Frost-Bite: Chinese Cures

At the end of his banquet speech at Delhi's Hyderabad House, just before he raised a toast, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji declared: "Currently, the international situation is undergoing complex and profound changes. As two largest developing countries in the world, China and India have on their shoulders important responsibilities for maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in Asia. We would like to strengthen our cooperation in international affairs and work together to promote the establishment of a just, equitable new political and economic order. I'm convinced that Sino-Indian relations will have a brighter future."

By any standard, such a comment, that apportions virtually an equal role to both India and China, is extraordinary. In recent years, the Chinese have never openly acknowledged that India has a role beyond south Asia. But ever since the two countries began discussing global security issues in 2000, China has grudgingly begun to revise its opinion. The Chinese have lost their older certainties and are reacting to the new environment they find themselves in.

China's paramount foreign policy priority is to manage its relationship with the US. This has proved tougher ever since the Republican administration took office last year. With the new dispensation in Washington searching for new Asian alliances, and in the process making friendly overtures to New Delhi, India's salience has grown.

Asked about this, Chinese spokesperson Zhang Qiyue was diplomatic: "India improving relations with the US is a bilateral matter and we're happy to see India improving relations with other countries." She refused to comment on China's concern about the growing presence of the US in its backyard.

Diplomats say the framework of interaction in place vis-a-vis China is "pretty intense, broad and actually drives itself". There is no single issue that can be seen as holding hostage the relationship, which has, over the years, diversified beyond diplomatic recognition. During Zhu's visit, that framework got an additional element in keeping with the dominant concern of the time: a "mechanism" to discuss terrorism. This was at the suggestion of the Chinese. The respective foreign ministries are now working on activating this mechanism.

Much significance has been ascribed to the fact that Premier Zhu told A.B. Vajpayee that "there is no reason why the two countries shouldn't expand on friendly ties and cooperation". The Chinese premier added for good measure: "There is no problem that is unsolvable bilaterally."

Indeed, one of the biggest outstanding issues, at the heart of the differences between India and China, is the unresolved border. But even on that, Prime Minister Vajpayee, in his opening banquet remarks, reported progress. Describing Zhu as the "prime minister of a friendly neighbouring country" (a phrase deliberately chosen to remove any distrust the Chinese might be harbouring over Vajpayee's 1998 letter to Bill Clinton describing them as a "bitter neighbour" and a security threat), Vajpayee said the "interaction between our two countries will be further strengthened and we'll move ahead in different sectors in a defined and time-bound manner". He then went on to add: "The good progress on clarification and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control signals this intention."

It'S obvious that both governments have arrived at some kind of a common roadmap with specific time-frames in which to achieve all-round bilateral progress. Diplomatic sources confirm that the process of resolving the border question has been intensified and now the process of clarification and confirmation of the LAC was poised to move from the Middle Sector (Uttaranchal) to the Western Sector. The Chinese spokesperson said this would be done through mutual accommodation.

Stability in Sino-Indian relations can be discerned in the fact that though there is no formal boundary with China in many areas, the Indian government hasn't hesitated in concentrating an overwhelming number of troops on the western border with Pakistan.

There do exist legitimate concerns about the quality of China's comprehensive relationship with Pakistan. But sources say, unlike as in the past, the Chinese no longer deny their supply of arms to Pakistan, though they insist that such transfers aren't directed against any third country. This explanation doesn't allay New Delhi's fears.

But even China's relationship with Pakistan may be changing. For instance, although Islamabad has repeatedly tried to insinuate, during the troop build-up on the border, that the Chinese would stand by Pakistan in all contingencies, the Chinese have steadfastly refused to endorse such a view, hinting to Pakistan that it ought to augment the international efforts on terrorism.