Operation Sindoor marked a significant moment in India’s evolving military doctrine, showcasing growing synergy between the Army, Navy and Air Force across conventional and emerging domains of warfare. In an exclusive interview to Saurabh Sharma, Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit, Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, spoke about the future of multi-domain warfare, the rise of AI and drones in combat, India’s push for integrated theatre commands and the broader transformation underway within the Indian Armed Forces to prepare for next-generation conflicts. Excerpts:
As the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, could you elaborate on the key initiatives and achievements that strengthened tri-service synergy, and explain how Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was enmeshed in the process, keeping in mind Operation Sindoor?
Operation Sindoor clearly demonstrated the growing level of inter-service synergy achieved by the Indian Armed Forces under the coordination of HQ IDS and the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The operation showcased seamless cooperation not only across the traditional land, air and maritime domains, but also in cyber and information warfare, marking a major evolution in India’s war-fighting philosophy. It highlighted our ability to deliver integrated effects with speed, precision and clarity of purpose, laying a strong foundation for true multi-domain operations. This success is the outcome of years of institutional strengthening, capability development and structural reforms. The creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff and the government’s sustained push towards jointness and integration played a crucial role in enabling this transformation. The raksha mantri’s declaration of 2025 as the ‘Year of Reforms’ further accelerated efforts towards integrated structures, organisational reforms and atmanirbharta, all of which translated into operational success during Operation Sindoor.
Coordinated war-fighting effort in all domains by HQ IDS and Service HQs led to better situational awareness, joint communications and integrated command and control systems. A robust communication architecture enabled real-time fusion of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance inputs, significantly compressing decision-making timelines and improving operational outcomes. Systems such as IACCS and Akashteer were integrated to create a comprehensive air defence picture, while efforts continue towards a layered defence architecture capable of countering drones, loitering munitions and missile threats. Our multi-domain approach now extends into emerging areas such as space, cyber and information warfare. New initiatives such as the Defence Strategic Communication Division and AI-enabled information warfare tools are strengthening real-time counter-misinformation capabilities. At the same time, tri-service doctrines, integrated logistics, joint exercises, war-gaming and coordination with agencies such as the Border Security Force (BSF), Indian Coast Guard, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and National Technical Research Organisation have reinforced a true whole-of-nation approach. Today, we stand equipped with increasingly integrated and future-ready capabilities, supported by seamless coordination among the Services, ministries, industry and national agencies.
How are the Indian defence forces redefining its doctrine to address the shift from conventional warfare to asymmetric and hybrid threats?
If we examine the evolution of warfare, conflict initially began on land, later expanded to the seas, and eventually extended into the skies. Today, warfare is moving into entirely new domains—cyber, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. Contestation is now taking place across every sphere.
Simultaneously, technological advancement has continuously transformed the nature of combat itself. Warfare once relied on bows and arrows, which gradually gave way to firearms, artillery, tanks and mechanised warfare. Cavalry disappeared and modern armoured warfare emerged. In the air domain, warfare evolved from biplanes to piston-engine aircraft and eventually to advanced fighter jets. Similar technological transformations have also reshaped naval warfare.
What we are witnessing today is the convergence of two major trends: rapid technological advancement and the expansion of warfare across multiple domains. Earlier, wars were largely unidimensional, with clearly identifiable armies confronting one another on defined battlefields. That is no longer the reality. Modern warfare is multidimensional, unfolding simultaneously across land, sea, air, cyber, space and the electromagnetic domain.
This is the central concept we are working on today—what is increasingly being described as 'multi-domain warfare'. Even the resilience of the civilian population, critical infrastructure, supply chains and national institutions have now become an integral component of warfare preparedness. That is why the prime minister has repeatedly emphasised the importance of a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach towards national security.
Warfare is no longer confined purely to military confrontation. Economic instruments, technological leverage, information operations, cyber capabilities, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, trade restrictions and resource control are all becoming tools of strategic competition and conflict. The broader dynamics of warfare are therefore expanding continuously and entering entirely new horizons.

You talked about the future of warfare and the importance of technology. Where do we stand in this particular area?
Technological advancement is rapidly transforming every domain of warfare. Take artificial intelligence [AI], for example. Just five years ago, AI was largely viewed as a futuristic concept. Today, however, we are not merely discussing AI in theoretical terms—we are actively integrating it into operational military systems. Technology, including AI, is ultimately a tool and not an end in itself. The objective of AI is to enhance the efficiency, speed and effectiveness of warfare and military decision-making. In any conflict, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, the process broadly involves observing the adversary, orienting one’s assets, making decisions, and then taking action. Traditionally, this entire cycle consumes valuable time. One of AI’s greatest contributions is its ability to significantly compress this decision-making loop.
AI can assist in identifying targets more accurately, analysing vast amounts of data at much greater speed and helping to guide weapons and operational responses with enhanced precision. In that sense, AI is likely to become omnipresent. Wherever computing exists, AI will exist. Wherever decision-making takes place, AI will inevitably play a role.
Whether in administration, logistics, resource allocation, sensors, weapons systems, communication networks or operational planning, AI will increasingly become embedded across every facet of military functioning. That is precisely the direction in which modern armed forces are moving today. We are integrating AI into networks, sensors, weapons platforms, operational effects and decision-support systems. In many respects, we are already at a fairly advanced stage of this transition.
It is equally important to understand the limits of AI. Human beings must continue to remain at the centre of decision-making. AI may provide options, recommendations, assessments, or analytical support, but the final decision must always rest with humans. Human judgement will remain paramount because complete autonomy cannot be delegated to machines. Otherwise, warfare could eventually devolve into a contest of ‘AI versus AI’, without meaningful human oversight or accountability.
What are the negative implications of AI?
Although these technological advancements and the rise of AI are significant assets, they also carry inherent risks and challenges. We do not want warfare to escalate beyond human control. At the same time, all forms of warfare must continue to remain within the framework of international laws and established conventions, including the Geneva Convention. India has consistently supported a rules-based international order and emerging technologies such as AI should strengthen these principles rather than undermine them. The objective should be to ensure that technology enhances precision, accountability and stability, while preserving human oversight and adherence to international humanitarian norms.
What lessons can we draw from the Russia-Ukraine war and the ongoing tensions in West Asia. What are the differences between these two conflicts?
The Russia-Ukraine war is a clear example of how the character of warfare is evolving rapidly—from conventional contact warfare to technology-driven and drone-centric conflict. One of the most significant lessons emerging from this war is the extraordinary speed of innovation, even while nations remain actively engaged in combat operations.
For instance, Ukraine has continuously developed new categories of drones, counter-drone systems and other battlefield technologies despite being in a state of war. According to various estimates, Ukraine is now producing nearly one million drones annually, demonstrating how modern warfare increasingly depends upon technological adaptability, industrial resilience and rapid innovation cycles.
Similarly, the ongoing conflict in West Asia reflects the emergence of what may be described as a ‘no-contact war’, driven largely by long-range missiles, drones, stand-off precision weapons and advanced air power capabilities. The major lessons being drawn from these conflicts include the critical importance of robust air defence systems, precision targeting capabilities, long-range strike assets, and the ability to sustain technological superiority over prolonged periods.
In my view, modern warfare is no longer solely about eliminating top political or military leadership at the outset of a conflict. Rather, it is about systematically weakening the adversary’s military capability, degrading production and logistics networks, targeting critical infrastructure with precision and sustaining strategic pressure over time. The focus today is increasingly on attrition through technology, precision and economic-industrial endurance rather than purely symbolic battlefield victories.
How do you assess the threat of attacks on civilian and key economic infrastructure? What steps are we taking to secure such sites?
The Indian Air Force is responsible for the air defence of the nation, and we will take every necessary step to ensure the safety of our civilians and critical infrastructure. During Operation Sindoor, we successfully neutralised every drone launched by Pakistan towards Indian targets, which reflected the effectiveness of our air defence and broader air power capabilities.
There are multiple methods available for countering hostile drones, including jamming adversary systems, intercepting drones mid-air, physically shooting them down and employing other advanced counter-Unmanned Aircraft System technologies. Our capabilities in this domain are being enhanced at a rapid pace to meet evolving threats. You would also recall the prime minister’s announcement regarding the ‘Sudarshan Chakra’ initiative during his Independence Day address last year, where he emphasised the vision of creating, within the next decade, a comprehensive defence system capable of ensuring that hostile aerial attacks are unable to penetrate or strike targets anywhere in India.
There is an increase in defence production in Ukraine despite the country being in a state of war. Is India also moving in this direction in terms of defence production and with such speed?
We are currently working on a surge production model. At present, we maintain a designated level of war reserves and stores for combat requirements. However, planning for drawn-out conflicts beyond our estimated duration and means to sustain operational requirements over this prolonged period is where the concept of surge production becomes critical.
To address this, we are actively engaging with defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs), the private sector and the Department of Defence Production. The objective is to develop a robust mechanism through which, in the event of a sudden spike in operational demand, the required defence production and logistical support can be rapidly scaled up to sustain military operations effectively.
We’ve been talking about the theatre commands for years now. Can you give a realistic timeline for when the first integrated theatre command structure will actually be announced or operationalised?
We have submitted the report to the Ministry of Defence and are currently awaiting its decision. Once the government grants the approval, it will take approximately one-and-a-half years to fully implement the transition. This will be a massive reform exercise of an unprecedented scale and has never been undertaken in India before.
The primary reason for this timeline is that entirely new organisational structures will have to be created, personnel across the Services will need to be trained and integrated into the new framework and operational plans will have to be developed to ensure seamless functioning of the reformed system.
What are the biggest challenges in this?
There are certain logistical, technical and organisational challenges involved, but such difficulties are inevitable whenever major reforms or transformational changes are undertaken. At the communication level, all three Services currently operate their own distinct systems and protocols. The present effort is focused on integrating these frameworks to ensure seamless coordination and interoperability. This integration extends to include logistics, training, operational planning and support structures, thereby enabling greater jointness and efficiency among the Armed Forces.
The ongoing wars like the Russia-Ukraine or the conflict in West Asia, have highlighted the significance of drones and counter-drone systems. Where do we stand in this domain?
Drones are now increasingly being treated almost like ammunition, with large-scale procurement underway across a wide spectrum of ranges and operational capabilities. These include short-range tactical drones for battlefield surveillance and support, as well as long-range systems capable of operating hundreds—and in some cases thousands of kilometres away.
The Army, Navy and Air Force have each formulated separate induction plans tailored to their respective operational requirements and threat perceptions. A significant aspect of this transformation is the growing role of the private sector, which is emerging as a major driver of India’s drone development, innovation, and manufacturing ecosystem.
Simultaneously, India is rapidly strengthening its counter-drone capabilities. Multiple technologies are under development, encompassing both 'soft kill' systems—which jam, spoof, or disable hostile drones electronically—and ‘hard kill’ systems designed to physically neutralise them. The DRDO has also transferred several technologies to private industry in order to accelerate indigenous capability development.
The government is now moving towards establishing a comprehensive counter-drone grid along the borders, with plans to eventually expand coverage to critical installations and sensitive infrastructure across the country. Coordination is also being undertaken with the Ministry of Home Affairs and forces such as the BSF, as counter-drone preparedness is increasingly being viewed as a wider national security imperative.
The sanctioned strength remains 42 fighter squadrons, but the Air Force is hovering around 29. How serious is this operational gap from a military planning perspective? And how long it will take us to reach the sanctioned strength?
One must keep in mind that the Indian Air Force has remained consistent in upgrading its aircraft fleet—be it the MiG-29, Jaguar, or the Mirage 2000. Each of these platforms has undergone extensive modernisation to enhance operational capability and extend service life. Once an aircraft is inducted into the IAF, every effort is made to ensure that not even an iota of its utility is wasted.
Second, there is a strong focus on indigenous development, which has become the need of the hour amid growing global geopolitical turbulence. India’s emphasis is on strengthening self-reliance in defence production while simultaneously pursuing joint production ventures with foreign partners under the broader vision of 'Made in India'.
Third, there has been a major surge in defence orders. The government has already placed orders for around 200 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), 156 Light Combat Helicopters (LCH) and nearly 70 basic trainer aircraft, apart from several other large procurements. However, geopolitical disruptions and supply-chain challenges have led to delays in delivery timelines. Nevertheless, there remains confidence that these inductions will materialise in the coming years.
Taken together—the continued upgradation of existing platforms, the growing reliance on indigenous capability and joint manufacturing, and the scale of ongoing procurement—the path toward achieving the sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons is clearly being pursued. However, realistically, it may take about 10-12 years to reach that benchmark.
You talked about the delays in deliveries. How does this impact operational readiness?
It undoubtedly affects operational readiness. At present, we are unable to attain the sanctioned strength. Although we would like to retire some of the older aircraft, this would further reduce the number. Consequently, we are consistently enhancing the current platforms and prioritising the domestic development of aircraft and engines.


































