By Executive Decree

Mostly, it was Sharif's reaction to a well-publicised statement by Karamat that the government must get its act together. The army chief suggested that a national security council or committee should be set up, that would institutionalise a decision-making role for the armed forces. Hinting at Sharif's 'heavy mandate', the general said a political mandate needs to be translated into institutional strength, otherwise "we would have a permanent election campaign environment in the country".

Sharif took this as a slight, and for good reason. The entire nation seemed to welcome Karamat's statement; the general sentiment was he was only echoing the people's views. Even some of Sharif's party-men couldn't hide their satisfaction. One Muslim League member from Karachi told Outlook: "We do feel insecure with Kara-mat's statement, but even now it is not too late to put our house in order." The Awami National Party leader, Asfandyar Wali Khan, hailed it "as the final wake-up call."

As the shadow of martial law seemed to loom large, Sharif summoned Karamat for a one-to-one meeting and expressed his displeasure, which Karamat took as his marching orders. The only other army chief to be shown the door was Gen. Gul Hassan, who was "harassed" by Zulfiqar Ali  Bhutto to put in his papers in the '70s.

After the Eighth Amendment was scrapped, a prime minister has the power to appoint an army chief. Sharif promptly used this power to nominate Gen. Pervez Musharraf, corps commander, Mangla, as the new chief of army staff (COAS), triggering off a whole new set of problems. Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan, the next in line to be army chief, went on short leave. Another senior general, Khalid Nawaz, resigned.

A besieged Sharif pushed the controversial Shariat bill through the national assembly late last week. Though watered down a bit—two clauses, the proposal to amend the Constitution through a simple majority to give effect to the Shariat; and the proposal to allow the government to issue directives to enforce the Shariat, were deleted—the Opposition said the bill still had provisions which the government could misuse in the name of Islam.The bill will now have to be passed by the Senate where Sharif may run into problems because he enjoys only a simple majority.

By forcing the change in the army, Sharif may have managed to divert attention from his own problems for now. The country is close to economic collapse; the three smaller provinces are completely alienated; Sharif's political allies have all but deserted him and even his own parliamentarians are up in arms against the hastily-drafted Shariat bill. To add to his woes were the corruption charges, publicised by the London daily, The Observer.

BUT by forcing Karamat to quit, what kind of signal is Sharif sending? On Friday, he declared that parliament's supremacy would be upheld at all costs and even threatened action against those of his own partymen who backed Karamat. In Sharif's two stints in power, his government forced the resignations of president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chief of naval staff Mansoor-ul-Haq, president Farooq Leghari, chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah, and now, Gen. Karamat. One former COAS, Gen. Asif Nawaz, died during his first stint in 1993. In fact, the relations between Sharif and Gen. Asif Nawaz were so bad that the general's widow accused Sharif of poisoning her husband.

There are other questions that need to be addressed. For instance, why did Karamat, usually very guarded in his remarks, suddenly go overboard? In fact, after the London Observer story broke, hinting at a martial law, he had strongly rebutted it—and denied such a possibility. Karamat claims he resigned because his statement created unnecessary controversy.

"Whatever my intentions were and whatever is being said wasn't that which was reported in the press. Queries were raised and suspicions were expressed about what motivated me to issue such a statement. There was no such thing. My statement triggered a controversy...so I thought it better to step down. I was due to retire in two months time anyway," he told the media.

This explanation appears strange because the media only reported what the armed forces' own information set-up, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), handed out. Karamat's lecture and the subsequent question-answer session at Lahore's War College was closed to the press. So whatever came out was what the COAS wanted to be made public. Why did the COAS want to go public anyway? Several such lectures and meetings between senior army officials are held but never made public. Could it be that before retirement, Karamat wanted to go on record about Sharif's lack of governance and put the blame squarely on the political leadership?

The ISPR again seemed to be out of the loop when the news of Karamat's resignation was announced over Pakistan television—and told the media it was unaware of the development. How could the ISPR plead ignorance when everyone else knew?

Though Karamat had often backed Sharif in public, there was no love lost between the two. Tensions were high during the judicial and constitutional crisis that gripped the country last year. Again when it came to improving ties with India and on signing CTBT, conflicting signals emanated from the general headquarters in Rawalpindi. In his statement, Karamat harped on the need to focus on the economy; on relations with China, Iran, Afghanistan, India, the US; and of, course, on giving priority to improving the domestic situation. After Karamat's scathing attack, it was obvious that he would find it difficult to have a working relationship with Sharif.

But should army generals make political statements? Has Sharif taught the army brass a lesson or two? These are debatable questions because for decades whenever political pygmies have failed to deliver, the pressure is on the army to do something. Karamat used to receive tonnes of complaint letters from people that Pakistan was doomed under Sharif's leadership. With the army being as powerful as it is—it has ruled the country directly or indirectly for long periods—temptation is strong for the army to intervene. It goes to Karamat's credit that despite several opportunities, he remained steadfast against army interference. To that end, Sharif was home safe as Karamat was his greatest 'protector'.

So where does the nation go from here? The new COAS, Gen. Mush-arraf, hails from the artillery and is a Mohajir. Only one other COAS, Gen. Tikka Khan, who later joined the PPP, has this distinction. The other COAS were either from the armoured corps or the infantry.

There is bound to be an edge in the relations between the army and Sharif after this incident. There has been some unhappiness about the fact that Sharif overlooked Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan, a Pakhtoon, for the post. Too many high offices are with the Punjabis, and Quli's appointment would have been instrumental in appeasing the smaller provinces. While Hamid Gul, former ISI chief, was quoted in the Nation as saying that Sharif had clearly made a mistake, Mirza Aslam Beg, former army chief, questioned what the prime minister would do if Musharraf toed Karamat's line.

Observers say the army is unlikely to differ from Karamat's views. There has been debate in the armed forces over the deteriorating political, economic and law and order situations. But as the new COAS tries to find his feet, the formation of the national security council should be far from his mind. And Sharif is sure to take advantage of this.

Even if the generals stay in their barracks, there might be a backlash against Sharif on the streets. And what can really make or break him is his own parliamentarians. But if one saw some hawkish elements during the debate on the Shariat bill, the exit of Karamat has certainly dampened their spirits. If the leader of the House can get rid of the senior most general in uniform, who are they to resist?