Game Theories

Through much of modern history, Afghanistan has been the focus of Big Power rivalry—the site of the Great Game between the imperial British Raj and Czarist Russia in its western arc; site also of two infamous Brtish (mis)adventures in the 19th century. Like the several unfortunates after them, the British thought it better to tiptoe out of it after arranging a modicum of stability.

As if in an echo of the Great Game, Afghanistan again became an adversarial theatre for the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. The Red Army invaded the nation at the request of the besieged President Najibullah in 1979 to fight the Mujahideen—armed and funded by the US, with help from Pakistan—who were determined to overthrow the Communist infidels. A decade later, a humiliated Russian army was forced to withdraw, with nothing to show for its efforts. Steadfastly, Afghanistan lived up to its reputation of being a graveyard of foreign armies. Things have now come full circle, with US and NATO troops ready to move out by September 11, exactly 20 years after the 9/11 attack, which was planned by Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan, prompting the US war on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. It has been America’s longest war.

Is a new Great Game in the offing? The agreement signed between the US and Taliban in February 2020, has a clause where the Taliban promises not to allow its soil to be used by any terror group against the US. Having got that assurance, President Trump was ready to quit Afghanistan by May 1. The Biden administration has pushed the date to September.

Crucially, between now and September, the Taliban and the Ashraf Ghani government need to wrap up a political settlement. Much will depend on how the various Afghan groups handle the transition. The Taliban had long stated that peace is possible only after the last foreign soldier leaves Afghanistan. Now that this is soon to be reality, will it keep its word, or will it start a conflagration and seize control? Tremblingly, Afghans watch and wait.

“Intra-Afghan talks are the only hope for Afghan citizens. We are hoping for a political solution to be worked out between the government and the Taliban. There is concern that ISIS fighters are growing in strength,” says Z. Khalil Raman Auzarmi, an assistant professor at Kabul University.

Afghanistan’s national security advisor Hamdullah Mohib said recently at the Raisina dialogue that Taliban att­acks on government forces and civilians that have continued despite the peace moves has to stop. “There will be no US troops on the ground, so there is no need for the Taliban to keep fighting,” he said. Like others, he wants a ceasefire to be announced. That seems unlikely, as the Taliban wants to control maximum possible territory bef­ore a ceasefire comes into force.

The Taliban, which has declared itself the ‘winner’ soon after the US ann­ouncement of withdrawal was ann­ounced, has been striving to stamp its authority on the peace process. It has also iterated a preference for strict Sharia laws that are practised in swathes of territory controlled by it. All this harks back to a time of persecution of women and harsh cruelties. Used to certain basic freedoms granted by dem­ocracy, the new generation of Afghans will not take the dictates of mullahs kindly. The Afghan government led by Ashraf Ghani may have differences with chief peace negotiator Abdullah-Abdullah, but both are resolved to ens­ure that the hard-fought gains of democracy are not relinquished easily.  

Already, there is talk of the Taliban refusing to attend the intra-Afghan talks in Turkey later this month—a show of disapproval for America not keeping to its May deadline for troop withdrawal. The worry is that the Taliban is out to grab the largest piece of the political cake during the transition, pushing the Ashraf Ghani government, which it has called ‘foreign stooges’, into a tight corner.

There is a sharp divide between what Ghani wants and what the Taliban asp­ires. The plan is for an interim government to take over till a new Constitution brought in and elections held. Ghani’s counter suggestion is that he is ready to step down and call for fresh elections. His insists on people voting for the transition government, on not handing over anything on a plate to the Taliban. Democratic values and women’s rights, he says, are sacrosanct. The Taliban, naturally, considers all this ‘un-Islamic’. Thus are the seeds of a rift sown for the imp­ending intra-Afghan talks—something that will be a long, torturous process and the determinant of Afghanistan’s future.

The US has long called for regional allies to get involved in Afghanistan and nudge stake-holders to work out a durable peace. President Biden has inc­luded India in the plans, together with Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran. However, New Delhi unwaveringly ref­uses to deal with the Taliban. Successive Indian governments have supported elected governments in Kabul, and New Delhi has placed all its trust in Ashraf Ghani, who has lost much credibility.

At one time, refusing to engage with the Taliban may have made sense. It suited both New Delhi and Kabul to speak in unison to expose Pakistan. But to cling to it still, when China, Russia and Iran are ready to engage, disregards realpolitik. Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai had advised India to begin talking to the Taliban, who are key to the peace process. “India participating in the international talks on Afghanistan will only serve its interests if it is in open contact with all Afghan parties,” says Vivek Katju, former Indian ambassador to Kabul. “It is not so with the Taliban. That is a decision India ought to rectify immediately.”   

Pakistan, of course, is a principal actor—it created the Taliban from among the young Islamic scholars educated in Pakistani seminaries. With the Taliban takeover in 1996, Islamabad achieved its long-held ambition to gain ‘strategic depth’ by installing a pro-Pak­istan government in Kabul. That aim remains, with the added incentive to stamp out India’s footprints from the country. Pakistan wants to minimise Indian influence, to ensure that New Delhi is made to roll back consulates in Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Herat. Pakistan believes that the consulates, especially in Jalalabad, is used by India and Afghan forces to foment trouble in its restive Balochistan province.

China, Iran and Russia are the other regional players. China will back Pakistan and support the Taliban and so might Russia—a junior partner in the game. Iran wants to ensure that minority Shia groups in Afghanistan are included in the power-sharing arr–angement. An unstable Afghanistan is a security nightmare for India, with the possibility of ISIS fighters crossing into Kashmir. Unless Afghans show some maturity in dealing with each other the floodgates will open for ano–ther bout of big power rivalry in Afghanistan. This time perhaps the US and China would cross swords.