President Bill Clinton arrives to the subcontinent at the sunset of his administration with the hope of strengthening a new, post-Cold War relationship with India and changing the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan enmity. Amid all of the hype and hoopla of a presidential visit far too long in coming, one overriding concern shadows the trip: India and Pakistan are again on a collision course.
Unless a course correction occurs, the Kashmir dispute is likely to spark another war, perhaps within three years. At present, there are no deeply embedded escalation control mechanisms and reliable lines of communication to establish parameters for another war. There is no agreed protocol, for example, when nuclear-capable missiles are moved in deep crisis. Of course, neither country's leadership intends to cross the nuclear threshold but it is difficult to establish tolerance levels for escalation control when neighbours "speak" to each other with megaphones and guns.
Indian emissaries and strategic analysts who came to Washington seeking support for labelling Pakistan a rogue state argued that militancy had already reached intolerable limits. In the immediate wake of the hijacking of IC 814, it might well have seemed things couldn't get worse. Not so: at present, India and Pakistan are poised at the threshold of an abyss.
The time might well come when a US president reluctantly concludes that Pakistan is a state that can't be helped to mend its ways but this decision would be wrenching for the US and devastating for India as well as Pakistan. Nonetheless, Washington and Islamabad are rehearsing the same roles they played in enacting the Pressler amendment: US administrations threaten to cross a consequential line, only to back off. Pakistani governments can't bring themselves to believe the US would actually carry out threats because of Washington's reluctance. When Washington finally crosses the line, Pakistan feels stunned, resentful and jilted.
What the new military government in Islamabad may not realise is that its pleas to help save Pakistan from itself have been vastly weakened by Kargil and Gen Pervez Musharraf's takeover. The linkages between the military, isi and the militants were so highlighted at Kargil that subsequent pleadings of inability to significantly clamp down on militant operations in Kashmir are no longer credible.
It'll be hard for Musharraf and his lieutenants to internalise this message but their country's health depends on it. Pakistan's Kashmir policy is now killing and isolating Pakistan. A return to civilian rule in Pakistan without actions by the military government to end militancy would seal its fate. Musharraf's reform agenda gives no inkling of this: the pursuit of law and order is without reference to the militant groups that carry out government-supported operations.
Worries on the subcontinent's future have impelled Clinton to deliver this message directly to Pakistan's military leader. But in the absence of convincing prior actions by Musharraf to address US concerns, a presidential visit to Islamabad, however brief, would also underscore how reluctant Washington is to classify Pakistan as a state supporting international terrorism.
India can't help Pakistan realise this by rejecting dialogue. The Lahore process is barely breathing, but is it in India's interest to declare it dead? If Lahore is deemed a failure, what verdict might be given to India's Kashmir policy? The actions of Indian security forces have not quietened Kashmir. Instead, militant groups are carrying out increasingly audacious operations and government officials residing in lonely compounds and ruling from behind heavily-fortified gates have lost public confidence. No wonder the Indian military is tired of fighting Pakistani-supported militancy with one hand tied behind its back.
India's draft nuclear doctrine compounds concerns over escalation control by repeatedly endorsing "prompt" nuclear retaliatory capabilities. In operational terms, India's declared readiness to retaliate quickly nullifies New Delhi's pledge of no first use. Pakistan's airfields, nuclear and missile-related facilities are both finite in number and well known. Thus, by mimicking the Pentagon's unwise preferences for high alert rates, India's nuclear strategists encourage Pakistan to be similarly ready for the next war.
If India's draft nuclear doctrine's emphasis on prompt nuclear retaliation is not official policy, it might be wise to clarify this in the most authoritative way possible. While retaining flexibility and the element of surprise at the conventional level, it might also be wise to clarify privately what steps India would not take in the event of continued provocations in Kashmir.
The passage of time is not working in anyone's favour, except perhaps the militant groups. New Delhi might be surprised to know the extent to which Washington understands and appreciates New Delhi's dilemma about engaging Pakistan after Kargil. Nonetheless, it is hard to see from a distance how a policy of non-engagement helps matters.
What responsibility does India have for the dreadful mess in Kashmir and for increased nuclear dangers now evident on the subcontinent? What greater good justifies a policy of avoiding dialogue, especially on risk-reduction measures and escalation control? To reject contacts with Pakistan while nuclear programmes continue apace and missiles are readied for deployment invites terrible miscalculation.
(Michael Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington.)
