Unknown to civilians, scores of disappointed officers every year fall off the pyramidical structure of the armed forces officers' corps, convinced that the better man lost. The rise of Bhagwat is nothing more or less than just such a story. Scratch any retired officer, as he potters on the Noida golf course, or drinks his two chhota pegs, and he'll tell you another tale of how he thinks the system did him in. But ask what the big issues are, and the answer's unanimous: the mod bureaucrats. The astonishing tale that should've been written and hasn't, is how a polity and a bureaucracy over four decades inveigled themselves into a position of control and power over the services HQ, and how successive chiefs failed to stem this emasculation.
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Much of the author's tale is true, but is it the 'whole truth'? For the 'whole truth' is that rarely in the bitter history of civil-military relations have the three chiefs been in such a difficult position as they were with the ministry officials after Mulayam Singh Yadav left. The chiefs had no quarrel with the new minister, up to as late as September. But this 'true account' doesn't answer why the minister backed the bureaucracy against the desires and complaints of all the three chiefs. The author does indict the then defence secretary for a couple of incidents, but what fails to come through is the special frustration of the services HQ with George Fernandes' ministry, for months. Defence secretaries who exceeded their briefs were sacked for much less than Fernandes permitted his secretary to get away with for over a year. Insiders don't need this book, but its lay reader won't come to know that the forces are astonished at the way this controversy degenerated into a Bhagwat vs Fernandes drama in the press, when the main participants,the bureaucracy,have simply vanished, smirking in triumpth.
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Whatever its failings, a reviewer is impressed if the answer to the question 'why was the book written?' produces a sincere and honest answer. But the answers this book produces raises unease. The disquiet arises from the number of official documents freely quoted from. Some are 'personal and confidential' and the notings on the letters by serving chiefs and mod officials are blatant proof that the author was given free access to letters or entire files. Sometimes the choice of words are identical to those used by the minister with Karan Thapar.
In the end one had hoped that the book would throw some light on the specific reasons why Bhagwat was sacked,particularly on his alleged breach of secrecy about the nuclear submarine. It appears some news dailies had echoed Bhagwat's request for a long overdue technical audit of the project. Again, lay readers will be unaware of the time, money, opportunities and security that's been compromised by a project that's run,without results,for over 20 years. Of course, a technical audit's long overdue. Those who want to know why have only to read Jane's Intelligence Review of June '98.
To conclude, this book couldn't have been better timed, as the defence minister continues to roll about like a loose cannon, in other, newer areas of national security.
