Bangladesh’s Teesta project with China could deepen Beijing’s footprint in northern Bangladesh
The project is close to the Siliguri Corridor, India’s vital link to the Northeast
India is likely to push for stronger bilateral cooperation with Dhaka on river management and connectivity
Bangladesh’s reported move to advance a Teesta river management agreement with China has renewed strategic concerns in New Delhi, particularly because of the project’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, India’s narrow land link connecting the mainland to its northeastern states.
The Teesta is not merely a river shared by India and Bangladesh. It has long been at the centre of diplomatic negotiations, water-sharing disputes and regional geopolitical competition. China’s possible role in a major river project in Bangladesh adds another layer to an already sensitive security environment.
What is the Teesta agreement?
Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman last month during his first overseas visit to China discussed the project, where Beijing signalled support for cooperation on its management.
The proposed agreement relates to the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, which is aimed at controlling floods, preventing riverbank erosion, improving irrigation and reclaiming land along the river basin in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has for years explored plans to manage the Teesta, which causes severe flooding during the monsoon but faces water shortages in the dry season. Dhaka has reportedly considered Chinese assistance for a large-scale engineering project involving dredging, embankments, reservoirs, irrigation channels and river restoration work.
The development comes against the backdrop of the unresolved Teesta water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh. A draft deal was prepared in 2011 but has not been signed, largely because of objections from West Bengal over concerns that reduced water flow could affect farmers in north Bengal.
For Bangladesh, the project is presented as an economic and climate-resilience initiative. But for India, its strategic location makes the issue far more consequential.
Why is China interested?
China has expanded its economic and infrastructure footprint across South Asia through loans, construction contracts and river-management projects. Bangladesh is an important partner because of its location on the Bay of Bengal and its proximity to India’s eastern and northeastern regions.
A Teesta project would allow Chinese companies and engineers to gain a presence in northern Bangladesh, close to India’s border. It would also give Beijing an opportunity to deepen ties with Dhaka through infrastructure financing, technical assistance and long-term project involvement.
China has considerable experience in large river projects, dams and water diversion systems. It has also built infrastructure across Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. However, India remains cautious about Chinese participation in projects located near strategically important border areas.
New Delhi’s concern is not limited to the construction of embankments or irrigation systems. Large infrastructure projects can bring Chinese personnel, equipment, survey teams and sustained institutional engagement into areas that are geographically sensitive for India.
Why is the Siliguri Corridor so sensitive?
The Siliguri Corridor, often called the Chicken’s Neck, is a narrow stretch of Indian territory that connects the rest of India with Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.
At its narrowest point, the corridor is only around 20 to 25 kilometres wide. Any military disruption in this area could affect India’s ability to move troops, supplies and civilians to the Northeast.
The corridor has become even more important amid India-China tensions along the Line of Actual Control and growing Chinese military infrastructure in Tibet. India has strengthened roads, railways, airfields and military deployments in the region, while also improving connectivity through alternative routes and waterways.
A Chinese-backed project in northern Bangladesh does not automatically pose a military threat but its location near the corridor means India will closely assess the nature of Chinese involvement, the personnel deployed and the infrastructure created.
Why is India watching closely?
India has traditionally viewed Bangladesh as a crucial security partner in the eastern region. Cooperation between the two countries has helped curb insurgent activity, improve border management and expand trade and connectivity.
New Delhi does not oppose Bangladesh’s development priorities. It has itself offered to support the Teesta restoration project and has discussed possible cooperation on river management, flood control and irrigation.
However, the relations between India and Bangladesh are witnessing a new phase of turbulence after the fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024. The new government in Bangladesh led by PM Tarique Rahman chose to visit China as his first international tour despite an early invitation by PM Modi.
The issue also carries political significance. Any perception that India is unable to respond to Bangladesh’s development needs could create space for Beijing to expand its influence.
What happens next?
India is likely to intensify diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh and offer practical alternatives for Teesta management. This could include technical assistance, funding support and faster movement on river-related cooperation.
The future of the Teesta water-sharing agreement will also remain important. A durable settlement between India and Bangladesh could reduce mistrust and strengthen New Delhi’s position as Dhaka’s most reliable regional partner.
