N-Trapment

Can US Congress put a spanner in the US-India civilian nuclear deal? Wait and see. Updates

N-Trapment
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"The (US-India nuclear) deal will reinforce the impression internationally that the Bush administration's approach to non-proliferation is selective and self-interested rather than consistent and principled, and will therefore provide an excuse for greater selectivity by countries like China and Russia."
US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress
  • How complete are India's declarations of civilian facilities? (Under the deal India is to separate civilian and military facilities.)
  • What is the level of intrusiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's programme to inspect civilian facilities?
  • What's the value of the Additional Protocol, given the likelihood that nuclear weapon facilities will not be open for inspection? (Additional Protocol is a set of voluntary measures a signatory country accepts for allowing IAEA quicker access to designated civilian facilities.)
  • How well is India's export control implementation functioning?
  • What are India's plans for its nuclear weapons programme; what is the possibility that US assistance could benefit it?
  • Is India prepared to stop producing fissile material for weapons?
  • Is it prepared to declare some nuclear material as excess to its defence needs and place that under IAEA safeguards?
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Indian diplomats in Washington dismiss these charges of haste and inadequate groundwork. They say the deal is part of the "process" set in motion by the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The NSSP had expansion of cooperation in civil nuclear technology as one of its goals. "It's not something conjured out of a hat at the last moment," an Indian official told Outlook, adding that occasions like the Indian premier's visit, though, end up being "action-forcing events".

It isn't as if India is oblivious of the perilous path ahead. That's precisely why it has requisitioned the services of influential Washington lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers for "advice and counsel to further our objectives" in the US, a diplomatic source told Outlook. The firm is headed by Robert D. Blackwill, former US ambassador to India with close ties to the Bush White House. Indian officials say Blackwill wasn't involved in securing the contract. Andrew Parasiliti, vice-president of the firm, told Outlook that Blackwill is "legally prohibited from representing foreign governments through a one-year cooling off period which began when he left the administration in November 2004. He, therefore, had no part in the discussion on this matter between the Indian government and Barbour Griffith & Rogers." Nevertheless, the firm under Blackwill's command could benefit immensely from his experience in India and his article of faith about making New Delhi a strategic ally of Washington.

This apart, India's ambassador in Washington, Ronen Sen, and his deputy, Raminder Jassal, have been engaging with Congress members to allay concerns. Sources privy to these discussions describe the response from the Americans as "thoughtful and constructive". Indian diplomats assert that the "logic of the understanding is so compelling that once the hearings take place, members of the Senate and the House will see it is something that benefits us both". The duo has also been talking to members of the think-tank community, including those who have an abiding interest in non-proliferation issues. "When they look dispassionately at the deal, they'll find it doesn't diminish but furthers the goals they espouse," a diplomatic source told Outlook.

Critics say the most significant improvement in the nuclear deal could be to have India commit itself to stopping production of fissile material for nucleararms. India need not do this unilaterally, but as part of a multilateral moratorium pending the completion of a legally binding Fissile Material Cut-offTreaty. Pointing out that the five original nuclear weapon states have stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons, Einhorn said, "If India is genuinely interested only in a credible minimum deterrent capability—rather than an open-ended nuclear programme—perhaps it will soon decide that it can join the others." Such a decision, he said, would eliminate most opposition to American nuclear commerce with India.

Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act, Congress must approve the US-India agreement for cooperation. If the Bush administration chooses to exempt the agreement from statutory non-proliferation criteria, including a requirement that India have full-scope nuclear safeguards, both houses of Congress must pass a joint resolution of approval. The administration alternatively may seek to amend certain portions of the Atomic Energy Act; in particular, Sections 128 and 129, both of which include non-proliferation criteria. Section 129 of the Act requires ending exports of nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state which, after March 10, 1978, detonates a nuclear explosive device. India first tested its nuclear device in 1974; it conducted a second round of tests in 1998.

Should Congress be unwilling to amend these laws, the President could use the National Security Waiver to authorise nuclear exports to India. But "circumventing the will of Congress would hardly be a promising foundation for building a new relationship with India", Einhorn said.

Help for India's cause could also come from Israel. For instance, Anatol Lieven, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is confident the nuclear deal would be pushed through Congress with help from the "pro-Israel lobby and some heavyweight economic lobbies". US industry covets the Indian market, and deeper, better US-India ties could inspire a clutch of gestures conducive to investments.

Cohen feels there's just no way the nuke deal will get blocked in Congress. "It will be hard for many in Congress to vote against India, it's the flavour of the month," he said. Come September, and New Delhi will know the truth.

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