Wagner Revolt Was Only A Matter Of Time, Not Possible Without Internal Help: Russian Analyst Kseniya Kirillova

The mutiny of the Wagner Group led by Yevgeny Prigozhin shocked the world, but it was not a shock to longtime observers of Russia, a section of whom were predicting it for some time.

It was only a matter of time, said Russia expert Kseniya Kirillova, an analyst at Washington DC-based think tank Jamestown Foundation. In an interview with Outlook, she said that Russian security services and the private ruling elite had been competing among themselves for a long time which involved outing each other’s agents and diminishing each other’s powers and it was only a matter of time before it translated into a conflict on the ground. 

Despite the popular usage of the c-word, Kirillova does not believe Prigozhin’s revolt was a coup against Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

“I don’t think that Prigozhin’s goal was to seize state power,” says Kirillova, adding that the goal appeared to be the removal of the Russian defence leadership instead of Putin. 

In an interview with Outlook’s Madhur Sharma, Kirillova spoke on several aspects of Prigozhin’s revolt and Russian politics, ranging from the nature of the revolt to the road ahead for Putin. Edited excerpts: 

First things first. What do you make of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s revolt? Was it a mere show of strength or was it an actual revolt? Please share your assessment of the possible objectives of Prigozhin’s revolt. 

I don't think that Prigozhin’s goal was to seize power. Coups with the aim of seizing state power are done differently — quietly, in the capital, without prior notifications and long marches through all of Russia. Rather, in this case, Prigozhin was really trying to force the resignation of the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence — Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Staff chief Gen. Valery Gerasimov.

Although Prigozhin did not formally achieve these goals, I would not call him a complete loser. He managed to demonstrate the strength of his private army and get away with impunity even after the murder of Russian pilots — at least for the moment.

Was Prigozhin’s revolt entirely unpredictable? If not, when exactly and why did you feel that something like this could happen in the future? 

Yes, it was predictable. First, the Russian authorities have done everything to turn the country into a bandit state ruled by violence and criminal practices. Second, the confrontation among the Russian special services had a brutal character even before. They set each other up, leaked the agents of their competitors, and even engaged in targeted assassinations of each other’s henchmen, such as when they fought for power in the Russian-occupied Donbas.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these special services and various groups in the Russian elite began to create their own private military companies not regulated in any way by law. These companies, in turn, began to recruit criminals and gained more and more combat experience in Ukraine. The fact that sooner or later they want to repeat their bloody path in Russia and start fighting each other with weapons was only a matter of time.

How do you see Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority in the country and over the country’s elite after the revolt? While no serious material damage was done as the mutiny ended without any pitched battle, it showed to the world that Putin does not have complete control over the feuding elite. Do you see his position weakening and the feud worsening? 

Indeed, through his actions, Yevgeny Prigozhin demonstrated that a well-armed ‘field commander’ could easily breach the Russian border, seize crucial strategic assets in a major regional centre like Rostov-on-Don, and reach Moscow in less than a day. Regardless of whether this impunity was due to the incompetence of Russian special services or the support Prigozhin received from certain leaders of the Russian security forces, it signifies that the state has lost its monopoly on violence and is no longer capable of effectively handling internal threats.

Furthermore, even official Russian media do not deny that Prigozhin’s associates were responsible for the deaths of approximately 15 Russian military personnel, including pilots of downed aircraft and helicopters belonging to the Russian Ministry of Defence. However, the leader of the mutinous private military company (PMC) faced no repercussions for these actions and it took the intervention of a foreign leader to persuade him to make concessions. This shows the weakness of the central government and Putin personally.

Please share your insights on Russia's power structure. People outside Russia are used to seeing leaders and Cabinet members elected democratically, so warlords with private armies and the concept of oligarchy are strange to them. Who are the ‘elite’ that we often mention and does Putin draw his power from them or do they draw their power from him? Are we seeing a change in it?

Putin has always selected people in his circle on the basis of personal loyalty to him. Despite the fact that various elite groups are fiercely opposed to each other, they still need the figure of Putin since the image of the Russian president has a certain sacredness in the eyes of the majority of the population. 

This image, which has developed over decades, leads to the fact that the Russian majority delegates the most important decisions to the authorities and does not seek to influence politics. No other figure in the Russian establishment has such a halo, so Putin is currently the only person capable of providing even a semblance of legitimacy to his elite.

On the other hand, Putin himself is terribly afraid of the excessive strengthening of some of the elite groups. Therefore, he always avoids taking sides in their confrontations. He prefers to balance and let different clans weaken each other. However, we see that now this tactic has gone too far.

In an earlier conversation, you mentioned that it’s possible that Prigozhin was supported by elements within Putin’s administration. Please elaborate on that. 

I cannot imagine that Prigozhin could easily reach Moscow without the help of not only individuals from the Russian army but also from the FSB. It is the FSB that is responsible for the internal security of the country and they are in charge of the State Border Service. Let me remind you that Prigozhin crossed the Russia-Ukraine border without any problems. Additionally, among the clear winners of this story, one can name a security official close to Putin, Alexei Dyumin, now the governor of the Tula region. 

The consequence of the rebellion will also be an increase in repression which plays into the hands of the FSB and the National Guard. For example, the Russian Guard received heavy weapons as a result of the rebellion. I would not be surprised if Prigozhin was spurred into this rebellion by people like Alexei Dyumin, Nikolai Patrushev, or perhaps Sergei Kiriyenko, deputy head of the presidential administration. Be that as it may, the founder of the Wagner PMC was clearly going out of control. I think that even groups in the Russian elite who sympathised with him did not expect such a demarche.

What do you believe is the road ahead for Russia and Putin? After saying that he would punish those “on path of treason”, he let go of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group personnel. How do you believe it reflects on him and his authority? 

Of course, Prigozhin’s rebellion set a dangerous precedent for Putin, and his impunity made that precedent even more dangerous. As the war continues, with the lack of frontline victories and the deterioration of the standard of living of Russians, the risk of repeating such things becomes ever higher. The Kremlin itself teaches people on a daily basis that brute force is the only way to solve problems and a man with a weapon can commit any crime under the guise of patriotism. 

Putin’s weakness, in turn, may cause the Russian elite to doubt that the president still retains the sacred authority that can protect them from popular wrath.

The problem is that during the Prigozhin rebellion, we did not see any other forces ready to take advantage of the turmoil — the liberal opposition or the rebellious regions. If the democratic forces fail to take advantage of the next window of opportunity, I do not see any positive prospects for Russia in the coming years.