Prospecting A War

A fortnight before he left for New York, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee gave his first-ever interview to the Arab media. The timing was apt: President George Bush was all set to divulge US plans on Iraq. Here was the chance to reiterate India's commitment to oppose arbitrary exercise of force to oust sovereign governments. Here then was the chance to assure the Arab world, which accounts for two-thirds of India's crude imports, that India wanted the US to respect international law.

Vajpayee did get his chance, at the fag end of the interview. Asked what he thought of Bush's "axis of evil definition" and whether India would support US military action to usher regime change in Baghdad, Vajpayee's response was timid: "India is vitally interested in the peace and prosperity of the Gulf region and has, therefore, supported all efforts to defuse the crisis relating to Iraq. In that respect, India supports the resumption of diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the United Nations." Some diplomats feel there couldn't have been a better study in pusillanimity.

This interview is proof of yet another fact: the prime minister isn't in a hurry to hug Iraqi President Saddam Hussein the way I.K. Gujral did, back when Kuwait was invaded. And yet, Gujral's embrace, maintain officials, was not a kodak moment in political pornography. Recalls K.P. Fabian, who was joint secretary, Gulf, during the Kuwait crisis: "Our basic motivation was over 180,000 of our people in Kuwait and Iraq. There were between 10,000-12,000 in Iraq. Our principal purpose was to meet with our people in Kuwait and Iraq and to make arrangements for their coming back; there were MPs from Kerala staging dharnas in front of Parliament. To say that Gujral went all the way to Baghdad to embrace Saddam is silly. He couldn't have pushed Saddam away."

Vajpayee certainly doesn't face such compulsions. The Indian community in Iraq has since dwindled (the prime minister put the number at 50 in December 1998), small enough for easy evacuation. But look beyond Iraq to other countries in the Gulf, and you find 3.8 million Indians remitting $6 billion annually.

This complicates the future big picture immensely: US attacks Iraq, this causes the political tectonic plates in the region to move uncontrollably. This would produce prolonged instability leading to economic downturn and political upheaval. If this were to happen, remarks Fabian, the evacuation from Kuwait (which took two months) "would look like a school excursion".

Explains an Indian diplomat: "Iraq is an artificial creation but it is very unique. Its contours abut and separate a large number of ancient and traditional foes—Iran and Turkey, and Arab, Kurdish and Jewish peoples. A strong ruler in Baghdad is able to keep the other forces at bay. Otherwise, you'll certainly see Iran, Turkey and the Kurds seeking nations, enclaves, entities for themselves. This will destabilise the region and impinge on our interests."

This diplomat cites another reason why India should oppose Washington's Iraq campaign. "It's Iraq today, it could be you tomorrow. After all, here are two declared wmd (weapons of mass destruction) nations in a state of sustained confrontation. Americans have just begun. Why should American reordering end at the Iraqi border?"

It's also impossible to prepare a perfect script for a war. Says P.R. Kumaraswamy of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, "When a war is initiated you may know where it starts. But you never know where it will end. We have to understand that the American interest is to establish a pro-US regime in Baghdad. Modernisation of Iraq is not on the agenda. Simply put, it's control of oil and reduction of political dependency on the Saudis." In other words, India doesn't matter in this scenario and those who think New Delhi stands to gain from Iraqi invasion had better think again.

M.H. Ansari, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, points to the Pentagon buzz: "Iraq is the tactical pivot, Saudi the strategic pivot, Egypt the prize." This means the US wants to reorder the region to its liking. Is this desirable for New Delhi? Continues Ansari: "India should be happy with the status quo where there's no strategic hostility to New Delhi in the Arab world and there's $10 billion trade with the Gulf countries."

Fabian thinks pro-Washington regimes in Baghdad and elsewhere could throw Arab streets into ferment. "What's likely to happen," he says, "is chaos, and pro-US regimes coming under mounting pressure from Arab streets, and the region witnessing instability for years to come. This isn't good for India because overwhelming quantities of our crude imports come from the region. Prolonged instability will have harmful consequences." Adds jnu's Prof A.K. Pasha: "The churning will unleash many fundamentalist forces that could have an indirect impact on Indian Muslims and provide impetus to Kashmiri jehadis."

Ultimately, the debate over what should be India's reactions is one between principles and realpolitik. Says a diplomat: "It's a matter of principle. If the US doesn't like Iraq, it could leave the country alone, as it has done in Cuba, North Korea and Iran. If we believe in world order, security, stability, we should leave it to individual nations to decide on how they want to deal with those nations to which the US is allergic."

That's easier said than done. When Chandra Shekhar was prime minister, he swiftly allowed refuelling of US planes involved in the allied war against Saddam. Recalls Fabian: "We had taken a position that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was illegal and should be vacated. Simultaneously, we did not join the US-led coalition as we were engaged in finding a non-military resolution. The US resented this. Its friends outside and inside India told us that we were getting isolated. Since our principled position conveyed the impression of a pro-Iraq tilt, the decision was taken at the highest level—under pressure—to agree to the US request for refuelling facilities."

This instance of realpolitik has now become an even more powerful factor in government decision-making circles. The argument is: India's bilateral ties with Iraq (see chart) will not take off until you visualise a post-Saddam scenario. Bush Jr is intent on getting him out of the scene. Since this is inevitable, and since what India thinks isn't a factor, why be cussed about it? If India is with Bush, then we get to share the spoils (reconstruction projects) in post-Saddam Iraq a la Afghanistan.

Some of these assumptions could be erroneous. For one, the bilateral promises the Bush administration had made to India have remained just that. A war against Iraq could distract Washington further from the unfulfilled bilateral agenda. Second, India's influence in Afghanistan, and its border with Pakistan, enabled New Delhi to play a role in the war against terror. In case of Iraq, there are no such factors for Washington to respect New Delhi's susceptibilities.

If realpolitik does hold the key to the Indian response, New Delhi could insist, as well as it can, that Washington's road to Baghdad must lie through Islamabad. Washington can't hope to open another front in its war against terror as long as India doesn't guarantee restraint against Pakistan. This is a leverage worth considering.