Doublespeak In Dubyaland

When Gen Pervez Musharraf suddenly declared himself president in June 2001, US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher had publicly bristled at the Pakistani leader's audacity. Claiming that the move had "cast Pakistan as a country ruled by decree rather than by democratic process", Boucher was furious: "Pakistan...should understand that US sanctions...cannot be lifted until the President determines that a democratically-elected government has taken office."

But the September 11 attacks quickly turned the clock back to the Cold War era. It was back to witnessing the State Department's fatal attraction for Islamabad, it was back to giving primacy to US interests at the expense of upholding democracy. Not only did US President George W. Bush waive sanctions Boucher had said wouldn't be lifted, Washington has even chosen to remain silent at Musharraf's ongoing attempts to arrogate power to himself through a clutch of constitutional amendments. Asked what the State Department thought of it, Boucher's office gave a terse reply, "We have not commented on the specific constitutional changes proposed by President Musharraf."

Washington's hypocrisy, no doubt, irks many South Asia analysts. Sumit Ganguly of the University of Texas, Austin, says there is a "certain kind of wilful moral blindness on the part of the American political class when it comes to coddling dictators". So deep is America's fear of chaos that a ruthless dictator who serves US interests is considered preferable over the danger of fanning anti-Americanism. "This is a real tragedy. In the end, we become our own worst enemies," he says.

The reason for Washington's duplicity is that it "desperately needs" Pakistan for its immediate interest, says Sunil Khilnani, director of South Asia Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington. "Whenever the US has been in such a position," he argues, "it has been quick to turn a Nelson's eye to how the internal business of a country is run. The overwhelming line of thought within the Bush administration, and in some Washington think-tanks, is: 'Musharraf now, democracy later...maybe.'"

Conscious of the Bush administration's hypocrisy, US Congressman Frank Pallone Jr recently introduced a legislation seeking to reinstate "democracy sanctions" on Pakistan. Pallone explained his move to colleagues on Capitol Hill, "The underlying strategy behind his (Musharraf's) guise of 'transitioning to democracy' is in fact to restructure the Pakistani government to protect his dictatorship."

But Pallone's legislation isn't expected to garner much support in a Republican-dominated House. Says Marshall Bouton, president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "I think most members of Congress will see this piece of legislation as premature. They realise the need to give Musharraf more space for the upcoming elections he has committed himself to. Reimposing sanctions would be perceived unhelpful."

Congressman Gary L. Ackerman, a former co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, has also introduced a bill in the House which aims to add two conditions to Senator Joseph Biden's bill. The Biden bill had empowered Bush to lift sanctions on Pakistan if he could determine that Islamabad was moving towards democracy and cooperating in the US-led war on terrorism. Ackerman's conditions now want Pakistan to put a permanent end to infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir, and conduct national assembly elections as a first step towards restoring democracy. His bill is more realistic, given the post-September 11 mood in the country.

But Dana Robert Dillon, of the influential, conservative Washington think-tank Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Centre, says the Bush administration's priority is not a democratic Pakistan but a Pakistan which is a solid ally in the war on terrorism. "We want a democratic Pakistan, but right now Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terrorism is more important than the return of democracy," says Dillon. Agrees Bouton, "Yes, democracy in Pakistan is a priority in the longer term...but we need to see what can be accomplished in the near term."

Aware of his trump card—Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terrorism—Musharraf has been brazenly exploiting Washington's susceptibilities. Arguing that the price for Pakistan's support "must not include our abandonment of democratic principles", Ackerman told the House International Relations Committee's subcommittee on West and South Asia that the US must insist on Pakistan returning to a democratic form of government without delay. He said, "The sham referendum extending his term, the proposed constitutional changes which would expand his power beyond even General Zia's wildest dreams, and the concern that the national assembly elections in October will not be free and fair, all point to President/General Musharraf's determination to hold onto power and create the veneer of democracy." He then commented disapprovingly, "The response from the US has been, at best, a mild rebuke and at worst, the turning of a blind eye."

Others, though, say it is Washington which is leveraging the situation in Pakistan to its advantage. Says Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute in Washington, "It's simply a case that we know him and feel we can have confidence in his commitments." Predicting that the Bush administration won't allow democracy to impede cooperation with Musharraf, Carpenter adds a caveat, "The US needs to realise its relationship with Pakistan is a political and diplomatic equivalent of a one-night stand."

Selig Harrison, of Washington's Center for International Policy, says though the US can't ensure democracy's return to Pakistan, "we must at least speak about it". Washington can't publicly threaten to slap sanctions because it would, he says, provide a volatile issue for the hardliners. Harrison, instead, suggests, "We can use diplomatic pressure. Leverage should be used privately."

But Dillon argues that Washington's leverage outside the US has always been exaggerated. "Musharraf's principal motivating factor is his country's national interest. And while specific influence is going to be tough to come by, it doesn't mean we can bully him around," he says. Counters Ganguly, "It's a popular Washington myth that we do not have any leverage with Pakistan."

Forget sanctions, senior State Department officials in fact say the Bush administration is moving towards providing over $2 million in election assistance to Pakistan. But Khilnani is sceptical about the fairness of the proposed October election. "There's no real pressure on Musharraf to conduct this election in a manner more transparent than the recent referendum, and it seems this election will be another charade," he says. And to think the Bush administration will fund this democratic charade. This is precisely why Mike Jendrzejczyk, Human Rights Watch's Washington director for Asia, says, "I think the administration has to be much firmer with Musharraf and tell him his plans for elections fall way short."

Harrison candidly admits the US will not push Musharraf on democracy. "We didn't even make a noise over the flawed referendum," he points out. He fears the October election in Pakistan could be postponed as Musharraf hasn't been able to cobble up a "king's party". And were this to happen, it won't surprise anyone to find Washington silent. "The tragedy of American diplomacy in South Asia is that short-term interests have always prevailed," says Ganguly.

Ultimately, it's all about the great American hypocrisy, inviting derision worldwide at its selective insistence on the need to adhere to democratic principles. Washington wants elections in Palestine; it doesn't, though, want its people to elect Yasser Arafat as their leader. It wants a free, fair and participative election in Kashmir—and yet is willing to condone Musharraf's distaste for democracy. After such knowledge, what lament.