Even as Asia ponders over the implications of America’s growing engagement in the region, New Delhi has been the first off the starting block to invite Washington to enjoy an extended military sojourn here. This is remarkable considering India’s historical aversion to the US and western military presence anywhere in the region, from the Persian Gulf to Diego Garcia to Trincomalee and beyond.
Jaswant’s remark to Hoagland, and India’s enthusiastic support to US presence in Central Asia, has led many to ask: is there cause for concern that New Delhi is getting too close to Washington, too fast? Or is it that India has few choices than to support the US and consequently hope to derive benefits from this new engagement? Says former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit, "Russia and China have not taken a strong exception to Pax Americana, though they are in a better position to resist it than us. Foreign policy is not an individual or collective ego trip. Wisdom lies in adjusting to realities."
Most foreign policy experts agree that the American presence in Central Asia is aimed at serving the following strategic interests:
- Safeguarding access to energy resources in Central Asia and secure land and sea trade routes between Central Asia and Southeast Asia;
- Control and prevent the rise of nuclear weapons states and regimes US does not consider friendly, like Iraq and Iran;
- Maintain equilibrium in the region between Russia, China, India.
Obviously, New Delhi’s Washington tilt didn’t happen overnight but began during Jaswant’s dalliance with the Clinton administration’s deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbot, post-Pokhran II. The advent of George W. Bush only bolstered New Delhi’s resolve to forge a special relationship with Washington, obvious in how it welcomed the US President’s National Missile Defence (NMD) initiative.
India’s haste in embracing the NMD, as also the fact that it marked a departure from its principled stand against weapons of mass destruction, has led many to think Jaswant is cast in the same mould as Andrei Kozyrev who, as Russian foreign minister between 1990-95, transformed beyond recognition Moscow’s relationship with Washington. Jaswant’s influence is obviously beyond doubt, yet it was none other than Prime Minister Vajpayee who joyfully pronounced New Delhi and Washington "natural allies". From believing it is a natural ally, it now seems New Delhi thinks it has become a trusted one. Evidence: Jaswant’s advice to Hoagland.
Many say India’s faith in the US, though touching, is naive, perhaps even delusional. The US presence in India’s backyard, no doubt, provides both opportunities and challenges to New Delhi. But to push for a dominant role for the US in the region is to also forget the boomerang phenomenon—the extended presence of the US could well hurt and haunt us in many ways (see table).
Says S.D. Muni of Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), "We have never welcomed great powers in our neighbourhood. We did not like the Soviets or Chinese in the region. Now the Americans are there physically. This would give rise to some sort of competition in areas where we think that we have an influence. We’ll thus see a shrinkage of the strategic space for India." For instance, US secretary of state Colin Powell recently visited Nepal to deepen US-Nepal relations. In the long run, experts say, this could lead to India and US competing for influence in Nepal, hitherto considered New Delhi’s backyard. What applies to Nepal holds true for others.
Former prime minister I.K. Gujral accepts the need to eject Cold War mindsets but adds a caveat: "It is critically important to preserve sovereignty and non-alignment in our relations with China, Russia and the US without becoming subservient to any of them." This isn’t going to be easy, and will certainly complicate New Delhi’s management of regional relationships. Points out Dixit, "We welcome America’s presence for certain reasons of our own but it wouldn’t be logical for us to endorse their anti-Iran policies."
Precisely why some find India’s silence on Bush’s State of the Union address deafening. Says Yechuri, "The government has not even made a demurral, a token protest. What does this show but creeping acquiescence?"
Such consequences are near home, too. Points out JNU’s Kanti Bajpai, "If the Americans are going to be poking around here, we will be watchful about what they do. We don’t want them to give our small neighbours the idea that they can now tweak India’s nose given the salience of American involvement." He also thinks that India’s rapid warm-up with Washington will quickly outstrip New Delhi’s cautious engagement with China. "But this gives us a little bargaining leverage with the Chinese because they won’t want us to become too close to the US," Bajpai argues.
However, this could also inadvertently suck India into Washington’s ‘Contain China’ policy. Since China has formidable economic and military muscle, it could in pique unleash its huge potential to create problems for New Delhi. Can India counter this?
Hitherto, India’s engagement with the US has been predominantly political. But that alone can’t deliver without the economy kicking into play sometime soon. Here too, Gujral points out, India ought to learn lessons from the East Asian economic meltdown. "We have our difficulties with the concept of globalisation that is being presented. The East Asian economic crisis happened because everyone blindly followed World Bank and IMF prescriptions. India has to have its own national interpretation of economic reforms." The moot point is: will this interpretation correspond to the US’?
Yechuri cites the example of Enron where US wants India to defray its investments and also uphold the sanctity of the contract entered between the Maharashtra government and Enron. Argues the CPI(M) leader, "If we don’t protect ourselves, the rest of our financial institutions will perish, that includes crores of middle-class savings. Now US ambassador Robert Blackwill is brazenly threatening India that it will have to adhere to the earlier commitments—even while bankruptcy proceedings are on against Enron in the US!"
What perturbs the political class is that Washington seems increasingly irked at the lack of economic content in the relationship. Says Francine R. Frankel, director, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia: "There is a great deal of frustration. There is a feeling that unless the economic relationship develops, other parts of the ties will not be robust enough to carry it." Pro-US policy critics consequently fear that New Delhi could provide unwarranted concessions to American big business.
All this apart, there’s consensus that if the Americans are here to stay in the region, then New Delhi should have Washington on its side, or at least neutralise Pakistani influence on the US. Argues Bajpai, "Americans have a stake in both India and Pakistan. Privately, we have to get them to commit to our basic preferences. But, on the whole, it will be a force for stability in the region. Extremist forces will really have to rethink options of operating out of this region." Counters Yechuri, "No terrorist organisation has rescinded from basic positions. The government should not be lulled into complacency thinking that the US will take care of all the problems. Because this would further hypothecate us to the US."
The US may become a stabilising factor in the region and help curb terrorism but even this has a flip side. Ashutosh Varshney, director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Michigan, points out an important constraint: "The US getting involved in Pakistan means certain kinds of compromises with Pakistan’s interests will have to be made. But America’s involvement also creates some opportunities for India. New Delhi should maximise the opportunity while taking note of the constraint."
Many Americans think Washington, willy-nilly, will court New Delhi over Islamabad. As Ted Galen Carpenter, of the Cato Institute, Washington, says, "There isn’t much to hold our interest in Pakistan. There are mainly negative incentives—we want a stable control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Also, we want it to neither become a failed state nor a haven for terrorists."
Agrees Stephen Cohen, senior fellow at Washington’s Brookings Institution, "I think the bet on India is a bet over the long run and is not a short-run advantage." And this, says Frankel, is because India offers many incentives. "I don’t think anyone expects Pakistan to be a major economic or military power. A major role that it could play would be as a moderate Islamic country that achieves some kind of economic development."
But New Delhi’s attitude to Islamabad could influence the contours of Indo-US relations. Says Michael Krepon, of the Stimson Center, Washington, "The larger issue is: are the US and India going to continue on a very, very positive trajectory? I can’t predict what bilateral relations will be two months from now. If India and Pakistan go to war, it will have a very significant negative impact."
Pakistan apart, cohabitation with the US could compel New Delhi to countenance diplomatically-compromising situations. Explains Muni, "We’ll have to make compromises where in our heart of hearts, we won’t like the move but wouldn’t oppose it. For instance, Norway’s entry into the Sri Lankan peace process edged us out."
P.R. Kumaraswami of JNU says this is a challenge "our diplomacy will now have to work overtime" to face, arguing that India’s support to the US need not evoke a negative response elsewhere. He says, "India’s ties with Israel haven’t undermined the basic Indo-Arab relations. In other words, you go along with the US but draw your red lines, then you will be taken seriously."
The biggest fear about India cosying up to the US is related to domestic politics. There is, obviously, the Kashmir issue. Though the US has desisted from expressing its views on Kashmir, its very presence in the region will allow it to play the role of both a balancer and sheriff, gradually building leverages with New Delhi that no Indian government has allowed to Washington so far. "There is going to be a lot more regular concerted American involvement in Kashmir," predicts Bajpai.
These leverages could be all-pervasive, given the emerging coalition nature of governments in India. Points out Yechuri: "The US has a track record of interfering in the internal politics of independent countries to ensure the establishment and continuance of pro-US governments. Take Nicaragua, Guatemala, Brazil, for instance. Even in India they are interested in ensuring that no government comes to the Centre with the Left’s support."
Osama bin Laden has enabled the US to address one of our problems—terrorism—but he has given Uncle Sam more than a toehold in the region, a fact laden with unknown consequences.
V. Sudarshan and A.K. Sen in Washington
