EVEN as an elected government is reinstated in Jammu and Kashmir after almost seven long years, autonomy for the state is being identified as one of the key issues before the Farooq Abdullah government. Senior United Front leaders, including the Prime Minister, have promised that maximum autonomy for the state would be considered once the state assembly is constituted. And with the National Conference’s main election plank being that it would achieve autonomy once it came to power, the onus will be on Farooq as well as the Central Government to fulfil this pre-election promise.
But as far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, promises made are not necessarily kept. The three accords signed since the accession of the state on October 26, 1947, have caused heartburn and alienation rather than dilute the distrust of India that the average Kashmiri still brooks.
Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession under pressure, faced as he was with attacks by Pakistan-supported tribal warlords. Hari Singh was quick to realise that his army was no match for the invaders and in desperation he appealed to the Indian government for help. However, New Delhi held that it could only send its troops if Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Indian Union. According to the Instrument of Accession, the Indian Parliament could only make laws directly involving defence, external affairs and communications.
Article 370—which provided for a special status for Kashmir and autonomy for the state as long as it was part of the Indian Union—came in for much criticism from various political parties which questioned the wisdom of providing special status to Jammu and Kashmir. And the seeds of alienation were sown.
The accession was followed by the 1952 Delhi Agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru. This was in tune with the Instrument of Accession and autonomy was protected in that the Indian Parliament could not frame laws without the consent of the state assembly except in the areas of defence, external affairs and communication. The eight-point agreement recognised the state flag and a common citizenship and spelt out the mode of appointment of the head of state. It also formalised the Centre-state financial arrangement.
However, all was not well and the voices of protest from the Jammu Praja Parishad and the Jan Sangh against the Sheikh-Nehru Accord greatly upset Sheikh Abdullah. In a letter to Nehru, he noted that there were "powerful influences at work in India who do not see eye to eye with you regarding your ideal of making the Union a truly secular state". He concluded by saying that if his people could not "build our state on our own lines, suited to our genius, what answer am I to give to our people?"
Sheikh Abdullah found himself forced to revive the Plebiscite Front and was arrested in 1953. He was later released and headed the state government. From 1953 to 1975, both the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement were not quite honoured. Laws were passed by the Centre that went against the spirit of autonomy.
The 1975 accord between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi admitted that many of the laws passed after 1953 had corroded the state’s autonomy. The assembly was given the option of reviewing these laws and recommending changes, which would be "sympathetically considered" by the President. The accord was roundly criticised in the Valley and the Sheikh, who reposed much faith in the accord and had disbanded his Plebiscite Front, soon realised his mistake. Disenchanted supporters of the Front broke away and the seeds of militancy were sown in the Valley.
The question of autonomy has taken centrestage once again. It remains to be seen what kind autonomy Farooq Abdullah will be able to wrest from the Centre. What’s clear is that if it’s not substantive, he will lose much credibility. And that would be disastrous.
