Those two cold weeks in 1971 when people darkened their windows with brown paper and Sellotape, dug bunkers in their backyards, turned out the lights when the sirens wailed, switched on their torches and tuned their radios to the news, have become but a distant memory. India won that war with Pakistan in which 3,630 soldiers were killed and another 9,856 wounded. But war between two nuclear neighbours in 2000 over the Kashmir issue has a much more sinister ring to it.
Increased militancy in the Kashmir valley, suicide squads, attacks on army posts-all have put Indian policy-makers on the defensive, provoking comments about "the inevitable war". So far, the responses have remained mostly in the form of verbal challenges, although there are increasing reports of retaliatory aggression by Indian soldiers as well. The idea, it would appear, is to engage the enemy in a contained area and timeframe-a limited war.
So what exactly is a limited war? "What is worrying me is that there are no definitions of a limited war. If you begin somewhere, you can lead it to a conventional war and escalate to a nuclear war," says P.R. Chari, director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. That a desperate Pakistan, with a smaller arsenal and on the verge of defeat in a conventional war, may be inclined to press the nuclear button and go for the jugular-New Delhi-is the worst-case scenario that most put out. While political hawks urge that the proxy war be taken across the LoC, they too stay clear of advocating any sort of conventional confrontation across the international border. "We should try and raise the cost for Pakistan by pressing the LoC Pakistanwards. This would be a protracted war which need not preclude talks but just puts pressure on Pakistan," says Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research. "But the way the nuclear weapons are tasked on the Pakistan side, it would not be advisable to try any sort of crossing from the approved international border or the nuclear wire will trip," he adds.
Some hardliners also suggest that India raise the stakes by increased shelling across the LoC, bombing forays by the air force on militant training camps in Pakistan and hot pursuit raids by the army, where fleeing militants are pursued across the LoC. There is even a feeling that a show of machismo on the battlefield will win back the pride that was lost on being caught by surprise at Kargil and the loss of face involved in Kandahar, when the Indian government was heavily criticised for negotiating with the hijackers of Indian Airlines IC flight 814.
The US administration may be unaware of it, but Clintons forthcoming visit has also encouraged a spate of violence along the LoC and in the Kashmir valley, reportedly initiated by Pakistan, which sees an opportunity to internationalise the situation. Reports from one army unit in Rajasthan suggest that ammunition is presently being massed by the Indian army, even along the international border, which is in a constant state of red alert as a direct consequence of the scheduled presidential visit. In other words, Clinton may play unwitting catalyst for the next war between India and Pakistan, while intending the opposite. "It is also a way of blackmailing Clinton to go to Pakistan and talk about Kashmir," explains a source in the external affairs ministry.
Others believe that "pressure" cannot be defined as the goal of an undeclared war and is not reason enough to pursue such a route. While even the Bangladesh war was fought with the specific objective of the liberation of the then East Pakistan, a protracted war across the LoC does not appear to have any such political objective (unless Vajpayee was really serious about PoK). But, steering clear of figures, analysts believe that economically as well as militarily India has a lot to lose by engaging in a war with Pakistan. The Indian army is stretched to breaking point in its continuous involvement in counter-insurgency movements in the Northeast. Moreover, especially post-Kargil, it is increasingly relying on highly sophisticated weaponry and firepower systems. "Since the Pakistanis would be defending their heartland in a war, they would attempt to destroy significant portions of Indias high-value military assets," comments an analyst. And, of course, a war-limited or otherwise-would see foreign investors leave in droves.
Diplomatically too, India stands to lose a great deal by warring with Pakistan. Whatever Jaswant Singhs 10 round of talks with Strobe Talbott accomplished would be as dust and whatever goodwill and kudos India earned in the international community for the restraint shown during Kargil and after would disappear as well. However, according to a senior diplomat, Indias reactions to the situation would be judged according to the level of provocation from Pakistan.
Its not just the hawks on both sides of the border that speak of confrontations. Theres also CIA director George J. Tenet. Tenet recently told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "the row between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is most likely to trigger war between the two countries". Tenet said that he feared "a wider and more dangerous conflict on the subcontinent", which would have an impact on Washingtons security interests.
India is under some pressure at the moment to exercise control in light of the five-day Clinton visit later this month. But things are liable to hot up the moment Air Force One is airborne en route India, officials say. "What is worrying me is that we are playing Pakistans game and the drift to the right in this country just fulfills the US image of a nuclear flashpoint," says Kanti Bajpai, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University. "The more restrained we are, the greater strategic stoicism we show, the better for us," he adds. Others want an endgame.
