Flexibility is one word which has gained wide currency in Islamabad. Anyone who is someone mouths it frequently. ceo Gen Pervez Musharraf uses it with gay abandon; ditto his foreign minister Abdul Sattar. The problem, though, is that no one in the government has cared to define the word "flexibility". With Musharraf slated to meet Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, 'flexibility' has come to mean different things to different people involved in the Kashmir imbroglio.
For Islamabad, any talk of finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute invariably leads it to declare that it is for the Kashmiris to decide on their future. Obviously, few believe such sanctimonious rhetoric, reiterated ad nauseam. Analysts believe neither India nor Pakistan will easily relinquish the initiative to the Kashmiris; any substantive role for them consequently must follow an agreement between Musharraf and Vajpayee.
The complexity of the Kashmir problem was precisely the reason why Outlook in its last issue (June 11) endeavoured to prepare a framework for ushering in peace in Kashmir. Assuming that the framework for peace must satisfy the three parties that are involved in Kashmir—India, Kashmiris and Pakistan—Outlook's starting point was to freeze and convert the existing Line of Control into an international border between Pakistan and India, and then taking steps to establish closer ties between the two parts of Kashmir that currently straddle the LoC. The framework also tried to express the will of Kashmiris through a substantial degree of autonomy, and explicit circumscribing of the powers of New Delhi vis-a-vis Kashmir.
Though it is assumed that the proposed July meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee is unlikely to yield much, Mariana Baabar caught up with Sattar to seek his response to the proposal of freezing and converting the LoC into the international border as a possible solution to the contentious Kashmir issue.
For Islamabad, any talk of finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute invariably leads it to declare that it is for the Kashmiris to decide on their future. Obviously, few believe such sanctimonious rhetoric, reiterated ad nauseam. Analysts believe neither India nor Pakistan will easily relinquish the initiative to the Kashmiris; any substantive role for them consequently must follow an agreement between Musharraf and Vajpayee.
The complexity of the Kashmir problem was precisely the reason why Outlook in its last issue (June 11) endeavoured to prepare a framework for ushering in peace in Kashmir. Assuming that the framework for peace must satisfy the three parties that are involved in Kashmir—India, Kashmiris and Pakistan—Outlook's starting point was to freeze and convert the existing Line of Control into an international border between Pakistan and India, and then taking steps to establish closer ties between the two parts of Kashmir that currently straddle the LoC. The framework also tried to express the will of Kashmiris through a substantial degree of autonomy, and explicit circumscribing of the powers of New Delhi vis-a-vis Kashmir.
Though it is assumed that the proposed July meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee is unlikely to yield much, Mariana Baabar caught up with Sattar to seek his response to the proposal of freezing and converting the LoC into the international border as a possible solution to the contentious Kashmir issue.
The positions of both Islamabad and New Delhi on the Kashmir issue are well known. The CEO has on many occasions spoken about flexibility while approaching the problem. What would you say this 'flexibility' means?
Many solutions have been talked about in the past and many are doing the rounds now. One of these is freezing the LoC and accepting it as the border. Do you see this as a possible way out?
Does this mean Pakistan could accept the LoC as the permanent border?
So then, what do you think could be the proposed solution to Kashmir?
Considering that India insists on not accepting a plebiscite and is also opposed to conceding territory it holds in Kashmir, what does Pakistan do?
