The Druk Jam

Buddhist Bhutan has repeated an act it had last carried out 138 years ago—calling out the army. At the crack of dawn on December 15, King Jigme Singye Wangchuk's royal government jumpstarted its small military machine to expel an estimated 3,000 Indian separatist militants belonging to the ULFA, Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)—who had made the Himalayan kingdom the base for their struggles for free homelands in West Bengal and the Northeast.

The action of the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Bhutan Guards (RBG) was swift and sharp. Consequently, the ULFA appealed to King Wangchuk on December 17, urging him to halt the offensive as "the organisation was not a threat to Bhutan's sovereignty". ULFA's commander-in-chief Paresh Barua told journalists that his outfit was prepared to negotiate with Thimphu on the issue of the location of their camps if the military operations were suspended. This statement by the ULFA's elusive chief was interpreted by many as a ceasefire and surrender offer.

But that was wishful thinking. While Barua wanted the King to call off the offensive, he was clear the ULFA cadre would not surrender. On day four of the operations, December 18, Bhutan said it could consider halting the operations if the rebels came up with the offer to surrender and agree to leave the kingdom. "We shall not surrender under any circumstances. Our boys will fight till the last man and the last bullet," was Barua's response.

However, Bhutanese authorities and Indian army intelligence say that despite such strong words the rebels have been severely hit. Bhutan has been tightlipped about casualties. But Lt Gen J.S. Veram, heads of the Eastern command, told reporters in Calcutta that 90-120 insurgents had been killed, while the Bhutanese army had lost seven men. According to Barua, his group lost a few cadres and veteran leader Bhimkanta Buragohain, 68, was injured. A number of top rebels, including ULFA publicity chief Mithinga Daimary, KLO's action squad commander Tom Adhikary and its second-in-command Milton Burman have reportedly been captured.

On December 15, sounds of staccato gunfire broke the early morning calm in four of the 10 districts in southern Bhutan bordering Assam, West Bengal, Sikkim and Arunachal as soldiers launched their assault on the camps. About 6,000 soldiers—the strength of the Bhutanese Army—were mobilised for the operation. Within less than 48 hours, the RBA took over both the central and general headquarters of ULFA. "The ULFA rebels have been dislodged from their key bases. They are on the run in the jungles, pursued by our troops," Bhutanese foreign ministry spokesman Yeshey Dorji said.

It was in the winter of 1990 that the ULFA opened shop in the dense jungles of southern Bhutan. The rebels sneaked across the border to escape the Indian army that had launched Operation Bajrang. Militants of the NDFB and the KLO soon followed suit. Thimphu has since confirmed the existence of 30 Indian insurgent camps inside the kingdom—13 ULFA, 12 NDFB and five KLO.

For Thimphu, the decision to go in for a crackdown has been extremely difficult. The nation's army is much too small and ill-equipped to deal with a possible guerrilla-style retaliation by the rebels. But the King had to honour the mandate of the 81st session of the country's National Assembly—to hold a last round of talks in October-November with the rebels or else use the army to flush them out.

Both New Delhi and Thimphu claim the operation was not a joint exercise. But India has admittedly provided ammunition and medical assistance to the Bhutanese soldiers as well as launching aerial patrols to track the rebels. However, the dividing line between direct involvement and logistical support is always very thin.

While Bhutan has taken the rebels by surprise, the Himalayan kingdom's military skills and statecraft may be put to test. If the militants begin striking soft targets within Bhutan it could spell trouble in the days ahead.