Who created the real roadblocks on the path to peace in Kashmir? There may have been others, but the main culprit: the Hurriyat. The unhappiness with its inability to take advantage of the talks offer is palpable.
The Srinagar Times, for instance, in its August 6 editorial, "Blood and Money", used the phrase "His Masters Voice", a direct reference to the Hurriyat being anything but an independent political organisation. The relevant amplification was made available in the following sentence: "The young (Hizb) cadres were leading a tough life in inhospitable conditions whereas their exploiters were issuing statements from their drawing rooms."
That the Hurriyat was fumbling and chafing at the Hizbs political foray is established from the Hurriyats contradictory statements. In 10 days, it changed its tune thrice. First, they called the ceasefire "hasty", then they welcomed it, but after further thought termed it unwise. At the end of a reported two-hour meeting a day after the ceasefire was called off in Islamabad (not Srinagar), all they had to say was: "No comment."
Clearly, the last word from the Hurriyat on talks with the Indian government is yet to come in. Reliable government sources confirm that there is an ongoing debate on this issue. For one, a clear division has emerged in the Hurriyat - with Yasin Malik, Abdul Ghani Lone and Mirwaiz Umer Farooq on the one side, and Prof Abdul Ghani Bhat and Syed Ali Shah Geelani on the other. It is also considered surprising that a Shia leader like Maulvi Abbas Ansari could have cast his lot with pro-Pakistan elements.
Its hard to tell when this division could escalate into a split. Individually, it is learnt, each Hurriyat "leader" with the sole exception of Geelani privately tells the government that he is in favour of talks. Collectively, they have been unable to arrive at a suitable modality. There is anticipation, since the Hizb has lost some operational sheen, that Pakistan will try to re-establish the Hurriyats primacy in the Valley. Very soon, sources claim, the Hurriyat will express it readiness to talk.
Politically, in the Valley it is no longer considered a bad thing to be talking to the Centre. For instance, when Dar was asked at the ceasefire-offer press conference if the Hizb would allow the Hurriyat to enter into a dialogue with the Centre, he said that the Hizb did not want to take away the right to talk from anyone and that there would be support and not obstruction for any such move.
Further, theres incontrovertible proof now that the Kashmiri psyche is turning away from militancy. All this could become a catalyst for renewed efforts at peace-making.
Could others have prevented the current impasse? Could this have happened, for instance, if Washington had not pulled its punches with Islamabad? On the question of the American effort, Washingtons primary concern is sanctity of the Line of Control, although President Clinton unambiguously stressed the central element of his stated Kashmir policy. He told Peter Jennings (abc) in March: "I dont think we ought to get in the position of saying that we think an ethnically diverse country like India cant exist anymore. I dont agree with that." Clinton also declared, while opposing "third-party violence in Kashmir" that "what really matters in terms of an ultimate resolution is that the people of Kashmir (who live in that part of Kashmir that is India) feel that their legitimate interests are being addressed in some formal manner".
This was what New Delhi was doing. What, then, was its strategy? It is believed that after some sort of political consensus emerges in Kashmir, New Delhi would be better placed to present a mechanism for the inevitable bilateral talks with Pakistan. That is, if the "third-party violence" in Kashmir is demonstrably brought under control.
Could New Delhi have handled it better? Questions remain on that score. It is obvious in retrospect that the talks were fated to come undone once there was the decision to engage in high-profile public diplomacy. Was the government not aware that Dar does not have enough influence with Islamabad to prevent the inclusion of the "tripartite clause", especially as the Jehad Council had not been taken into confidence before the offer? Did New Delhis political haste to be seen as actively engaging Kashmiris - for the benefit of the millennium UN conference next month - sacrifice possible long-term gains?
Sources also indicate that there are other issues that await denouement. The first is Dar himself. How long will Pakistan allow him to remain in control?
