India is becoming John le Carre country. Lethal arms come tumbling out of the night sky in Purulia and massive hawala "scams" paralyse the political process. No wonder that Indian "sleuths" have their hands full.
From investigating the backgrounds of individuals nominated to "sensitive" posts to trying to forecast terrorist threats, officials in the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) say the ambit of their activities has widened considerably. Says P. Venkatesh, a senior IB officer: "Earlier RAW and IB were employed to investigate people with communist leanings. Now our mandate is almost everything under the sun."
Yet, the intensity of their labours is far removed from the stylish gadabouts of 007. Their painstaking data-gathering receives little encouragement from brother officers. Counter-intelligence operations against the ISI—the "thrust area" at the moment—are hampered by government controls because political bosses insist on only defensive action. Covers are often blown because names of intelligence officers are not included in diplomatic lists in overseas missions, thus leading to embarrassing speculation about their identities.
RAW today comprises 10,000 personnel with a budget of Rs 1,000 crore. The IB, with 15,000 people, has a budget of Rs 30 crore. But the information gathering network is still limited. A few years ago, there were only four "operatives" in the US with a mandate to send information from all of North America. Technology is still not as up-to-date as it should be and often the media is quicker with the news. Rules pertaining to secrecy are arcane. Faxes are banned and all mail must be sent by tortuous diplomatic post. Often sister intelligence agencies, such as army and civil intelligence, are in competition against each other, particularly on the border.
The crucial need to trust new entrants means that recruitment is often difficult, leading some officers to admit that RAW has become a "Relatives and Associates Wing". "Only men with a certain pedigree can be drafted in," says Sameer Ahuja, a former RAW agent. "The sons of former police offi-cers with a proven track record are most likely to get in. But the welfare side of our jobs is low, so very few apply." Intelligence agencies are governed by service conditions of the central services. Perks and facilities are thus often far lower than those for officers on deputation to the IB and RAW either from the IAS or the IPS.
In overseas missions, while intelligence officers have to operate from small, dank cabins, junior first secretaries are given luxurious rooms. Agents often double as visa officers in the embassy, leaving them with little time to get on with their 'real work'.
Most frustrating of all, intelligence advice is often ignored by high-flying colleagues eager to monopolise political approval. A report in an American newspaper recently stated that the CIA is diverting 60 per cent of its funds towards "economic intelligence" gathering. As India embarks on an open economy, intelligence to secure the smooth functioning of business is imperative. Yet IB and RAW remain trapped in more orthodox activities.
"Nevertheless," says K. Arun, a former RAW director, "RAW and IB are doing a great deal of good work. A number of successes that have taken place in recent times have been because of good intelligence. The accord with the Mizos, the ULFA accord, the unravelling of the recent Jain hawala scam, were all investigated by the intelligence agencies."
But younger officers in the IB complain that the Government's postures are far too defensive. Counter-intelligence work is the priority now in a no-holds-barred game with Pakistan. Yet intelligence methods continue to be old-fashioned. "We follow the classical methods: shadowing, following, surveillance, cultivation of the 'asset'," says P. Venkatesh. "Of course, technology is used, such as monitoring of VHF devices, radio telephonic talk (RTT) as well as scanning frequencies. But the situation is so tense at the moment that we classify operations in two categories: enemy and not-enemy."
In this situation more aggressive action is needed. "ULFA members are travelling the world on forged passports given to them by the Bangladeshis. Why don't we get a hitman and simply take them out? This wait-and-watch is getting us now -here," Venkatesh says.
As global terrorism spreads its tentacles in India, just unearthing the details of a conspiracy can take months. "It takes three minutes to tell a story of how a militant was sent back from London airport because of a forged passport. But it took us three months to find out when this guy would be travelling, who gave him his passport and which flight he had taken," says Ramesh Sharma of RAW. In investigating militancy in Punjab, it took years of deciphering the code in which the militants spoke, to figure out that "sabudana" meant explosive and "safed sabudana" meant RDX.
Agents must work quietly, never be accompanied by a personal security officer, and, most important of all, never be seen walking into any government office while on a "mission". Even in Delhi, they change their routes to work almost every day. They must avoid falling into a set pattern of life. All conversa-tions with foreigners must be reported. There are restrictions on their right to association and they can never unionise. Their "tradecraft"—modus operandi—must be zealously guarded. "It's a strenuous life," says Raj Sinha of the IB, "with no possibility of public appreciation."
Intelligence operations are still concentrated on cultivating the human "source", in the absence of state-of-the-art gadgetry. "We have fairly efficient listening posts in a number of neighbouring countries, most of the opposition MPs in the neighbouring countries are in touch with us. We have some high-level contacts," says Sinha.
"We always try to find who in the top echelons of a particular country is amenable to favours of some kind, in return for information," says an intelligence officer. Intelligence agencies function most efficiently in friendly countries, such as Nepal and Germany, and both the IB and RAW often operate with the active help of the host country.
In the cultivation of contacts, the IB uses "guests" to attract other "guests". Says Venkatesh: "Suppose we get someone from Pakistan, we do not inform the press about it straight away. Instead we keep him here and try and persuade him to bring others across." The biggest problem here is the operation of the media. "If the media finds out and plays up the fact that we have caught a Pakistani spy, then the game is over."
But the most difficult task of all is learning to keep the cover. Former RAW officer Shankar Sahu tells a story where an Indian agent had spent years in Pakistan and spoke Urdu and Punjabi to perfection. "But one day, instead of saying 'salaam aleikum' to a contact, by mistake he said, 'ram ram, bhaiya'. His cover was blown and he was 'eliminated'."
Sahu says that particularly in border areas, the competition between various intelligence agencies gives opportunities to tricksters. "On the border, several intelligence networks operate. The BSF has its own intelligence, so does the army, the air force and the police force in the region. So the small-time operatives who criss-cross the border to get information soon get wise to this. They get a single report, photocopy it and pass it on to all intelligence agencies. Rather like a freelance journalist. The fact that there are many copies of the report is then seen as corroborating evidence, the Government is informed, there is panic and sometimes even troop deployments are ordered. And all because there just isn't enough cooperation between sister intelligence agencies."
Cooperation with other wings of the civil service is a continuing obstacle to functioning. Sahu recalls that when he was posted to the US, diplomats' wives would make clear, and snobbish, statements that IB officers were not "one of us". "This naturally makes people suspicious. It destroys our credibility. Nor are our names ever included in diplomatic lists. So when we go abroad we are trained to operate as though the opposition knows who we are."
But it's a mistake, says Venkatesh, to regard RAW and IB officers as spies: "We are spy-runners, not spies. We run a network of spies. We run operatives. Like the sweeper in an enemy high commission, for example, now he is the real spy. For example, he brings in the waste paper basket for us to analyse and he runs the risk."
In any case, Indian intelligence officials are far too status conscious, according to Sinha: "It is not unknown for a KGB officer to get a job as a cook in the enemy's house or even the sweeper in the garden. But our chaps are too lofty to do such things."
The overwhelming and often limiting control of the Government, suspicion from other services, the lack of proper technology in the face of an increasingly assertive enemy are leading some officers to chafe at the bit. "Even the genesis of RAW lay in a personality clash between M.M.L. Hooja and R.N. Kao," Sahu says. "Both Hooja and Kao were close to Mrs Gandhi and both were tipped to become heads of the IB. So she simply created RAW not to offend her close associates."
As a result, even today RAW is divided into a number of lobbies centred on an individual. And there are others too—south Indian, air force, army and so on. At a time when the security of the state is under threat from both the East and the West, intelligence officers confront a complex and technologically advanced enemy with ageing methods and an indifferent political leadership.
(Some names have been changed.)
