But this was a planned manoeuvre with a difference, something that both the ghq and the Prime Minister's House wanted to keep under wraps for as long as they could. A rare military manoeuvre, where even all the corps commanders were not taken into confidence. It is only now that the army, after having ended up holding the baby, feels that it is time for some explanations, at least within its own ranks.
As prime minister Nawaz Sharif gets sucked into the day-to-day affairs of state, with the entire opposition joining hands asking for his resignation, he has little time to dwell on the aftermath of Kargil. For him, it is time to move on. However, no matter how hard he tries, it is essentially due to the manner in which he wrapped up the Kargil operation that the opposition is determined not to let him forget. It's the lowest common denominator keeping all the political parties outside the Pakistan Muslim League together.
For Musharraf, however, it is an entirely different situation. "What has not been welcomed is the withdrawal. 'Withdrawal' is a bad thing and not something that is liked either by the people or the army. We should not have been seen withdrawing," says former chief of army staff Gen Mirza Aslam Beg. But Beg had found himself in a position similar to Musharraf's current predicament, during the Gulf War. Then the whole nation, including the army, had stood with Saddam Hussein and against the Americans. It was only the political government of the day, led by Sharif, which was backing the Americans. This had led to disgruntlement within the army and Beg had addressed a large section of officers and soldiers. This speech later got leaked to the media, which clearly took a line different from what the government was propagating.
Could Musharraf and Sharif have had an easier task if they had disengaged from Kargil at a time of their own choosing? After all, both say that the objectives of the Kargil operations had been achieved, so why did they linger on? Some in the army say that the withdrawal should have been more systematic. "My understanding is that there is a certain degree of disillusionment as far as the military leadership is concerned. They knew the potential of the government and should have realised all the consequences. India is not going to fight a war of your choosing. Our army did very well but you have to understand that the Indians will not restrict themselves in the future. Now they will expand their activities and make life difficult for us," says retired Lt Gen Talat Masood. Other senior officers that Outlook spoke to agree that after the Kargil conflict, the myth of the Indian army had been exposed, Kargil was a cruel reminder that 'Kashmir' was an unfinished agenda and the Kashmiri mujahideen had got a boost. "It should have been a neat and clean surgical operation and yes, disengagement should have been at a time of our own choosing. Because after all, what else were the objectives?" asks a member in the armed forces.
However, there are other officers who feel that despite the international pressure, the government should not have caved in. "Another three months and come October, we would have had the Indians in a position where elections or no elections, they would have begged us for talks," says one source who was actively monitoring the Kargil conflict. When asked about reports that the chief has recently held meetings with his troops over Kargil, one source says that it is essential to know about the chief himself and the way he runs the army.
"Musharraf is a great believer in national consensus and strengthening nationalism even if it means the armed forces contributing in any manner to achieve this, provided it does not take them away from their professional responsibilities. Assisting wapda (water and power department) is one such example. He feels that the army can play a role in national reconstruction and does not hesitate to take on such assignments from the prime minister," remarks a defence source who knows Musharraf well. He says that many had misread this as a sign of weakness.
"After all," he says, "the chief of army staff feels that the nation contributes significantly to the upkeep of the armed forces so it is only proper that they in turn do something for greater national cohesion which at this time depends a lot on strengthening the economy. If wapda had been allowed to sink, it was in more than one way the collapse of the state," says Musharraf's man.
Suggestions had been put up to the army chief that he should in writing and through the proper channels tell the officers and soldiers about the Kargil operation, its aims and objectives and the reason for the withdrawal. "But the chief is not your normal coas. He refused this suggestion and said 'I will talk to the boys directly. Let them ask me any question they want to directly.'"
Musharraf had by now realised the strength of the Indian media in the face of the total collapse by the one at home. As an embarrassingly silent government and all its departments simply ignored Kargil or reacted in fits and starts-at times contradicting themselves-the Indians, once they had woken up to the reality, quickly got their act together.
Not only the civilians but even the soldiers and the officers were watching Zee TV where hour-by-hour the latest propaganda was unleashed," goes one explanation. "Our own electronic media appeared to be on long leave. Naturally, what the Indians were saying was affecting the army's morale. It is a healthy sign that the coas is democratic enough in his own institution and personally meeting with the officers for discussions. Unlike Zia-ul-Haq, who shut up anyone who asked questions, these sessions with the coas have helped answer many questions in the minds of the troops."
Naturally, the most frequently asked question by the officers at these discussions has been, "After all that we achieved militarily, why did we withdraw? Was a full-scale war in the offing? Why were we not called?"
It appears that the hard fact that the military is subservient to the government which makes decisions at the political level was something that Musharraf drew strength from. In a nutshell, the army was told that it carried out military objectives to strengthen political objectives. But if at any stage the continuation of these military strategies ran counter-productive, then disengagement was necessary. Reports were received by the intelligence agencies that India had started to train a battalion related to operations on these icy heights and also on the likely consequences if the enemy reoccupied these posts before the Pakistani army did. Also, a little-known fact was revealed that the Indian dgmo, Lt Gen Vij, had requested his Pakistani counterpart to conceal the fact that the Indian army had agreed to a ceasefire after Sharif's return from Washington.
"The chief also narrated the valour of our troops on the heights and operations they carried out which had never been seen before. It was not the Pakistani but the international media which wrote about the brilliant strategy and the fighting capabilities of our boys. There were loud slogans and cheers when he would leave the briefings," says one officer. But what has left even the army amazed and with little answers is the hurried manner in which Sharif left for Washington and his statement that he had avoided a nuclear holocaust. The army is not at ease with this statement in any manner.
"In no way with all their divisions occupied could the Indians have opened up a front on the international borders and sustained an all-out war. They had seen what had happened to their aircraft over Kargil after which they desisted from using airpower. They knew what it would mean to their troops in Siachen when supply lines would be cut off. The Indian army till today knows the strength of the enemy occupying strategic positions overlooking their national highway. In the last meeting between the military and political leadership in Pakistan, the army had given its assessment of the situation and what India could do in response. It was concluded that India was in a fix and at least militarily could do nothing. It was another matter that it had overshadowed us completely on the diplomatic front. The coas was so relaxed that he went over to Murree for a rest," confide defence sources.
In fact, when Sharif did an about turn and set off for Washington, Musharraf could barely make it in time to see him off and photographs showed that he had no time to change into his uniform. "Today it should be the government which should have generated a debate and found answers to the questions that the army is seeking. The coas should not be doing this job. You cannot give one-sided explanations. Though it is good for the coas to explain things, the dialogue remains incomplete," says Masood. And with it, perhaps the full picture as well.
