Congress government into power. “In the past, the Congress freed the country and now the time has come to free the country from the Congress’ misrule,” said NTR at a National Front in Chennai. Ramesh Kandula, who wrote a political biography of NTR, terms him the first proponent of the Congress-mukt Bharat ethos in his book, Maverick Messiah: A Political Biography of NT Rama Rao.

The TDP, which rose to prominence on a mix of anti-Congressism and Telugu identity, has largely maintained its distance from the Congress. The party was also among the earliest regional forces to align with the BJP, entering into a formal partnership as early as 1996.

In the latest Assembly elections, held alongside the Lok Sabha polls, the TDP contested as part of an alliance with the Jana Sena Party (JSP), led by Pawan Kalyan, and the BJP, securing a sweeping mandate. In the 175-member Assembly, the TDP won 135 seats, the JSP 21 and the BJP eight, underlining the coalition’s decisive dominance.

While the BJP remains the junior partner in this arrangement, some observers believe the balance could shift over time. “The TDP’s position as the leading partner of the NDA in Andhra Pradesh is likely to hold, at least in the near term. But a leadership transition from N. Chandrababu Naidu to his son Nara Lokesh could trigger a phase of political churn in the state,” says a BJP leader, speaking on condition of anonymity.

In Telangana, the new Telugu state carved out of Andhra Pradesh, the BJP is still struggling to find a partner. The split within the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) and K. Kavitha’s decision to form a new party, and the trajectory it could take, remain to be seen. In a political ecosystem, divided between the Congress and the BRS, the BJP needs to find a partner.

In the 2023 election, the BJP secured 13.9 per cent of the vote and won eight seats, up from just one seat in the previous election, indicating significant growth for the party.

With Telangana heading to the polls in the next couple of years, the political landscape remains fluid. For now, K. Kavitha has turned her criticism towards K. Chandrashekar Rao—her father—even as the BRS leadership continues to target the Congress government. This could have a significant bearing on the state’s politics. “It is still unclear how Kavitha will position herself going forward and whether she might eventually align with the BJP remains an open question,” says Gari Nagaraja, a political commentator.

Most South Indian states have historically been shaped by strong regional political formations that resisted the dominance of national parties, first the Congress and, over the last decade, the BJP. In Tamil Nadu, this role was played by the Dravidian parties; in Andhra Pradesh, by Telugu sub-nationalism articulated through regional parties; and in Kerala, by the Left movement.

However, the recent election results in Kerala suggest that a crack may be emerging in Kerala’s long-standing political pattern. For the first time in the state’s history, the BJP has managed to win three Assembly seats, signalling a modest but symbolically significant breakthrough in a state where the party had long remained electorally marginal.

N.K. Bhoopesh is an assistant editor, reporting on South India with a focus on politics, developmental challenges, and stories rooted in social justice