Summary of this article
Governments announce schemes months in advance and then release the money or benefits just before voting
Technically, they follow the MCC, but in practice they stretch its intent.
According to the Economic Survey 2025-26, state spending on such measures has increased fivefold to ₹1.7 lakh crore, amounting to 0.6 per cent of GDP.
In recent months, images of long queues of women outside banks in poll bound states have become a familiar sight. What began in Bihar is now visible in Assam, where the government recently transferred ₹3,600 crore to 40 lakh women beneficiaries under the Orunodoi scheme, just days before the 2026 Assembly elections. In other states too, election manifestos include promises of regular cash support, free ration and items, and household goods for voters.
This is not merely welfare politics as India has known it. It signals the consolidation of what may be called freebie populism, a distinct political logic where electoral competition increasingly revolves around the immediacy, visibility, and personalisation of state benefits.
To be clear, this is not an argument against welfare. India’s developmental trajectory has long depended on redistributive policies, from the Public Distribution System to MGNREGA. The issue here is not whether the state should provide, but how such provision is embedded within democratic practice. Freebie populism differs from rights-based welfare regimes in one crucial respect. It ties benefits more directly to electoral cycles, making delivery itself the primary language of political mobilisation.
From rights to visibility
The shift is subtle but significant. In institutionalised welfare systems, entitlements are made routine. Citizens claim them as a matter of right, often independent of electoral timing. Under freebie populism, however, benefits are staged, announced, amplified, and delivered in ways that maximise political visibility. The state is no longer just a guarantor of rights. It becomes a visible benefactor, and elections begin to resemble referendums on its generosity.
The scale of this transformation is hard to ignore. According to the Economic Survey 2025-26, state spending on such measures has increased fivefold to ₹1.7 lakh crore, amounting to 0.6 per cent of GDP. In several states, this now consumes a substantial share of revenues. The Reserve Bank of India has flagged that many states are borrowing not for asset creation but for consumption, with committed expenditure including salaries, pensions, interest, and subsidies touching nearly 65 per cent of revenues.
The consequences are structural. Capital expenditure on infrastructure and human development is squeezed, fiscal deficits widen, and long term growth prospects are constrained. But beyond fiscal arithmetic lies a deeper democratic concern.
Narrowing the space of politics
When the timing and amount of benefits begin to decide elections, the space for real political competition reduces, leaving less room for debate on policies, governance, and long term priorities. Elections shift from being arenas of policy debate to contests of distributive capacity. Voters, in turn, are nudged to evaluate governments less on institutional performance or long term vision, and more on immediate, tangible transfers.
This does not diminish voter rationality. It simply changes how they make decisions. When people are under economic stress, immediate benefits matter a lot. But if a democracy keeps prioritising short-term gains over long-term policies and vision, it risks weakening its own foundations. Recent observations from the Supreme Court reflect a growing institutional unease with this trend. The concern is not welfare itself, but how it is used close to elections in ways that may affect a level playing field.
A code at a crossroads
At the centre of this debate lies the Election Commission of India and its Model Code of Conduct. Designed to ensure fairness in elections, the Code restricts the announcement of new schemes once elections are notified. However, it remains largely silent on what happens just before that moment.
This gap matters. Governments can announce schemes months in advance and then release the money or benefits just before voting, ensuring maximum visibility. Technically, they follow the Code, but in practice they stretch its intent. The line between governance and campaigning starts to blur. If elections are to remain fair, this loophole needs to be clearly addressed.
One step would be to introduce a clearly defined cooling period before elections, perhaps three to six months, during which large and non routine cash transfers or material benefits cannot be rolled out unless they are part of an already established and regularly scheduled scheme. This would distinguish ongoing welfare from strategically timed freebies without disrupting genuine entitlements.
Greater transparency in election promises is equally important. Political parties should clearly explain how much their welfare promises will cost, using a simple and standard format, with some independent check. This will help voters understand the financial impact and trade-offs. It does not limit what parties can promise, but it helps voters make more informed choices.
There is also a need to reduce flexibility in when benefits are given. Welfare schemes should follow fixed and publicly known schedules, so that payments are not suddenly pushed just before elections. Alongside this, a simple public dashboard showing major government transfers in the months before elections can help citizens, media, and watchdogs spot patterns and ask questions.
Even within its existing mandate, the Election Commission can act. Clearer advisories on the use of welfare schemes during election periods, combined with a willingness to publicly call out questionable practices, can reinforce norms. The Commission’s moral authority has long been its strength. This is a moment to assert it more visibly.
Balancing welfare and democracy
India’s challenge is not to reduce welfare, but to separate it from election-driven politics. Welfare should remain central to governance, but it should be regular, predictable, and based on rights, not timed for visibility around elections. This is ultimately a test for the ECI. The credibility of the Model Code of Conduct rests not only on regulating what governments announce, but also on how and when they deliver. If the timing of benefits begins to shape electoral outcomes, the idea of a level playing field stands compromised.
If this trend continues, elections risk becoming short-term exchanges, where immediate benefits matter more than governance and long term priorities. The role of the ECI is not to question welfare, but to ensure that elections remain free and fair. This means making sure voters are not influenced mainly by when benefits are given. In the end, the real test is not whether benefits reach people, but whether voters still have the space to choose freely beyond them. If that space begins to shrink, what happens to democratic accountability? And can a democracy sustain itself if long-term vision steadily gives way to short term gain?
Saurabh Raj is a core team member at the Indian School of Democracy and is also associated with the European Center for Populism Studies. With over a decade of experience in Indian politics and elections, his work focuses on democratic and political reforms, political leadership, and the study of populism.
Views expressed are personal
