Neighbourly Wars

Sabotaging SAARC was easy. Its charter allows any member state to postpone the summit on request. The Commonwealth, on its part, requires the automatic suspension of any member violating "certain fundamental political values". Something New Delhi is likely reiterate ad nauseam at Durban. Not willing to be identified as the spoilsport, New Delhi first asked other SAARC members to propose a deferment. But attempts to coax Dhaka or Kathmandu to be the first to request such a deferment failed. While Colombo insisted that any postponement would not only affect the spirit of unanimity guiding SAARC, using the internal affairs of another member as an excuse would also set a bad precedent.

So finally, on November 4, citing "the military coup d'etat in Pakistan and the consequent concern and disquiet expressed in the region and beyond", New Delhi formally urged Sri Lankan President and conference chairperson Chandrika Kumaratunga to defer the Kathmandu conference. Simultaneously, word went out that Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal had "informally and privately" expressed the desire to put off the summit till things "stabilised" in Pakistan.

"India's stand has to be seen in light of the uncertainty that surrounds Musharraf's legal status. He heads a military regime that is yet to acquire legal basis," says Pran Chopra, political analyst with the Centre for Policy Research. "Some earlier dictators had declared martial law, which gave them some legal standing. In fact, Zia-ul-Haq was allowed to attend SAARC summits just because he had legitimised his government, describing himself as Chief Martial Law administrator. But Musharraf has not done that. Nor has he been formally appointed by the President. In fact, he has suspended the constitution. If, for instance, Rafiq Tarar were to attend the summit as President of Pakistan, no one could have had any objections. But Musharraf should be invited only after he has some legal standing."

Analyst and author Achin Vanaik sees it quite differently. "SAARC should not be a forum where India and Pakistan take their differences. India should have taken the initiative, shown its commitment to the SAARC process and to the other member states," he argues. "Not so," retorts columnist and MP Kuldip Nayar. "What the government has done is very justified. We cannot accept a military dictator at the same table."

This is not the first time that the summit has been postponed. There have been at least three other instances, in 1989 then in 1991, when Bhutan did not turn up, and in December 1992, following the Babri Masjid episode. "The argument that we have talked to Zia earlier smacks of disengenuity," says an expert on the region on condition of anonymity. "It's the first time since SAARC was formed that the army has taken over a country by toppling a democratically elected government (Zia took over in '77 and SAARC was formed in '85). Just because we talked to Zia, does it mean we should continue to encourage dictatorships?" Giving Musharraf a legal standing would also go against the message being sent out by the international community-both the EU and the US have called for restoration of democracy. Says the expert, "How can we talk to them at this time?" Besides, "four of the seven SAARC members are also members of the Commonwealth, which, at the meeting in Durban, is likely to debar Pakistan till democracy is restored. Wouldn't it be strange for these four nations to then talk to Pakistan just a week later at SAARC?"

Kanak Mani Dixit, editor of Himal, a regional magazine brought out from Kathmandu, disagrees. "SAARC is just a toddler and it hasn't reached a point where democratic credentials of regimes should be a factor in the holding of summits. Besides, it is clear that New Delhi's decision on scuttling the summit had to do more with its bilateral grudge against Gen Musharraf in Islamabad rather than wanting to strike a blow for democracy in the subcontinent." Agrees Kamal Mitra Chenoy, a professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, "It's absolute rot. The government's stand is that we should not legitimise dictators by talking to them. This implies we have the right to decide what kind of a government another country should have. Very soon, Islamists might say that we will not talk to non-Muslim nations...That kind of logic gets us nowhere." Adds he, "What the government fails to realise is that if Musharraf goes, he is likely to be replaced by his deputy, Gen Aziz, who is even more of a hardliner. The scuttling of the SAARC process is not in the national interest. But it is an indication of how the Hindu fundamentalists of the Sangh parivar have started to dictate government policy. This is a beautiful chance for the parivar to argue that Pakistan cannot have a democracy because it is a Muslim state and besides, 'how can we talk to the anti-hero of Kargil?'

"Scuttling the process," Chenoy asserts, "also reinforces the image of India as a big brother in the Orwellian sense. This, taken with our recently announced N-doctrine, sends out all the wrong signals to the world. India should have bent over backwards to allow this meeting. By not doing so, the image we are projecting is that of a Hindu fundamentalist regime."

In Pakistan, many feel that India's move was a backhanded manoeuvre but one in which no winners emerged. And that it would set a precedent where any one of India's six neighbors can in the future use this 'postponement' card to put roadblocks in an organisation which is moving too slowly for its own good. Analysts in Islamabad are quick to point out that it was another general in uniform, Zia-ur-Rahman of what is now Bangladesh, who initiated the SAARC process. "It is surprising that a leader of Vajpayee's maturity and experience is allowing India's relations with its most important neighbour to be dictated by personal likes and dislikes rather than by the imperatives of peace and security in the region," says columnist Afzal Mahmood.

The fact that Musharraf is a cruel reminder to New Delhi as being the architect of the Kargil war is not lost on Islamabad and many feel this is the only reason why New Delhi is sulking. Others, like former foreign secretary Tanvir Ahmad Khan, point out that "India has little interest in fostering multilateral cooperation in South Asia, be it in the economic sphere symbolised by SAARC, or in pursuing Pakistani proposals for a stable regime in arms control, equitable confidence-building measures and nuclear restraint. Recent events in the region provide New Delhi, in its traditional myopic view, fresh opportunities to assert the validity of its unilateralism".

But did Islamabad have any choice except to succumb meekly? "I say it's a case of missed opportunity, which reflects badly on Pakistan's foreign office bureaucracy. In the face of Indian efforts to get the summit postponed, Pakistan should have called for an emergency SAARC summit on humanitarian grounds in the wake of the Orissa cyclone disaster in India. Given the scale of this human tragedy, the rationale for such an emergency summit would have been to formulate a SAARC collective institutional approach to natural disasters in South Asia," contends Shirin Mazari, a defence specialist. "Even if Vajpayee did not respond, it would have gone Pakistan's way. (But) Vajpayee could not have said no to such a proposal, and this would have nipped any attempts to stall the summit in the bud," says Mazari.

The general feeling in Pakistan is that Musharraf has made several attempts to get communication between the two nuclear neighbours back on track. But he has been met with either stony silence or quick rebuttals. But sooner or later, India will have to play ball. And it'll be business as usual. Till, that is, the next opportunity comes along.