The Hurriyat Hawks And Doves

 The dissenters reportedly met at the residence of hardliner and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani and decided to depose Ansari and 'suspend' the seven-member executive committee,the highest decision-making forum of the APHC. A five-member committee has been formed to review theHurriyat's constitution and suggest amendments to reverse what the dissenters perceive as 'autocratic'decisions taken by the executive committee.

The schism is a culmination of the war of attrition between the 'moderate' faction led by Ansari and the hardline group led by Geelani, with the latter seen as implacably committed to a pro-Pakistan position. Geelani,in recent times, has campaigned for the expulsion of the pro-dialogue Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference (JKPC)from the Hurriyat. JKPC leader Abdul Gani Lone had been assassinated by two unidentified terrorists at theEidgah grounds in Srinagar on May 21, 2002. Some JKPC leaders later participated in the state LegislativeAssembly elections held in September-October 2002 although Lone's son, Sajjad Lone, has consistentlymaintained that those who contested the elections were doing so 'in their own capacity' and not on the party'ssymbol.

The issue had also led to the JeI's removal of Geelani as its representative in the APHC executive councilin May 2003, when he was replaced with Sheikh Ali Mohammad. During his campaign, Geelani had denounced theHurriyat leadership for failing to provide a direction to the 'freedom struggle' in J&K.

An alliance of 25 socio-political and religious organisations, the APHC was formed in March 1993 as apolitical front to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism. The umbrella group has been consistently promotedby Pakistan in its quest to secure legitimacy for its territorial claims on J&K. Hurriyat's origins aretraced back to the 1993 phase of the Kashmir insurgency, when the initial euphoria of the armed struggleagainst Indian security forces had subsided in the face of counter-terrorist operations. 

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), with its pro-independence ideology, had been marginalisedand was being replaced by a network of Islamist terrorist groups sponsored and controlled by Pakistan'sInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at this stage. In a parallel development, Pakistan facilitated the creationof the Hurriyat as an umbrella body for all over-ground secessionist organisations. Since the internationalcommunity frowned upon the resort to violence by non-state actors, the Hurriyat was projected as a'legitimate' platform to promote the Kashmiri secessionist cause.

The Hurriyat has long been plagued with dissension from within. For one, there are clearly defined 'hawk' and'dove' factions, with leaders like Geelani overtly supporting terrorist violence, particularly of thoseoutfits which espouse an orthodox Islamist future for the state. In contrast, constituents such as the JKLFhave renounced violence as part of their agenda. 

The issue of a possible future for the state outside Indian sovereignty has also generated an internaldivide, with Geelani and others openly espousing J&K's accession to Pakistan, while the JKLF demands anindependent state. The issue of foreign mercenaries and Pakistan-based groups that operate without anyindigenous membership or leadership has created controversies within the organization. 

While dissension within the Hurriyat has been fought out in public under the façade of ideologicaldisputes, individual ego clashes are invariably visible in the conflicting statements of warring leaders. Theelection for the Chairman in year 2000 heightened these personality clashes, and these have continued tosimmer till date, with Geelani and the People's Conference emerging as the main protagonists. 

On issues, the two have clashed over the role of foreign mercenaries and over character of the conflict inthe state, with the latter terming it as a political issue and Geelani calling it a 'religious issue'. TheHurriyat's claim to be the 'sole representative' of the Kashmiris has, so far, been explicitly endorsed onlyby Pakistan.

While the scuffle between the two factions as to who constitutes the real Hurriyat can be expected tocontinue, the Geelani faction will almost certainly secure the support, both of Pakistan, and of variousPakistan-based terrorist groups. Geelani has long enjoyed the unequivocal support of the Pakistan-backedterrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM),and this is crucial. 

On May 27, 2003, the Pakistani paper, The News, quoted Hizb spokesperson Salim Hashmi: 

"The Hizb is filled with dismay over the removal of Geelani from the APHC… Attempts to sidelineGeelani from the Hurriyat will not only badly affect the goodwill of the alliance but also help Indiaaccomplish its plans to de-track (sic) the liberation movement." 

Hashmi said that during a 'command council' meeting held at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK),to discuss Geelani's replacement within the Hurriyat, Hizb 'commanders' had said that his "fearless andenthusiastic leadership enjoyed complete trust" of both Kashmiris and militants "engaged in thebattlefield to overthrow Indian occupation." The JuM claimed that Geelani had been sidelined by theHurriyat and the Jamaat-e-Islami "to win the goodwill of Indian and American leadership". 

Further, the Lashkar while praising Geelani's "principled stand", appealed to the Kashmiris tosupport him. The United Jehad Council (UJC), a conglomerate of 13 Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, in a pressrelease from Muzaffarabad on May 26, 2003, had described Geelani as 'a staunch leader' who could neither becowed down nor purchased by any agency. It asked the Hurriyat to address Geelani's complaints against thePeople's Conference, endorse his "principled and constitutional stand" and take him back in itsfold. 

Similarly, the Muzaffarabad-based 'supreme commander' of the Hizbul Momineen, Syed Aijaz Rizvi, said thatJamaat-e-Islami had actually "committed treason with the blood of martyrs" and adopted a"hypocritical approach" in retreating from Jehad.

The schism within the Hurriyat, howsoever important it may be in the current political dynamic in J&K, is,however, not the crucial issue. The real question will be about the occupation of the secessionist space inthe state, which was hitherto dominated by the Hurriyat - factional squabbles notwithstanding. 

Geelani was at the centerstage of this political platform, and had long argued the position that terroristviolence had given much-needed leverage to the 'freedom struggle' of the Kashmiris. He also consistently heldthat J&K was an integral part of Pakistan, and that India had forcibly occupied the territory. Ironically,Geelani earns a pension for his tenure as a Member of the state Legislative Assembly, which he entered afterswearing allegiance to the Indian Constitution. 

On the other hand, the 'moderates' led by Maulana Abbas Ansari more accurately reflect the mood andinclinations of a majority of the people of Kashmir today, with a growing popular resentment againstPakistan-backed terrorists and mercenaries in the state.

Nevertheless, with the Pakistan-based groups throwing their weight - and the coercive force of terroristviolence - behind Geelani, there are fears that the moderates will be systematically marginalized or,eventually, eliminated, from the secessionist political space they currently occupy.

Kanchan Lakshman is  Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines:Writings on Conflict & Resolution. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal.