Balancing Competing Rights: Bhojshala Judgment, Religious Character Disputes and the Future of the Places of Worship Act

At one level, the judgement may appear confined to the determination of the true character of a specific religious structure based on historical and archaeological material. However, a closer reading reveals that it raises much deeper questions, particularly regarding the continuing relevance of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. More importantly, the judgement potentially creates a pathway through which historical-religious disputes, which the Act had largely sought to place beyond contestation, may once again be reopened.

Ascertaining the True Character

A fundamental issue, amongst many others, framed by the court was whether the reliefs claimed in the petition were barred by the Places of Worship Act. Yet, while the judgement extensively discusses the text of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, it engages surprisingly little with the broader legislative intent underlying the legislation.

The Places of Worship Act was enacted to prohibit conversion of religious places and preserve their religious character as it existed on the date of Independence. The legislation, through Sections 3 and 4, bars the “conversion” of any place of worship into that of another religious denomination and further provides that the religious character of a place of worship existing on August 15, 1947, shall continue to remain the same. Importantly, Section 4 also mandates that pending suits and proceedings relating to conversion of religious character would abate and no fresh proceedings concerning such disputes could thereafter be instituted. The legislation, however, carved out limited exceptions, including disputes already settled before the enactment of the legislation, conversions protected by the law of limitation, and significantly, monuments and archaeological sites covered under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. Ayodhya itself was separately excluded from the legislation through Section 5.

The legislation was passed in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid demolition, and hence its broader purpose was clear: maintaining communal harmony by providing finality and statutory closure to historical-religious disputes after Independence. In the Ayodhya judgement (2019), the Supreme Court described the Act as a constitutional commitment to secularism, non-retrogression and closure of historical disputes. The court observed that “history and its wrongs shall not be used as instruments to oppress the present and the future” and treated the Act as a legislative intervention intended to ensure that Independence would mark a settlement point beyond which religious disputes would not be reopened.

The Bhojshala judgement, however, departs from this philosophy by creating an important distinction. The court repeatedly emphasises that the petitions do not concern “title of the property” but instead involve “the fundamental right of worship” and determination of the “character of the place of worship”. According to the court, no claim to title was being asserted; rather, the issue was merely identification of the true character of the disputed structure as it existed on August 15, 1947. On this basis, the court held that the bar under the Places of Worship Act did not apply in the same manner.

This distinction is significant. The judgement effectively suggests that while the Act may prohibit alteration of the religious character of a place of worship, courts remain free to determine what the “actual” or “true” religious character of the structure is as on August 15, 1947. The practical consequence of this reasoning is substantial. Future litigants may no longer frame disputes as claims seeking conversion of religious structures or declaration of title. Instead, disputes may increasingly be framed as exercises in determining “religious character” or enforcement of “fundamental rights of worship” under Article 25 of the Constitution.

The court takes this reasoning even further by holding that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be constrained by the Places of Worship Act because judicial review forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This position is legally correct and yet perhaps one of the most consequential aspects of the judgement. If every dispute involving a religious structure can be reformulated as an issue concerning enforcement of fundamental rights and brought under Article 226, the statutory finality contemplated by the Places of Worship Act may gradually lose much of its practical force. Ordinarily, courts, while departing from a clear statutory intent aimed at limiting judicial intervention, exercise their writ jurisdiction sparingly and in exceptional cases involving a clear violation of fundamental rights. If that was indeed the position in the present case, the judgement ought to have engaged far more substantively with the nature of the fundamental rights involved, particularly under Article 25, their scope and the broader constitutional implications of applying such rights in the context of the dispute. This becomes especially important in disputes such as Bhojshala, where competing religious groups assert rival claims of worship over the same structure. Article 25 may provide a basis to approach the court, but the assertion of religious rights by one group necessarily requires balancing of competing rights and claims of others. The judgement, however, does not adequately attempt to do so.

Can Courts Determine Historical Disputes?

The high court states that it must determine the “character” of the disputed area—whether it is fundamentally a Saraswati temple, Kamal Maula Mosque or a Jain temple, on the basis of historical texts, archaeological findings, inscriptions and architectural features.

This raises an important institutional question: are constitutional courts best equipped to conclusively determine complex historical and religious questions stretching back several centuries? Courts undoubtedly assess historical evidence in many disputes. However, disputes of this nature involve deeply contested questions of archaeology, faith and historical interpretation—areas where even academic consensus is often lacking. The reports of the ASI and historical literature are not gospel or infallible truths; they are interpretive exercises themselves, frequently contested by historians and archaeologists.

The Ayodhya proceedings perhaps reflected an implicit judicial recognition of this complexity. The Supreme Court was extremely circumspect while relying upon archaeological findings of the ASI, travel records and other historical material, repeatedly emphasising that such material had to be tested against evidentiary standards sustainable in a court of law. Even the ASI report was ultimately treated as one evidentiary component among several others, and not as conclusive proof either of demolition or legal entitlement. Eventually, the dispute was substantially resolved through principles of property law, reflecting the court’s recognition that it could ultimately decide only legal questions which courts are institutionally equipped to answer. Further, the dispute itself was treated as exceptional, heard over extraordinary lengths of time and repeatedly acknowledged by the Supreme Court as involving unique circumstances. Yet, post-Ayodhya litigation increasingly appears to treat archaeology, historical records and claims of historical continuity as questions capable of judicial determination in religious disputes. Bhojshala may now further institutionalise that trend.

Ultimately, the significance of the Bhojshala judgement lies not only in what it decides, but in the pathway it potentially lays down for future religious disputes. The Places of Worship Act was enacted to provide closure and ensure that courts would not become forums for litigating centuries of contested history. However, the judgement creates a possibility that such disputes may increasingly be reframed as questions concerning “religious character” rather than “conversion”, thereby gradually weakening the legislative finality contemplated by the Act itself.

(Views expressed are personal)

Swapnil Tripathi is with the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy. He specialises in constitutional law