Strategic Vastu Shastra

There has been much breathless editorialising about‘security reforms’ having been put on the 'fast track' since the hurriedpassage of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act and the UnlawfulActivities (Prevention) Amendment Act (UAPA) by Parliament. Virtually nomeaningful debate or discussion preceded the passage of these Acts, particularlyregarding the mandate, provisions and resources of the proposed NIA, on the onehand, or the necessity or effectiveness of the clauses of the ‘tough law’amendments to the UAPA. 

There was, however, much partisan posturing and, despite the enthusiasm ofmany a long-in-tooth expert, it can safely be said that these twoinstrumentalities have now already exhausted much (if not all) of theirpotential utility -- neither can be expected to have any significant impact onIndia’s capacities to counter the relentless waves of terror that willinevitably come in the foreseeable future; the passage of these Bills has,however, served to deflect the attention of an uncomprehending public and anuncritical media from far more pressing CT imperatives. 

Within the political calculus -- if there are no early repeats of Mumbai26/11 -- this may just get the parties over the hump of the coming GeneralElections with no extraordinary pressure to do much more.

Nevertheless, the cheerleaders of the regime would have usbelieve that, with the establishment of the NIA, India will now have an agency"like the FBI". This would be laughable, were it not, at once, bothtragic and contemptible. 

What is not understood, when imitative remedies such as the NIA are proposed,is that every ‘solution’ occurs within a particular resource configuration.Simply saying that America has prevented attacks after 9/11, so we must do whatAmerica did, is plain stupid. America does not have Pakistan -- the epicentre ofglobal terrorism -- as its immediate neighbour. 

America has launched two major wars purportedly with the objective ofcontaining the ‘sources of terrorism’ abroad. And, with a GDP of USD 14.14trillion and a population of just over 300 million, its resources are, incomparison to India’s, with a GDP just pushing USD 1 trillion and a populationof 1.2 billion, virtually limitless. 

Specifically, the FBI’s annual budget stands at USD 7.1 billion -- to matchthis for India’s population, we would need to envisage an expenditure of atleast four times as much. The Centre’s outlay under ‘policing’ currentlyamounts to just USD 3 billion. While the total allocations for the NIA are stillto be defined (indeed, would hardly have been estimated, given the haste andincoherence that attended the drafting of the NIA Bill) reports suggest that the‘initial budget’ is to be a paltry Rs 20 million (about USD 423,000) as‘non-recurring expenditure’ and Rs 30 million (about USD 634,000) as‘recurring expenditure’ for the present financial year. 

There is also some talk of carrying our imitation further to create a Department(or Ministry) of Homeland Security in India as well. It would be useful toremind ourselves that this department’s declared Budget in the US amounts toUSD 44 billion (excluding the budgets of the various agencies and departments itcoordinates and controls). Its ‘secret’ budget is described by sources as‘without limit’. The US also spends USD 650 billion on defence alone, withina total expenditure bill of USD 2,730 billion. The total annual outlay of theunion government in India amounts to just USD 150 billion. 

Efforts to imitate American ‘solutions’ have already created a number ofutterly dysfunctional agencies at the centre over the past years, including theNational Security Council (with its ponderous ‘secretariat’ and advisoryboard), the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Department of Net Assessment andthe National Disaster Management Authority (imitating the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency). 

Most of these institutions remain under-manned and under-resourced across allparameters, and operate under ambiguous mandates, with little effective orstatutory authority, and every one of them has failed to secure the objectivesof its creation. 

The NIA’s mandate, according to the Bill passed by theLok Sabha on December 16, 2008, moreover, fails to correspond even remotely tothe FBI’s mandate. Within the scope of the latter, the FBI is statutorilyobligated to investigate every single incidence of a Federal Offence -- that is,every violation of Federal Law, or offence on Federal property. The NIA,however, is going to cherry pick "fit cases to be investigated by theAgency… having regard to the gravity of the offence and other relevantfactors." 

But this is entirely counter-productive since terrorism is a complex andongoing offence and the distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’incidents can be misleading. Major conspiracies often comprise a succession ofminor offences, eventually culminating in the final strike. On the other hand,if the NIA’s mandate was to be expanded (at some indeterminate point in thefuture) to cover every offence relating to its charter -- that is,"offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India,security of state, friendly relations with foreign states and offences underActs enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions andresolutions of the United Nations…" -- this would yield tens of thousandsof case every year, and require thousands of skilled investigators within theAgency. 

It is useful, in this context, to note that the Centre has failed to providethe requisite manpower and resources even for a comparatively tiny CentralBureau of Investigation to fulfil its relatively insignificant mandate. 

It is useful to pause here, for a moment. The CBI has suffered chronicmanpower shortages, which are particularly acute at the level of senior officersand investigators. At top levels, all three posts Special Director/AdditionalDirectors, for instance, are currently vacant. Two posts of Joint Director arevacant, out of a sanctioned strength of 18; the deficit at DIG level is 12 of 38posts; 22 of 100 posts in the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) are vacantor held in ‘additional charge’. Crucially, current vacancies at the level ofInvestigating Officers (IO), the cutting edge of the Agency, number 91, againstan unspecified total strength. 

The CBI’s manpower profile, moreover, is a complete muddle, with officersdrawn on deputation from entirely unrelated services -- the State Police Forces,the Central Paramilitary Forces, and other Police organisations. By the timethey begin to learn the ropes of investigation, the time for repatriation totheir parent departments, or, at senior levels, for retirement, looms at hand.

Against such a background, how can it even be imagined that the NIA would rise,fully formed, functional and efficient, from the womb of the earth? Given theCentre’s disastrous record of institution-building and the management ofexisting institutions, scepticism -- indeed, cynicism -- is not only reasonable,it is inescapable. The NIA can only cannibalize existing organisations --already suffering from acute skill and manpower shortages -- for a smallmanpower component in the foreseeable future. 

Even in the long run, there will be inflexible caps to its capacities forrecruitment of suitable personnel -- caps that now afflict virtually everyGovernment organisation at specialised and supervisory levels. In the relativelysmall pool of educated resources in the country (India has an abysmal 9 per centHigher Education Participation Rate, compared to 35 to over 60 per cent in mostWestern countries -- and 6 to 7 of this 9 per cent would be unemployable, giventhe quality of general education), a diminishing proportion is now willing tojoin the Government, despite a continuous dilution of standards in mostservices.

In its present form, consequently, the NIA is destined to irrelevance. A morecomprehensive mandate, however, is an impossibility within the prevailingresource configurations. Moreover, several provisions -- including thoserelating to the NIA’s authority to supersede State investigative agencies --may attract Constitutional impediments, and are certain to be challenged whenthe very first cases are taken up by the NIA. Further, it is not clear how an‘investigative agency’, whose role comes into play after a crime has beencommitted, is going to prevent future attacks. 

For a final reality check, it is useful to note thatPakistan has had a Federal Investigation Agency since 1975. In case no one hasnoticed, that has not put an end to terrorism in the land of the pure. 

What is argued here is not that the NIA can have no conceivable utilitywithin the architecture of counter-terrorist strategy, but that it can have noimmediate utility within the circumstances currently prevailing in India; thatthis cannot be a national priority; and that the NIA that India is currentlycapable of putting up (in terms of manpower, resources and skills) can have noplausible bearing on the trajectory of terrorism in India. 

Moving on, it is, indeed, astonishing that the very political formation thathas been vociferously arguing for over a decade that POTA was ineffectual incontaining terrorism -- their favourite phrase was, "POTA could not preventthe attack on Parliament" -- is now offering a ‘tough anti-terrorismlaw’ as a solution to terrorism. It is, of course, obvious that the oppositionto POTA was inspired by electoral calculations, and it is the case that thesecalculations may have changed dramatically after Mumbai 26/11. 

Regrettably, the half-truth of that original argument remains inescapable. Acounter-terrorism (CT) law is as ‘tough’ as its implementing mechanism.Within the degraded policing and security environment in India, and the equallydebilitated justice system, a ‘tough law’ will be of no more than marginalutility, if not entirely toothless, in fighting terrorism.

The disturbing reality is that, far from offering any ‘solution’ toterrorism, the NIA and ‘tough law’ Acts simply confirm that India, today, isa country utterly consumed by irrational belief systems and unexamined faiths.What we see here, is a triumph of form over content, a kind of strategic vastushastra -- a symbolic shifting about of doors and windows, a shuffling ofspaces, that has no realistic impact on the strength or utility of the edifice. 

The Government’s responses have, of course, not beenlimited to just these two initiatives -- although an overwhelming proportion oflaudatory comment has been devoted to these. Crucially, there have been a largenumber of declarations of intent and official ‘sanctions’ for capacityaugmentation in a number of critical organizations and agencies. It is useful tolist the principal among these:

• Home minister P. Chidambaram announced in Parliament on December 11 that National Security Guard (NSG) units would be established in four ‘regional hubs’, subsequently to be extended to a number of other such ‘hubs’. The decision is to be implemented ‘as expeditiously as possible’.
  
  
• The home minister also announced that ‘gaps’ in intelligence gathering had been ‘identified’ and steps were being taken to fill existing vacancies in intelligence organizations and to provide them with advanced technical equipment. Significantly, the previous home minister, Shivraj Patil, had, in the wake of the Delhi serial bombings of September 13, announced the sanction of 6,000 additional posts for the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and for the creation of a new ‘Research and Technology Wing’ in the Agency dedicated to the continuous monitoring and analysis of terrorist operations and to assess emerging CT technologies.
  
  
• India Reserve Battalions are being raised in a number of States, with financial assistance from the Centre. The Union Government has authorized two companies in each such battalion to be raised as "special commando units", with additional central assistance for their training and equipment.
  
  
• A decision has been taken to set up 20 counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism schools in different parts of the country for training commando units and State Police Forces. 
  
  
• MHA has advised all States to establish 24x7 control rooms, linked to offices of Superintendents of Police and District Collectors in the State, to collect and disseminate intelligence relating to terrorism and other forms of organized violence. 
  
  
• Defence minister A.K. Antony announced the decision, on December 20, to set up nine Coast Guard stations, in addition to the existing 13, for better coverage of the country’s 7,516 kilometre coastline. Acquisition of ‘cutting-edge equipment’ and interceptor boats on a ‘fast-track basis’ was also approved. The Coast Guard was also authorized to lease and hire ships from the global market for its surveillance and patrolling activities. 
  
  
• Some announcements have also been made by various state governments, including Maharashtra. Maharashtra has announced its intention to raise a special unit, Force One, "on the lines of the NSG commandos". To strengthen coastal security, the state government has authorized the acquisition of 36 speed boats, twelve of these "immediately". The state minister of home affairs also saw it fit to announce the intention of recruiting the incredible number of 25 personnel to ‘strengthen the intelligence network’.

It is not possible, here, to give a detailed critique of each of theseproposals. It can be said, however, that most of these are, at best, marginallyincremental, and, at worst, entirely misdirected. 

The decision to locate ‘elite’ NSG units in several strategic and urbancentres across India, for instance, -- what can accurately be described as the‘Rambo model’ of response -- is ill-conceived. The idea is that these smallcontingents of this ‘crack’ force would quickly be able to smash up anyterrorist group that may have the audacity to attack. Regrettably, it can beanticipated that the terrorists will not do us the courtesy of attacking wherewe are prepared for them; consequently, delays in actual deployment of the NSG-- while they may not be as interminable as was the case in the 26/11 attack atMumbai, will still remain significant. 

Worse the NSG’s present record at Mumbai does not support a very positiveassessment of its capabilities. Even if the delay in arrival at the incidentsites is discounted, the awkward reality is that, considering the sheerprotraction of the incident and the magnitude of damage just eight terroristsinflicted with small arms and grenades, their eventual neutralization can hardlybe considered an exemplary operational success.

It is useful to reiterate, here, that any terroristoperation can only be contained or neutralized, in terms of its potential, inthe first few minutes. Which means that the ‘first responders’ -- invariablythe local Police -- have to be equipped, trained and capable of, if notneutralising, then, at least, containing the terrorists. 

The reality is that, while ‘special forces’ such as the NSG (or, better,Quick Response Teams within the Police setup) may play a significant tacticalrole in counter-terrorism, the strategic success of India’s counter-terrorismresponses will depend overwhelmingly on the capacities, mandate andeffectiveness of its ‘general forces’. It is, however, in these that thegreatest and most intolerable deficits currently exist.

It is crucial, in this context, to note that, despite so much hysteria andposturing over the ‘terrorist threat’ over the past years, thepolice-population ratio in India actually fell marginally from 126 per 100,000in 2006 to 125 per 100,000 in 2007. As repeatedly emphasised in earlierarticles, most Western countries have ratios ranging between 225 per 100,000 toover 500 per 100,000. Western Police Forces, moreover, tend to confrontchallenges that are far less acute than those Indian police forces are facing,and are, in any event, infinitely better equipped, trained and resourced thantheir Indian counterparts, many of whom move around on foot, armed with nothingmore than a lathi (cane) or an 1895 vintage .303 rifle, and with little trainingin the use of the latter. 

While the various initiatives and sanctions announced can, at best, help inmarginally augmenting capacities, it also remains the case that theirimplementation is, itself, suspect, given the government’s past record.Specifically, one December 20 report in the Indian Express suggestedcomprehensive failures even in utilizing funds allocated for security upgrades.For instance, of Rs 7.15 billion allocated for the Police under ‘planexpenditure’ in the current financial year -- largely for acquisition ofweapons and equipment -- Police organisations under the MHA had spent a mere10.7 per cent. 

The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), the apex technicalintelligence body set up on the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee,had spent, till November this year, just Rs 1.95 billion of a total allocationof Rs 24.20 billion. The NTRO received Rs 18.5 billion in 2006-07, of which it‘surrendered’ (as unspent) Rs 14.14 billion on the grounds that it could not‘finalize’ purchase of required communications equipment. 

Sanctions and allocations, consequently, have little bearing on capacities andimplementation within the Indian system. As one Western commentator notes,"You don’t deserve any praise for doing what you're supposed to do. Butin India, bureaucrats who actually do their jobs are virtually heroes."

These are the core realities that need immediateattention. It is obvious that the centre has come under enormous politicalpressure to show ‘quick results’. However, the will to address the tasks ofcapacity building, which constitute the real responses to terrorism is stilllacking. A large part of the problem is that these tasks cannot be addressedwithin a timeframe that could have electoral relevance (the General Elections,we must remember, are just around the corner).