THE Bharatiya Janata Party's continued dithering over supporting the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh is symptomatic of a deeper malaise. It highlights the confusion and adhocism the party is experiencing both at the national and the state levels.
Giving up its claim to form the government, the party's Central Parliamentary Board withstood former Uttar Pradesh chief minister Kalyan Singh's rigid insistence that either the BJP—the single largest party in the state assembly—form the government or sit on the Opposition benches. (See box.) Kalyan finally relented to the dominant view of supporting the BSP.
The logic was: end the hung-assembly impasse. And if you cannot form the government, at least use the scenario for a lesser advantage—that is, end the "political isolation". And both the BJP and the BSP's antipathy towards Mulayam Singh Yadav, who is seen as ruling the state by proxy during Central rule, remains the crucial factor in bringing them together. Besides, the support to Mayawati would have a far greater political impact in the "secular camp", heralding as it would the collapse of the Congress-BSP alliance.
But the fact that both the Rashtriya-swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and the BJP took so long to convince Kalyan indicates, more than anything else, the central leadership's diminishing authority over the states. Perhaps the Gujarat episode had taught the central leadership a lesson: that "cadre discipline" by itself is no immunity to a possible revolt by powerful state or regional satraps, and that their views have to be taken into consideration while deciding party policy in the states.
After Shankersinh Vaghela created a din over his expulsion—calling it the BJP's antipathy towards backward castes—and succeeded in splitting the party in Gujarat to form the government, the BJP clearly wanted to make amends. And supporting a Dalit party in Uttar Pradesh gives them the perfect opportunity to offset its upper caste image. With this move, the party could make inroads into Dalit segments.
But Kalyan Singh stood in the way—stered by the fact that he was chief minister when the Babri Masjid was demolished, he probably hoped to draw support even from outside Uttar Pradesh in his anti-alliance politics. And while he played the backward card to the hilt, he was sternly told that "an individual is not above the organisation". "I have my reservations, but I will go by the party decision," a disappointed Kalyan told the party's Central Parliamentary Board meeting on December 24.
Though a senior BJP leader, who doesn't want to be named, said, "the RSS leaders do not have the frame of mind to work in a coalition—a major problem for the BJP in an era of coalition politics," the go-ahead for the support to the BSP came from the RSS leadership itself. And the dictate was equally stern: state BJP chief Kalraj Mishra warned of disciplinary action against any one who dared to oppose the move.
"We are exploring all options. Whether the government's formation has to be based on a common minimum programme or other considerations is something the parliamentary board will have to decide," former BJP chief Murli Manohar Joshi told Outlook. In informal talks, leaders say what delayed the tie-up was the BJP's insistence on a coalition arrangement with Mayawati as chief minister rather than extending support from the outside. In fact, Advani pleaded with the RSS leadership that the BJP should use its strength in the assembly to implement its programmes and policies.
In the meantime, Atal Behari Vajpayee held a couple of meetings with Kanshi Ram, who, according to sources, sought a guarantee that saffron fronts, like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal, would not rake up the Varanasi-Mathura and Ayodhya temple issues. Kanshi Ram, hounded by the memory of August 1995 when the saffron brigade raked up the "Mathura liberation issue", probably wanted to ensure a smooth governance for his protege.
Vajpayee, however, didn't have a reply for Kanshi Ram. The only redeeming factor is that since these outfits work under the Sangh Parivar's aegis, getting them around to shelving or deferring these issues would not be all that difficult.
But joining a BSP-led coalition—even after the four-month fiasco in 1995—is not going to end the BJP's woes. Just as BJP General Secretary K.N. Govindacharya and Joshi are observing an undeclared truce over the issue of "social engineering" (the RSS, Govindacharya and some BJP leaders favour social engineering; Joshi claims it has never been on the party's agenda), the Uttar Pradesh saga exposes other areas of conflict.
Apart from differences on specific issues, the party is also likely to witness a difficult transition of power from L.K. Advani to a younger leader some time next October-November when Advani completes his two-term tenure. The RSS is believed to be in favour of a generational change. But before the search begins, the Sangh Parivar and national BJP leaders—mainly Advani and Vajpayee—will have to meet to short-list the candidate.
THE RSS' puritanical approach notwithstanding, senior RSS leader Bhao Rao Deoras had injected nearly two dozen young leaders in the party both at the national and state levels in order to raise a second generation leadership. But they are yet to be assimilated in the higher echelons of the party leadership. The Deoras experiment did not take off beyond a point in a party where Vajpayee and Advani have alternated for 23 years for the top post except for the brief 1991-93 stint when Joshi took over. Even 60-year-old Joshi was found too immature to be considered for a second term.
Joshi and Kalyan, both opposed to Govindacharya's social engineering (they claim it is vague and do not know what it is all about) theory, are strong contenders for Advani's post. But Joshi insists he is not a candidate. "I am preoccupied with major responsibilities in Parliament and outside," he says. He is aware though that the decision of senior RSS and BJP leaders will prevail over the party. What goes against Joshi—despite his clarity of approach and consistency on economic and policy matters—are his leanings towards the pro-VHP lobby in the party.
On the other hand, Kalyan Singh's disadvantage is that he has overplayed the backward card. An issue which has distanced him from Advani whose support is crucial if he has to take over as party president. And in all probability, he has already lost his chances.
But there are indications that the party would also like to expand its pro-Dalit Uttar Pradesh experiment to the national level and in other states—clearly an attempt to be a more acceptable proposition at the hustings. The party is toying with the idea of making a Dalit the first-ever national president of the BJP. To this end, the name that tops the list is that of the low-key Bangaru Lakshman, former chairman of the party's Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe cell. If the BJP settles for this Andhra Pradesh leader, it will be the first time the party will have a southerner as head.
But more than the change of leadership, what the BJP needs to do is to look beyond Ram. Its Ayodhya stand or its latest pro-BSP tactical shift will only serve short-term interests—a myopic vision will not benefit the party in the long run.
