Gambling On Global Stability: Japan Entangles With Taiwan

The US intervention in Venezuela is the recent event in international politics that involves questions of sovereignty, international law and global stability. The ongoing Ukraine-Russia war and the long-drawn-out case of Taiwan are in similar order. But the latter gains significance, as the global ramifications of an eventuality centred around it, is enormous.

Any combat involving Taiwan would likely transform into a US-China-Japan war. In such case, the fallout would not be confined to the region but global. Because East Asia is home to some of the largest economies in the world; houses major manufacturing hubs with vast consumer markets and it is well-integrated with global trade and supply chain networks. The consequences of lockdowns in East Asia during COVID-19 pandemic are still fresh in our memory that any conflict in the region would not only disturb our daily lives but also threaten our livelihoods.

In this scenario, Japan’s first female Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent statement that China using military force on Taiwan would likely represent a ‘survival threatening situation’ for Japan warranting a response set off the latest round of confrontation between China and Japan. China is uncompromising over its sovereign claims on Taiwan and is willing to use force to defend it. But, the Taiwanese response to Takaichi’s statement has been muted. Neither are there many takers for impending Chinese invasion theory in Taiwan. Then, why did Takaichi make a provocative statement despite knowing that it would induce retaliation from China, which could possibly affect the stability of East Asia and beyond. 

Disputes leading to weaponisation of trade and services against each other have become a norm in the region. No exceptions this time as well. Nearly 40 per cent of the flights from China to Japan were cancelled by December 2025. Chinese students in Japan were instructed to remain cautious. The ban on seafood imports from Fukushima region was re-imposed. Concerts and movies could not escape their fate either. The extremity of it was that the Chinese Consular General in Osaka clamouring for Takaichi’s head on X platform. In response, Japan has asked its citizens and students in China to enhance their safety precautions. Nor an emissary to China could salvage the situation for Japan. Currently China has initiated an anti-dumping investigation against Japan over the imports of dichlorosilane, a crucial chemical for chip-making. 

On the other hand, Chinese military drills around Taiwan have generally been portrayed as the bellwether for its provocative behaviour. However, the evidence points otherwise. For example, China has staged one large-scale military drill in April 2025 compared to two in 2024. According to an analysis of the figures released by the Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan, in the second half of 2025, the activities of PLA warplanes and ships have been less active. For instance, the number of sorties by PLA aircrafts between July and November 2025 near Taiwan saw a drop of 14 per cent compared to the corresponding period last year. Still coastguard operations have witnessed a spike.

Japan’s security and foreign policies predominantly cohere with the US. Currently both  China and the US are lowering the rhetoric and looking to constructive engagement. So Takaichi’s provocative position is out of step with the US position.  Since the Trump-Xi meeting in October 2025, America’s raging trade war with China has quietened down with a compromise significantly reducing tariffs on each other’s products; restrictions on rare earth exports were eased and export controls on certain technologies were suspended. The issue of Taiwan was conspicuously absent. Perhaps, as a precursor, the Trump administration declined a stopover in New York for Taiwanese President William Lai in July, in effect, he had to cancel his visits to Central and South America allies. Although the US NSS 2025 recognised the importance of Taiwan’s geostrategic location, its ‘One China’ policy remains undisturbed.

In sum, it is neither Taiwan seeking Japanese intervention nor was there any Chinese military escalation. There was no sign of American pressure that compelled Takaichi to make the statement either. The faction ridden domestic politics of Japan provides the answer. The prime ministership usually goes to the winner of the unending game of political musical chairs. In the last two decades, Japan had 11 prime ministers.

Sanae Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) historic defeat in the House of Councillor election in July 2025 and the loss of majority in both the houses of Diet triggered the dissolution of the long-standing coalition between LDP and Komeito. PM Shigeru Ishiba’s resignation ensued. In this flux, Takaichi grabbed the opportunity to form the government with the support of more conservative Nippon Ishin (Innovation Party). So, Takaichi had to make concessions to keep her new radical coalition partner in good cheer so as to secure her position.

For example, Takaichi’s refusal to retract her statement; maintaining ambiguity on the three nuclear principles; and agreeing with Innovation Party’s proposal to review the regulation on exporting offensive weapons were intended to consolidate politically and also to achieve her long-term strategic objective of overcoming ‘pacifism’. Further, the attempt to advance the plan to increase defence spending to 2 per cent of the GDP by two years, attest this. A ‘normal’ Japan brings back negative memories of its colonial past and militarism to many in the region. 

Now, her approval ratings are robust and the conservative voters are magnetised. But the moot point is whether Sanae Takaichi would forge her legacy as someone with a tunnel vision of militarising Japan or a stateswoman who has surmounted the rough and tumble of Japanese politics to ensure global peace and stability.

The author is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Taiwan Centre for Security Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei. He works on international relations, East Asia, and Indian foreign policy. 

Views expressed are personal