In A High, Cold Plateau

For all the rapprochement over the past 30 years—joint working groups, appointment of special representatives, the five agreements to maintain peace along the border, confidence building measures and, lastly, high-profile summits between heads of state--suspicion of China is deeply rooted in the Indian psyche. Ever since India’s defeat in the 1962 border war, the Chinese have been regarded with ingrained distrust. That has now been reinforced manifold by the border clashes in Ladakh last year, and the protracted military stand-off thereafter. Yet, despite the loss of lives and the amassing of troops on both sides, the two countries managed to pull back from the razor’s edge. All through this tough period, India and China continued talking. This has finally yielded results—a disengagement process has now begun in Ladakh. What the future holds for Sino-India ties once the process is completed is unclear, with the post-COVID-19 international situation continuing to be in flux.

Much will depend on the power play between the US and China. At the G7 leaders’ statement, US President Joe Biden has reasserted that America is back to leading the multilateral cooperative world order. The idea is to call out China on its unfair trade practices, its human rights record, and emphasis on a law-based free world order. But the world that Biden was familiar with has changed drastically in the last four years. Biden wants Europe’s cooperation in challenging China. But is the EU, especially France and Germany, ready for it? The UK’s Boris Johnson is willing to play ball, but Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel may not be as enthusiastic. As the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi called for mutual respect and cooperation for a reset in US-China ties on February 22, will Xi Jinping and Biden cut a deal? After all, the economies of the two countries are closely integrated. As countries hope to repair shattered economies, China will remain a major player. It’s early days yet as the Biden administration weighs its options.

India-China ties cannot be insulated from the overall international situation. But it will not be back to square one with China. “Events of 2020 have put our relationship under exceptional stress,” foreign minister Jaishankar had said. He had added that the loss of lives in the Galwan valley, the first involving Indian and Chinese troops since 1975, has “profoundly disturbed” ties and that “advancement of ties are predicated on peace and tranquility on the borders and respect for the LAC”. Though this was said before the return to status quo ante, New Delhi will continue to be wary of China. All that feel-good talk about India and China rising peacefully in the ‘Asian century’ will languish for a while. Nor are informal summits, like those in Wuhan and Mahabalipuram between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping, likely in the near future.

“Relations between India and China will remain cool for the next few years, though there will be no tension on the border like the kind we saw last year. Chinese hopes of insulating what happened on the border and going ahead as though all is well on other aspects of relations is wishful thinking,” says Gautam Bambawale, a former ambassador to Beijing. India is scheduled to hold the BRICS summit this year and President Xi will attend. “But don’t expect the bonhomie that was evident in his last visit,” says Bambawale. Not only is Indian public opinion against China, the Opposition has repeatedly attacked the government for yielding ground to China. The BJP’s own ultra-nationalist support base will also not welcome a business as usual approach.

The old template of pushing forward bilateral ties while keeping the border question hanging in a limbo cannot hold. “There will be unobtrusive inc­remental engagement with China. The border issue will not be on the backburner. Relations will be kept simmering on a side burner, with the flame deliberately reduced,” says Alka Acharya, professor of Chinese Studies in JNU. So, decoupling ties from what happened on the border is definitely out for the Modi government.

“We are back to basics and have to build relations cautiously one step at a time. The prerequisite now is peace and stability on the border. After Galwan, every move of the Chinese will be put under a magnifying glass and analysed. Trust levels are low and Chinese motives will be repeatedly tested and re-tested by India,” says Srikanth Kondapalli, China expert and JNU professor.

Bambawale says that India will continue upgrading and modernising its defence platforms. The military asymmetry between the India and Chinese is a reality. In the geopolitical space, New Delhi’s commitment to the quad will possibly be strengthened further, where India will work together with US, Japan and Australia to checkmate China. The building of infrastructure on the border with China will also not halt despite Chinese misgivings.  

On the economy, Bambawale expects the ban on Chinese apps to stay. Nor will Chinese companies figure in the 5G spectrum trials. The worry that Huawei is close to the government and can be used by China to gain access to vital national intelligence ensures its exclusion. However, the need to bring down reliance on Chinese imports is easier said than done. Self-reliance takes time and some import restrictions on Chinese products will be quietly removed. At the same time, the search for alternative supply sources will be explored. Bambawale believes India needs to put down its head and work at improving economic performance, much as what China did under Deng Xiaoping. Economic growth is paramount in any credible challenge to China. However, Delhi is unlikely to stop Chinese companies from working in sectors that do not compromise security. Investments clearance of Chinese companies did not come to a halt even during the height of tension. Chinese investments in India, according to Kondapalli, are relatively low—for a country with a GDP of $14 trillion, the maximum investment in India is a measly $8.2 billion. Missing out on the Indian market may not hurt China as much as some think.

But there is another view on the Ladakh face-off and the India-China equation. “China wanted to teach India a rude and sharp geography lesson,” says a senior Indian diplomat. “India’s decision to join the anti-China camp triggered the PLA action in Ladakh. By joining the Quad, Delhi has shown it is firmly in the US camp,” he says. Aligning with US interests through the Quad makes little sense, according to this reasoning, because New Delhi’s outstanding issues with China does not lie in the Indo-Pacific region. American interests in West Pacific, East Pacific and the South China Sea have little to do with Indian security interests. “China is not interested in a war with India,” the diplomat explains. “After the disengagement process on the ground in Ladakh is done, China will leave it to India to decide how it wants to take the relations forward. After a cooling-off period, New Delhi has to take a call.”