De-escalation during the time of a high-cost border war that refuses to die down? With the Vajpayee government's largely successful policy of military restraint in the face of some sustained Pakistani belligerenceóeven after the final date of withdrawal of its troops from Indian territory has long passedómilitary de-escalation along the LoC largely remains a far-fetched idea. The liberal view in both countries says that political leaderships should never let go of serious diplomacy with Islamabad desperately trying to push India towards the negotiating table.
New Delhi, on the other hand, is in no hurry to get to that table, given that any seeming compromise with Pakistan could be counter-productive in a general election just weeks away. India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh last week laid down the broad parameters of any discussions with Pakistan. But Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed responded by saying that the Indian ploy of holding talks were ' tactical.'
Analysts say a prime reason for de-escalation in Kargil is the prohibitive costs deploying additional troops will mean. So, can India afford such deployment? Some estimates put the cost of manning the Kargil border at about Rs 1,800 crore a year. That's a huge drain on the exchequer, even higher than Siachen. Some other experts say final costs have yet to be ascertained as the logistics of additional deployment in the Kargil sector are yet to be worked out.
But when it comes to national security, experts say money is not a consideration. Says Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: 'The way things stand after Kargil, you can't really trust Pakistan, as was being done earlier. We have no option but to man the heights, man the border and organise supplies. We have failed to understand their propensity for mischief. India is eight times Pakistan's size, but it is they who cross the LoC every time. Talk of de-escalation has to come from Pakistan, not us.'
But there could be other ways to cut costs. Says a retired general: 'One way is to raise battalions accustomed to living there, like the Ladakh Scouts or an itbp-like force, for whom survival is not as bothersome as some of the troops from the plains. Posting an army there would be sheer waste.'
Could there be other means to de-escalate? Says Amitabh Mattoo, from the Jawaharlal Nehru University's school of international studies: 'Eventually, the goal should be a demilitarised LoC. For that we need confidence-building measures, a minimalist political agreement between the two sides, a technology-driven frontier policy where sophisticated equipment and not troop deployment is used to detect infiltration.'
In such a situation, trust is the key word. Asks defence analyst K. Subrahmanyam: 'Where's the question of de-escalation when the Pakistani elite speaks in terms of jihad? When Pakistani rulers say they have no control over the mujahideen, can we seriously contemplate pulling back our troops from the border?' Warns former foreign secretary S.K. Singh: 'On one hand we have our defence minister saying that the war is over. On the other, the adversary is saying that there will be many more Kargils. I think that Pakistan has not got over '71. They are keen to take revenge. And even if we agree to de-escalation, what after that?'
Some analysts point to the internationalisation factor, that US interest in the situation would lead to partial de-escalation and talks on Kashmir, that the Pakistanis as well as Americans are keen that India is brought to the negotiating table. That position does not suit India and privately experts agree that it would take a lot for India to agree to third party mediation. So is the so-called US intervention just hype? Says Subrahmanyam: 'The Americans are very clear that the Kashmir issue is bilateral. There is no ambiguity there. People who talk of US pressure should read the text carefully.' Adds Singh, 'The US role is an invention of Natwar Singh.'
In a way, says foreign policy specialist Kanti Bajpai, Sharif has started the de-escalation process. He has visited Saudi Arabia to keep fundamentalists in his country in check, he has reached out to the US to keep world pressure on resumption of Indo-Pak dialogues going. Points out Bajpai: 'To Atal Behari's credit, he has not gone to town over Kargil, he has repeatedly stressed the Lahore process. We have not crossed the LoC and we have not crowed over the victory. There has been no deliberate attempt to paint Sharif into a corner and the overall restraint has shown India in good light.'
As for US intervention, Bajpai says the Americans 'do not have the same strategic interests in South Asia as they have in West Asia', so it is unlikely they would get seriously involved in Kashmir or even de-escalation in Kargil.
In Islamabad, as foreign minister Sartaj Aziz flies to European capitals to talk about ' talks', there is an understanding that India has more than one reason to act coy and take its own time before it resumes from where it had left off in Lahore. The message that war can be an expensive exercise has finally been conveyed to the architects of the Kargil operations and right now, all eyes are on Pakistan's finance minister Ishaq Dar, who is in Washington trying to get a ' promised tranche' of $280 millionódelayed till Augustóreleased from the imf. Aziz did not mince words when he said that 'the international community must realise that peace between Pakistan and India can no longer be delayed or held hostage to the whims of New Delhi. It is time to go in for a meaningful dialogue'.
Sharif, on the other hand, has met with Kashmiri mujahideen leaders post-Kargil, but will it be so easy to be seen ' face to face' with the ' enemy'? Already, cries of ' betrayal', first heard when he asked the mujahideen to withdraw, are growing louder by the day. Politically, Sharif has to tread carefully while he carries out a commitment to Washington to start parleys with India, while at the same time not appearing to be totally ' selling out' on Kashmir.
'Ending the conflict in Kargil is a sin,' proclaim Kashmiri mujahideen leaders. Former chief of army intelligence Gen Hameed Gul went to court claiming that withdrawal from Kargil was a case fit for charges of sedition. 'The government may force the mujahideen to come down from the Kargil hills, but it cannot force them to accept its new pacifist policy,' says a spokesman for the United Jehad Council, an umbrella organisation representing 15 Kashmiri groups. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.
