OR P.V. Narasimha Rao, the tightrope walk is getting trickier. As if the Congress' electoral debacle was not enough, the Delhi High Court on May 24 instructedOR P.V. Narasimha Rao, the tightrope walk is getting trickier. As if the Congress' electoral debacle was not enough, the Delhi High Court on May 24 instructedthe CBI to redraft an FIR with a sharper focus on Rao. The allegation: he survived a no-trust motion against his government in Parliament in July 1993 by bribing some Jharkhand members. The directive came a week after the court was convinced that the earlier FIR was quite a diluted version of the original complaint of the Rashtriya Mukti Morcha—a non-political outfit. Now there's little doubt that Rao's name will be entered this week as the main offender in the FIR. The next course: interrogation and, if necessary, chargesheeting.
In one of the agency's worst indictments, judges Y.K. Sabarwal and D.K. Jain came down heavily on the CBI and its chief Vijaya Rama Rao, saying that "unless the court's supervision is imposed, the CBI is sure to play all the tricks to bail out (Narasimha) Rao." Making the former prime minister more vulnerable to criticism is the fact thatover half-a-dozen ministers had resigned at his behest after the CBI chargesheeted them in the hawala case, and that they were subsequently denied party tickets.
But it's not so much the legal course, which is often time-consuming, that Rao loyalists are bothered about at this stage. Rather, it's the likely political fallout and, more crucially, the response within the party. Ironically, looming ignominy has also spurred the campaign to recapture power as a preemptive strategy, otherwise the prosecution may not spare Rao on either the Jharkhand bribery or the St Kitts signature forgery cases. Though party general secretary and Rao loyalist Devendra Dwivedi put up a brave front, saying "we welcome the court directive", there is visible demoralisation in the camp. After all, it has come after the Congress' moral credibility was eroded by the hawala scam and Rao's alleged role in the St Kitts forgery case. Rao can be no exception to the rule and, with similar legal provocations, what should logically be at stake now is his leadership.
That there is panic in the party was obvious when S.S. Ahluwalia, a perpetual loyalist, tried to solicit Ajit Singh's support. Singh turned down the request and said: "Let the party take a decision. The matter is pretty serious". Singh also wants wider consultation between the party leadership and MPs on a more frequent basis as the "CWC has become more or less defunct". If Rao trades in his 'privileges' for support from the likes of Singh, it would mean erosion in his centralised power, which is now under question from many quarters.
Singh is not the only one in a defiant mood. As the BJP Government seems reconciled to its defeat in Parliament, the Congress is divided into three clear groups. The first wants the party to stake claim to form the government by virtue of it being the largest party after the BJP or, alternately, join a coalition regime headed by Deve Gowda. The other wants the party to extend conditional support to a United Front government. The third favours unconditional support to the Front. Though in the first two camps the majority want Rao to continue as leader, the court order has come as a blighter. But Rao sees no harm in trying.
In a preemptive bid to silence his critics or demands for his resignation, Rao has announced organisational elections by the middle of 1997. The message: anyone who wants to play leader should wait for elections in the party, which is the democratic way to sort out such things. The latent hope is that with time the poll debacle would be a forgotten chapter and that he could continue as both party chief and its leader in Parliament. His success in stalling the May 22 CWC meeting, scheduled to consider the one-man-one-post issue, has raised hopes in the camp.
There are already enough indications that Rao's authority could be greatly compromised in the days to come. His detractors forced him to agreeing to P.A. Sangma as Speaker instead of Shivraj Patil, though the added pressure from the United Front in favour of the tribal leader did the trick. The counter-move came when Rao and Sharad Pawar held a session with about 60 loyalist MPs at Suresh Kalmadi's residence on May 23—where everybody swore by the duo's tactical line that the Congress should share power with the UF. Participants included Rao's son P.V. Rajeshwar Rao.
Almost coinciding with this, Rao asserted at the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting that "we are not going to support the Deve Gowda government meeting with our eyes closed". It also suited him to accept the pro-UF group's demand for a whip to party MPs to ensure that they vote against the BJP Government. In fact, the Rao-Pawar group also wants a floor coordination committee in which the Congress would have more members than others in proportion to its strength. In the extreme event of the Front not accepting this demand, the loyalists want support to be withdrawn, as Indira Gandhi had done a week after Charan Singh formed a government on Congress support.
His detractors see no escape route for Rao. Says party General Secretary Ahmed Patel: "We will discuss all issues that have weakened the party. We have only agreed to put if off till the BJP Government falls." Apart from legal hitches, Rao's survival hinges on his art of managing the contradictions within the party. The support to a UF government, and parallel assurances to state-level NF-LF haters like Mamata Banerjee and Santosh Mohan Deb have only heightened the state of confusion.
"Shall we blindly support a UF government? After all, what's so common between Ashok Mitra, an opponent of reforms, P. Chidambaram, an architect of the reforms, and Mulayam Singh Yadav who framed false cases against many Congressmen," asks Ajit Singh. It was only after such rumblings that Rao began meeting state leaders to find out what fallout support to a government headed by Deve Gowda, conditional or otherwise, would have.
The division at the Centre has percolated down to the states. Partyleaders in Andhra Pradesh are opposed to extending any kind of support to any front with the Telugu Desam as a constituent, Mamata wants no truck with a government supported by the Left Front since her political survival in Bengal hinges on antipathy to it. In Arunachal, Rao loyalist and CWC member Omem Deori was defeated in the Rajya Sabha election as Chief Minister Gegong Apang was sore over Rao imposing his choice. State units are now likely to behave in an increasingly autonomous fashion. "Rao should realise this and give a free hand to state units to decide their approach towards a UF government. Our approach in Bengal and Kerala has to be different from that in Madhya Pradesh and Himachal," points out a loyalist ex-minister. Rao has explained these compulsions to Deve Gowda during their meetings.
If the Congress move to grab power on its own or forge a coalition with the UF does not come through, Rao still has to keep Deve Gowda in good humour. After all, past experience has shown that the executive can play a role in diluting or delaying investigations. For now, Rao's comeback seems a remote possibility. Primarily, he has to survive these investigations while managing a rebellious flock. But he may be fighting a losing battle. What appears inevitable is more divisions in the party and a possible realignment once a UF government takes over.
