Spinoff Advantage

The China-US relationship plunged into the high seas when a Chinese military jet collided mid-air with an American surveillance plane. It was an ominous echo of the new Republican administration's characterisation of the Sino-American relationship as one of strategic competition rather than partnership. And, strangely, it might be India that will stand to profit from this estrangement.

As one diplomatic source put it: "The longer US-China tensions go on—and the spy plane thing is only one instance of it—the more win-win the situation is for us. We could leverage it to create a negotiating space on our nuclear posture." Indeed, India and the US have begun discussing China under the bilateral dialogue structure. In 1996, an independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations had observed: "The entire effort of the US to establish universal non-proliferation regimes that indefinitely perpetuate the inequality between the nuclear weapon states—including China—and non-nuclear weapon states—including India—is designed to relegate India to second-class status."

Says Anupam Srivastava, executive director of the 'India Initiative' and the South Asia Programme at the Centre for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia: "If India plays its cards right, it stands to gain a lot. The most important thing for the Government of India to do now is to demonstrate that in the emerging strategic template of Asia, India can be an important 'balancing factor' in maintaining peace and stability."

Testifying in March 1999 before the Senate, Richard Haass, now director of policy planning in the state department, declared that the US policy on South Asia "should be shaped by realism, not orthodoxy". And that, "Washington should seek to influence the size and composition of the Indian and Pakistani arsenals and their associated doctrines. India should be encouraged to seek a posture of sufficiency, not equality, vis-a-vis China; Pakistan should be urged to seek the same vis-a-vis India." Equally significantly, he had stated: "In addition to pressing China to cease any nuclear-related cooperation with Pakistan, the United States should urge China to take steps that reduce the threat it poses to India."

In its report last year, the government-appointed National Security Advisory Board had despaired over the state of Sino-Indian ties. But simultaneously, it had also recommended: "There is a marked ambivalence in the Sino-American relations foreshadowing future difficulties. For the foreseeable future, the US is the only effective counterweight to China in Asia.... In the long-term perspective, the US' interests in our region are not in conflict with India's interests and we should jointly explore areas of cooperation without in any way compromising our national security."

Though G.P. Deshpande of the Institute for Chinese Studies finds this "less than realistic", if the US does take the lead in countering China in Asia, India could well come in the line of diplomatic crossfire. Benjamin Gillman, who chairs the powerful International Relations Committee, had in April 2000 declared that because of all of Beijing's nuclear placements on the Tibetan plateau, "India's heartland and many of its major cities are now in the range of Chinese missiles. China's dangerous expansion in Tibet and meddling in South Asia has brought the region to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe."

It was this very imperative that drove Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to write to President Clinton in 1998, citing China as the principal reason for India's nuclearisation. The then defence minister George Fernandes was only echoing this official sentiment—which has since been suppressed—when he kept calling China as India's Potential Threat Number One.

During his Senate confirmation hearings this January, Colin Powell was asked what role the special coordinator for Tibetan issues would play in the Bush administration in the light of the failure of the previous administration to promote Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Powell had said: "I think we have to re-energise our discussions with the Chinese to let them know that this is another example of the kind of behaviour that will affect our entire relationship. And show our interest with the Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet." One step he could take would be to upgrade the post of special coordinator to special envoy. If that happens, things could get tricky for India's tightrope walk on Tibet, considering its diaspora in India.

Interestingly, Troy Systems—which provides a range of support activities, including analytical, to missile development-related spheres—produced a report last March for the benefit of American policymakers. Titled South of the Middle Kingdom: India's Place in China's Strategic Worldview and the Implications for American Foreign Policy, its central recommendation was to broaden and strengthen American ties with India: "Such a warming of Indian-American ties need not be dramatic at first. Rather, the United States need only signal Beijing and New Delhi that it intends to accord India a status commensurate to its growing geopolitical stature." Among the six policy recommendations it makes are to work towards increasing India's ties with other Asian powers, help India become an established nuclear power, facilitate permanent Indian ascension to the UN Security Council.

Things easier said than done. Says George Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones Foundation: "India often was treated as a pawn in the US-Soviet, or, as in the 1971 war, the US-China game. I find it somewhat bewildering and discouraging that people now posit wildly divergent scenarios whereby India offers itself to one contestant or another in the triadic competition between the US, China and Russia. I cannot imagine a successful marriage of convenience between the US and India premised on India's sharing US interests vis-a-vis China and Asian security. For example, Indians might expect Washington to look more leniently on India's nuclear and missile activities if the US and India are on the 'same side' against China. Yet, the scope of Russian assistance to India's nuclear and missile programmes will increasingly cause great concern in Washington and lead to tensions with New Delhi, regardless of what's happening with China."

Concludes C.V. Ranganathan, former Indian envoy to Beijing: "As far as India is concerned, what it needs to do is to have balanced relations with all the major powers without linking up one set of relations with the other."

Indeed, there's no given that Sino-US ties will dip in a manner that will benefit India. Declares Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, author of China, the World and India: "It would be wise for India to resist the temptation of thinking that 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend.' We must recognise that the US is a friend only in terms of its own interests."

Prof Manoranjan Mohanty, former director of the Institute of Chinese Studies, feels the spy plane incident illustrates the multipolarity that the Chinese have been talking about."They want to proceed in that direction, challenging US superiority in as many areas as possible." He points out that the Chinese have now come around to the view that Russia, China and India could have mutual trilateral consultations, an idea they had ignored when Russia first mooted it in the mid-Nineties.

Srivastava also notes that the Chinese side "fears that US-India ties might become part of a wider containment strategy". In his assessment, it was significant that "Jaswant Singh's entourage, when he visited US, included vice-admiral Madanjit Singh who had independent meetings at the Pentagon. The possible points of discussion and cooperation include joint peacekeeping and maritime security in the Indian Ocean."

It's an assessment that might have a foundation in what Robert Blackwill, the Bush Administration's nominee for ambassador to India, wrote in the book he co-edited. In America's Asian Alliances, Blackwill recommended that US, Japan, South Korea and Australia "harmonise their policies with respect to China". The intent? To contain China. And given Blackwill's proximity to Mr President, there's a likelihood of his theory being put in motion. Will India then be able to keep itself out? Things will become clearer should President Bush, as some Congressional sources claim, decide to drop in on New Delhi in November this year.