Sibaji Pratim Basu Interview on Political Defections: 'Today, Power, Not Ideology, Drives Politics'

The present string of party splits in West Bengal, Maharashtra, and the possible split in the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, although likely to benefit the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance [NDA], is technically and structurally different from the traditional pattern of political defections, where elected representatives simply switched from one party to another. The 52nd Constitutional Amendment, which introduced the Tenth Schedule in 1985, was enacted to curb such defections.

Political defection by elected representatives, however, has a much longer history, beginning even before Independence. The first notable instance took place after the United Provinces [now Uttar Pradesh] Assembly elections of 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935. Although the Indian National Congress had won a thumping majority with 134 of the 228 seats and the Muslim League had secured only 27, Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim of the Muslim League defected to the Congress. After Independence, defections became rampant following the fourth General Elections in 1967, particularly in Haryana, where Gaya Lal, an MLA from Hassanpur, switched parties three times within a single fortnight, giving rise to the phrase “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram”. In many of those cases, the Congress had some direct or indirect role.

In recent years, the BJP has adopted a different strategy to strengthen itself and weaken the Opposition. It allows the party to avoid both tarnishing its image as ‘a party with a difference’ and creating resentment among its longstanding party workers and representatives, which could trigger internal rebellion.

Instead, the BJP has encouraged elected members of opposition parties either to split their parties and assume new registered identities, as it happened in Maharashtra, or to form a majority-supported bloc within the original party, as is being attempted in West Bengal. In the latter case, the Speaker may recognise the majority bloc as the original party and its leader as the Leader of the Opposition.

Of course, the West Bengal case may still be challenged in the high court or the Supreme Court, which could even order the disqualification of legislators. However, the Speaker has considerable discretion over the timing of such decisions and may use legislative business to test which faction commands the majority within the principal opposition party.

In the case of the Trinamool Congress Lok Sabha members, the BJP is taking advantage of an exception under the anti-defection law. If at least two-thirds of the legislators in the original legislature party agree to merge with another recognised political party, in this case, the NCPI [Nationalist Citizens Party of India], their membership cannot be disqualified [under the Tenth Schedule]. In practical terms, there is also no legal bar preventing the merged party from supporting the NDA.

There are other factors as well. For example, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [DMK] is also a family-led party, yet it has been rooted in a strong pro-Tamil and anti-Brahminical ideology since the days of Periyar [E.V. Ramaswami]. As a result, despite electoral defeats, the party has survived.

A party like the Trinamool Congress, however, came to power riding the anti-Left movement against land acquisition in Singur and Nandigram from 2006 onwards. Under one supreme leader, it relied heavily on around 100 state-run welfare schemes and a consolidated Muslim vote bank to govern. Today, it is facing an extreme survival crisis.

In West Bengal at least, which may also be true of other states, a number of other factors have compounded the situation: the strong anti-incumbency arising from corruption in several sectors and concerns over women’s safety, particularly after the R.G. Kar Hospital incident; the super-active role of the Enforcement Directorate, Central Bureau of Investigation and other central government agencies; the exclusion of about 90 lakh names during the special intensive revision of the electoral rolls; the impact of the Hindu-Muslim divide among Hindus; and the BJP’s promises of development, employment, dearness allowance and a new pay commission for government employees. All these factors have contributed to the present situation.

Since Independence, Bengal politics has two main contenders, the Congress and the Left. Although the Bharatiya Jana Sangha was founded before the first General Elections by Syama Prasad Mookerjee and had two parliamentary seats in WB, after his untimely demise in Kashmir, the party was almost decimated in the state. 

But both the Congress and the Left faced splits over the years.

The Congress first split in 1967 with the formation of the Bangla Congress under Ajoy Mukherjee, who became chief minister with Jyoti Basu as deputy chief minister. The Bangla Congress later merged back with the Congress. In 1998, the Congress split again with the formation of the Trinamool Congress under Mamata Banerjee. After the emergence of the Trinamool Congress, the Congress gradually lost relevance across most of Bengal, except in Murshidabad, Malda and Uttar Dinajpur.

The Left followed a similar trajectory. The CPI split in 1964 after the Sino-Indian conflict, leading to the formation of the CPI(M). Later, radical Naxalite groups split from the CPI(M) to form the CPI(ML) under Charu Majumdar in 1969. Among these Communist parties, the CPI(M) remained the principal force until 2011. After the 2016 Assembly election, however, it gradually began losing its support base to the BJP. In fact, the BJP’s growth in West Bengal came largely at the expense of the CPI(M).

Mostly, yes. It is an unfortunate state indeed. What a shame we have brought to the idealist martyrs and freedom fighters who sacrificed their lives and youth to bring down British rule and pave the way for independent governance by Indians. They imagined a democracy rooted in principle, in ideology, and in the belief that elected representatives owed their first responsibility to the people who voted for them, and not to whoever could offer them the most comfortable political arrangement.

I do not think the legal framework has fundamentally changed. What may have changed is the willingness of institutions to enforce it with the same determination.

With all due respect to the judiciary, one can recall the Allahabad High Court judgement invalidating Indira Gandhi’s election. That judgement, which ultimately led to the Emergency, demonstrated that courts could and would act as constitutional referees regardless of political consequences. Whether that same institutional resolve exists today is a legitimate question.