Announcement of such a policy framework ahead of crucial Assembly elections in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala make it politically crucial.
By formalising intelligence fusion, escalation protocols and role definition, it converts a distributed apparatus into a doctrine-driven one
Yashovardhan Jha Azad says India needed a security doctrine but the new policy framework doesn’t seem more than a general statement.
PRAHAAR — unveiled by the Ministry of Home Affairs — is India’s first comprehensive national counter-terror and cybersecurity doctrine. PRAHAAR stands for Policy for Response Against Hostile Activities and Radicalism. It is not a new law, nor does it establish a new agency. Instead, it functions as an overarching strategic framework designed to integrate intelligence-led prevention, inter-agency coordination, cyber-threat management, counter-radicalisation and post-attack recovery into a single policy architecture.
Existing laws and agencies such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the National Investigation Agency (NIA), state police forces and specialised units like the National Security Guard (NSG) continue to operate as before. PRAHAAR seeks to consolidate them under one doctrine.
On its face, the move appears overdue. Despite decades of confronting insurgency, cross-border militancy and high-profile urban attacks, India has never codified a unified counter-terror doctrine. Its architecture evolved incrementally — statute by statute, agency by agency — without a formally articulated strategic blueprint.
Yet in India, security policy rarely exists outside political context. The unveiling of PRAHAAR hence begs the question: is this primarily bureaucratic consolidation, or calibrated political signalling at a time when national security remains electorally resonant, or it is both?
The Logic of Consolidation
India’s counter-terror system has long rested on legal and institutional patchwork. UAPA provides the statutory spine. The NIA centralises investigations in significant cases. State police function as first responders. Elite units like the NSG intervene in escalated crises. Intelligence agencies operate across these layers, often coordinating through executive arrangements rather than codified doctrine. What the system lacked was not authority but coherence.
PRAHAAR addresses that gap. By formalising intelligence fusion, escalation protocols and role definition, it converts a distributed apparatus into a doctrine-driven one. It also integrates cyber and hybrid threats — online radicalisation, encrypted communications, drone usage — within the same strategic framework as physical terrorism. That integration reflects contemporary realities rather than political novelty.
Modern counter-terror policy globally has shifted from reactive prosecution to pre-emptive disruption. Prevention, financial tracking, early-warning systems and resilience planning now define best practice. In that sense, PRAHAAR aligns India with established international models.
From a governance perspective, the doctrine reads as long-pending rationalisation.
The Politics of Timing
However, the vocabulary surrounding PRAHAAR is not merely technical. The emphasis on “zero tolerance” and decisive response resonates with a broader political narrative cultivated over the past decade — one that foregrounds muscular security and a strong state. Announcement of such a policy framework ahead of crucial Assembly elections in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala make it politically crucial.
National security in India is not just administrative terrain; it is a symbolic capital the government uses for political signalling. Military retaliation, cross-border operations and hardline rhetoric have been integrated into electoral messaging. A formal counter-terror doctrine fits seamlessly within that framework. It projects preparedness and institutional maturity while reinforcing the image of anticipatory strength.
Timing sharpens this perception. As India enters a dense electoral cycle, the codification of a national counter-terror strategy inevitably reinforces the government’s security credentials. Even if conceived as bureaucratic reform, its announcement carries political utility.
According to former special director Intelligence Bureau Yashovardhan Jha Azad India needed a security doctrine but the new policy framework doesn’t seem more than a general statement. People were expecting that the government will define terrorism but that didn’t happen. The policy lacks in seriousness.
The Implementation Test
The decisive question, however, is operational impact. India does not lack legal tools. UAPA is expansive. Investigative powers are wide. Agencies are empowered. Yet persistent concerns remain: uneven policing standards, prolonged pre-trial detentions, low conviction rates in certain categories and recurring allegations of misuse.
A doctrine alone does not rectify these structural tensions. If PRAHAAR produces measurable change — improved forensic capability, interoperable intelligence databases, professionalised cyber units, defined accountability metrics and consistent training standards — it will represent substantive evolution. If it remains a high-level framework without altering ground-level realities, its effect will be largely declaratory.
Framing PRAHAAR as either administrative housekeeping or electoral theatre oversimplifies the moment. It is plausibly both. Bureaucratic systems often consolidate for internal efficiency while simultaneously serving political narratives. These dynamics are not mutually exclusive. But if PRAHAAR’s relevance doesn't go beyond the announcement before the polls rather than its implementation, it will recede into the background of India’s already expansive security state.
