India-Bangladesh Border Fencing, Illegal Migration and BJP’s West Bengal Win: What’s Next for Bilateral Ties?

The historical resentment against Bengali-speaking people in Assam is palpable. Assamese speakers have seen migration as a threat to their culture, livelihood and political identity. These migrants include those who migrated during the pre-Independence era. Post-Independence, illegal and forced migration from East Pakistan—later Bangladesh—dramatically raised these numbers and created a demographic imbalance, particularly in Assam and West Bengal.

These neighbouring states sharing borders with Bangladesh have had to deal with illegal immigration and other issues of border management such as smuggling and human trafficking. Cross-border familial, economic and cultural linkages have created bonds that an international border cannot eradicate. Hence, to deal with these issues, these states have influenced India’s foreign policy, which is a Central subject as per India’s Constitution. In the absence of any formal platform for consultations, India’s states have dealt “bilaterally” with the Central government ministries. This lacuna in coordination was mitigated to some extent by the Ministry of External Affairs by creating a division for policy coordination with India’s states and line ministries.

There is no doubt that events in Bangladesh during the unconstitutional interim government led by Muhammad Yunus—which assumed power after the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—influenced voters in West Bengal. The interim government deliberately downgraded ties with India and moved closer to Pakistan, the US and China. Ironically, this axis of countries had opposed Bangladesh’s creation tooth and nail. Primarily for this and other reasons, bilateral ties suffered a serious setback under the Yunus-led interim government, which was controlled largely by the pro-Pakistan Islamist Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Unequal Treatment

The interim government snapped connectivity links like passenger buses and trains, stopped issuing visas and curbed trade in certain commodities. Crucially, the large-scale mistreatment of Hindus during the tenure of the interim government created anxiety and fear among voters in West Bengal who have watched with increasing alarm the demographic impact of illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims into their state. Vote-bank politics aroused anxiety about appeasement and unequal treatment. This perception gained traction among the electorate in West Bengal.

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) recent electoral victory in West Bengal has set in motion currents that will impact bilateral ties with Bangladeshis. Unarguably, it has given rise to anxieties in Bangladesh. The BJP’s electoral success underlines a significant political shift in the largest state bordering Bangladesh. Policy differences, which may have exercised some influence on India-Bangladesh ties under the Trinamool Congress (TMC) government, now stand eroded.

Centre-state coordination has begun with the immediate implementation of erecting the fence, along open sections of the border that was pending under the TMC government, which did not act to provide the required land. The largest border is with West Bengal which also has the largest unfenced portion. The TMC government’s vote bank has always opposed the fence. The vigorous implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizen (Amendment) Act (CAA) as well as the recent announcement for setting up detention centres in each district of the state are expected to also raise anxieties in Dhaka. While these are sovereign decisions, Bangladesh will be concerned about reverse migration of illegal Bangladeshi migrants.

The powerful mafia on both sides of the border—controlling smuggling and human trafficking—have worked overtime to oppose the fencing. The fencing will impact their illegal activities and reduce their flow of funds with which they buy influence with politicians and officials to gain patronage. For the same reason, there is always a hue and cry about Bangladeshi smugglers getting shot when they engage in armed confrontation with the Border Security Force (BSF). Shooting of smugglers is the most effective deterrent. Bangladesh has always opposed fencing of the border for both psychological and material reasons. Bangladeshis have argued that a fence between friendly neighbours is inappropriate and given the overhang of geography, makes Bangladeshis feel “imprisoned”. Other factors are related to smuggling and the human-trafficking mafia, which feels deterred by the fence and killings on the border.

Friction between the border forces, the BSF and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), can be expected during the mapping and surveying that precedes the location of the fence. Bangladesh’s home minister has publicly stated that building the fence is India’s sovereign right. The barbed wire-topped fence will be built 150 yards from the international border on Indian territory as per a bilateral protocol signed in 1975 during the euphoric days when it was believed that friendship would be eternal.

In hindsight, this protocol is proving to be a millstone around India’s neck. It has facilitated land grab by Bangladeshis along the border and illegal activities because the territory in between the international border and the fence has become a no man’s land for illegal activities. The world has moved on and it is time that India revisits and scraps this protocol which no longer serves in its interest. Ideally, the fence should be aligned with the international border, leaving no room for ambiguity. Geographical difficulties to set up the fence closer to the international border require mutual consent of the two governments.

The BJP government’s actions in removing encroachments on government land largely settled by Bangladeshis are viewed in Bangladesh as the BJP’s anti-Muslim orientation. It ignores decades of illegal Muslim migrants encroaching upon government land. This kind of thinking is basically grounded in religious affiliation and Bangladesh’s requirement for fostering nationalism based on anti-India overtones.

The new policy of deportation of illegal Bangladeshi migrants, announced by the new government in Kolkata, has ruffled feathers in Bangladesh. Under this policy directive, effective from May 20, detained illegal migrants will be directly handed over to the BSF for deportation. This policy merges with the Central Government’s “detect, delete and deport” policy framework. No court order will be sought for such deportation and the BSF will “push” these detained Bangladeshi illegal migrants across the border.

Deliberate Delay

Bangladesh has always objected to this procedure of deportation and demanded that India follow the protocol of handing over lists with details of such detained illegal migrants to the BGB after verification. The persistent problem faced by India is the deliberate delay on Bangladesh’s part in carrying out the verification, citing incomplete information. Such delays have sometimes lasted as long as five years, thereby defeating the purpose of this procedure and are being increasingly viewed as a deliberate policy to avoid accepting illegal migrants. Hence, India has been forced to adopt the “push” procedure because of the uncooperative attitude of Dhaka.

Bangladesh has followed a policy of denying illegal migration into India. As a densely populated country, it has looked favourably at illegal migration, which reduces the pressure of population on its land. The more ideologically inclined Islamist sections in Bangladesh have seen illegal migration as part of Ghazwa-e-Hind (battle of India), the enduring belief that India has to be brought into Dar-ul-Islam (house of Islam). There is also the belief that West Bengal and the seven sisters can be absorbed into a “Greater Bangladesh”, a concept promoted by the interim government and supported by some sections of the Bangladeshi people.

This concept is not new and is part of the mythology of “Lebensraum” that is subscribed by some Bangladeshis even today. This comes from the hangover of Partition when the slogan of “moth-eaten Pakistan” was promoted by M. A. Jinnah because he believed that several parts of undivided India should have been included in Pakistan.

The forthcoming negotiations on renewing the Ganga Water Treaty—which will expire in December 2026—and the Teesta River water-sharing agreement will test both sides. The draft Teesta agreement has been stalled for 14 years by the TMC government, objecting to the sharing formula, citing water requirements of North Bengal. Water requirement has gone up and both sides will adopt maximalist positions when they engage. Unless there is willingness to compromise, agreements will elude both sides and create rifts in bilateral ties. As the upper riparian, India can live with no agreement on water sharing as it gives more leeway to utilise river waters.

Bangladesh’s domestic politics have created pressure and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government has to show that it can negotiate a better deal than the Sheikh Hasina government. Under the BNP government, the process of repairing and reviving Delhi-Dhaka ties has begun, but there are pitfalls that will have to be recognised and navigated. Dhaka will do well not to let the BJP’s electoral victory in West Bengal become a roadblock to mend ties. With better Centre-state coordination, Bangladesh will face a more coherent Indian approach which can be advantageous in advancing bilateral ties.

(Views expressed are personal)

Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty served as Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and was earlier High Commissioner to Bangladesh