IF joining hands with the Congress was part of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) gameplan to use the former’s upper-caste support and upset the BJP applecart, then the strategy does not seem to be working too well. As D-Day neared, it became increasingly clear that ultimately the BJP would stand to gain—partly because of its consolidated mass base and well-planned electioneering and partly because of the divide among its rivals.
The BJP morale soared with each blow to the Congress in the run-up to the elections. First came the chargesheet against P.V. Narasimha Rao in the Lakhubai Pathak cheating case, which was followed by the issuance of non-bailable warrants against the former Congress boss in the St Kitts forgery case. The BJP not only cashed in on this but it also benefited from the fact that it has leaders with greater charisma and mass appeal than any of its rivals.
The BJP leadership is confident that these factors will prove too harsh for the BSP-Congress alliance. Says BJP’s star campaigner and former prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee: "We thought that the BSP-Congress alliance would be number two, but now the situation has changed and they will be number three." And within the BSP, there is a growing feeling that the Congress did not plunge into the action wholeheartedly, nor did it show enough political acumen in ticket distribution.
The BSP’s calculation was that, if the Congress fielded Brahmin candidates, it would have been difficult for the BJP to hold back its upper-caste votebank. But the Congress failed the BSP in that: it only fiel-ded 28 Brahmins. Says a disappointed BSP leader: "We were expecting at least 70 to 80 Brahmins from the Congress."
As a result, in many constituencies where the Congress did not put up Brahmin candidates, the traditionally upper-caste Congress voter was in a dilemma. The cases against Rao and the projection of the Congress as a party of corrupt leaders only sealed the party’s fate. The Brahmin voter was virtually left with no other option than to support the BJP—a party perceived to be supportive of the upper castes.
At the end of the day, according to observers, while the traditional BSP supporter may not have been averse to voting for the Congress, the upper castes were not too amenable to rooting for the BSP, which is a Dalit party.
Also, BSP leaders feel that Congress leaders hit the campaign trail in a casual and lacklustre manner. They are of the view that the new Congress president, Sitaram Kesri, should have addressed more meetings and covered more constituencies. However, despite all these odds, the BSP strength can’t be underestimated. The BSP’s poll percentage increased from 9.9 per cent in the 1989 parliamentary elections to 11 per cent in 1993 assembly election. And in the 1996 Lok Sabha election, it touched a phenomenal 20.6 per cent.
Points out journalist-turned-BSP leader Santosh Bharatiya: "What media and political pundits have failed to realise is the ever-increasing growth rate of the BSP. While the poll percentage of all other political parties is more or less stagnant, the BSP has made its mark." He claims that by judicious distribution of tickets, the BSP has eaten into a major section of Thakur votes too.
To get Muslim support, the BSP is pinning hopes on the fatwas issued by top Muslim religious leaders in its favour. Maulana Abdullah Bukhari of the Jama Masjid, Maulana Kaleem Ashraf of the Khankah sect of the Muslims and Maulana Tausif Raza Khan of the Barelwi sect have all issued appeals in favour of the BSP.
So far so good. But the Muslim voters in Uttar Pradesh are a confused lot. A majority of them still see Mulayam Singh Yadav as their undisputed leader, but the second round of polling showed a remarkable change in their attitude. There were no long queues in front of polling booths in Muslim-dominated areas of cities like Lucknow, Bareilly and Kanpur. This trend is a far cry from the turnout in 1993, when Muslims and Jatavs queued up before polling booths at 6 am and voted against the BJP with a vengeance—the memories of the Babri demolition were still fresh then.
Lack of enthusiasm among the Muslims is mainly because of the non-aggressive posture adopted by the BJP this time. With no yatras being organised by the VHP-RSS-BJP combine, and no war cries of ‘Jai Sri Ram’ renting the air, there is next to no anti-Muslim hysteria. Therefore, the Muslims are not as paranoid as they were after the Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992, which sparked off nationwide anti-Muslim riots.
In an obvious effort to woo Muslim votes and to pull the rug from under Mulayam Singh Yadav’s feet, the BSP put up a little over 50 Muslim candidates. In every constituency where the party put up a Muslim candidate, the equations for the Samajwadi Party have changed. At Masauli constituency in Barabanki district, the BSP candidate, Haji Farid Kidwai, has given sleepless nights to the Samajwadi Party’s Rakesh Verma, son of the Union telecommunications minister Beni Prasad Verma. Says Taqir Ahmed Kidwai, Masauli gram pradhan: "Muslims of this area will vote for the BSP."
Even in Bareilly, the Muslim turnout has been reportedly low. But Mulayam is also not complacent and is working to a plan. Reports coming from Bilsi, from where Mayawati is a strong contender, suggest that Mulayam’s workers actually asked their Muslim supporters to vote for the BJP candidate.
One of the major weak points of the United Front-Bharatiya Kisan Kamgar Party (BKKP) alliance is that apart from Mulayam, it has no other star campaigners. Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda is more of a stranger for the UP voter and does not have mass appeal. Thin attendance at some of his public meetings said it all. The Chaudharis, Ajit Singh and Mahindra Singh Tikait, have only a limited area of influence: their respective Jat feifdoms in western Uttar Pradesh.
It is not as if all is well in the BJP. Dissidence in its ranks has been some cause for worry. Hardwari Dubey, ex-minister in the Kalyan Singh cabinet and a powerful leader from Agra, has been the most vocal dissident leader. He was forced by the leadership to withdraw his nomination after he was denied a ticket. According to party dissidents, in at least 20 to 25 seats deserving candidates were denied tickets and the party will have to suffer in these seats. They cite examples of the last assembly election when candidates in at least 19 seats were denied tickets and as a result, the party lost all 19 seats. "I think some non-political elements have crept into the ticket committee who don’t understand the basic nature of politics and force their people on the party," said a dissident.
Whichever party wins, if political observers in Lucknow are to be believed, then never has Uttar Pradesh seen a more complex election. Devoid of any issues, the campaigns of the three major alliances—the BJP-Samata Party, the UF-BKKP and the Congress-Bahujan Samaj Party—lacked focus. Caught in a triangular contest, the various allies mainly chalked out strategies to encroach upon each other’s caste-driven base. Many professed ideologies were quickly jettisoned and the most unlikely of parties forged alliances of convenience.
