Ground Realities
- 978 US soldiers dead
- 3,442 Wounded
- $227 billion went down the drain
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When the United States invaded Afghanistan way back in 2001, president George W. Bush had talked of “smoking out” the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants from their inaccessible mountain hideouts. Nearly nine years later, after pouring billions of dollars into an interminable war that has killed hundreds of American soldiers and countless Afghans, the world’s sole superpower (and those who participated at the recent London Conference on Afghanistan) has done a veritable U-turn, endorsing President Hamid Karzai’s outreach to members of the Taliban. This has prompted many in Washington to warn that the US support for such an effort could seriously undermine the credibility of American power. Really, is America admitting to its inability to “smoke out” the Taliban?
Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says attempting reconciliation with the Rahbari Shura—the 10-member leadership council Taliban supremo Mullah Omar appointed—“confirms regional expectation that the US is looking for a face-saving departure from Afghanistan”. To those who view this outreach as a mere tactic, Tellis points out that the shura and its patron, Pakistan, perceive it as an admission of defeat.
It isn’t that Tellis thinks it’s futile to attempt reconciliation with the ‘rent-a-Taliban’ lumpen proletariat of Pashtun society. What he’s opposed to is the attempt to integrate the Rahbari Shura—as Karzai is attempting, with backing from the West, largely the Europeans—into the power structure. “It’s crazy and doomed to fail,” he told Outlook. The shura, he explains, can be reconciled only if the western military coalition promises to depart from Afghanistan. But their departure, Tellis cautions, could itself sound the death knell for Karzai, dashing hopes of offering Afghanistan an alternative to radical Islamic ideology.
American officials describe the attempt at reconciliation with the Taliban as an Afghan-led undertaking. But the idea isn’t a purely Afghan one. Last year, a review of US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, led by former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, concluded that Taliban fighters should be lured away from the battlefield with offers of cash. To this he had added one important caveat: the strategy would work only if the Taliban believe they no longer have the upper hand in the war. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, told senators this week that the Taliban continue to believe they’re winning.
Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis says talk of reconciliation and President Barack Obama’s pledge to begin withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011 have cast doubts among many Afghans, and other key players in the region, that the international forces will remain committed to preventing the Taliban’s return to power. True, US officials have gone to great lengths to explain that reintegration means accepting only those Taliban who renounce violence, sever ties with Al Qaeda and accept the Afghan Constitution, but many analysts have extrapolated from this proposal that the US is ready to cut a deal with the Quetta Shura—the council directly under Mullah Omar that issues orders of attacks to their Taliban commanders operating in Afghanistan. Curtis says a deal with the Quetta Shura would be a “monumental mistake” and would impact US as well as global security for years to come. “Floating the idea that the US is ready to compromise with the Taliban will only give credence to their destructive ideology,” she argues.
Others such as Daniel Markey, of the Council on Foreign Relations, feel talks with the Taliban need not be a sign of surrender, though the strategy is fraught with severe risks. Markey says the plan aims to make Taliban footsoldiers and lower-level commanders lay down arms in exchange for money. He argues, “Dealing with them is not an admission of defeat, and in fact, is only likely to happen on a large scale when/if the Taliban movement is weakened.”
But neither have the Taliban been weakened nor can anyone be sure the principal motivation of their footsoldiers is money. C. Christine Fair, assistant professor, Georgetown University, says there’s no way to verify US special envoy Richard Holbrooke’s claims that at least 70 per cent of Taliban fighters are waging the war for reasons other than ideology. The special envoy said this number had been gleaned from interviews with detainees. But Fair counters, “Can you image a detainee at Bagram or Pul-e-Charkhi prison (much less Guantanamo Bay) conceding they fight for ideological reasons.... Who wouldn’t claim they fought merely for money under those conditions?”
Fair views the reconciliation effort as evidence of a realisation that military might solely can’t defeat the Taliban. “You simply can’t kill every Talib,” she explains “So clearly, another way is needed to pacify the country. And while the US and its partners haven’t been defeated, victory has been and will likely remain illusory.”
The talk of reconciliation efforts has also prompted many to analyse America’s inability to vanquish the Taliban. Cited among the prominent factors is Pakistan’s continuing support to the Afghan Taliban. For instance, Tellis says the US has failed to change Pakistan’s calculus in patronising the Afghan Taliban and reconciliation talks will provide what he describes as a “splendid opportunity” for the isi to regain its primacy in controlling Afghan politics.
No doubt, the reconciliation efforts, says Pakistani defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, will please Pakistan’s military besides of course providing a short-term respite to the Afghan people. For one, Pakistan will be able to reclaim its influence on Kabul as also hope to roll back India’s penetration into Afghanistan. “And why shouldn’t the Taliban talk?” Siddiqa asks. “They have everything to gain, starting with political legitimacy.” She also blows against the Indian strategy of engaging with some actors inside Afghanistan only to minimise Pakistan’s influence. “It’s a bleak scenario,” Siddiqa told Oulook.
Claiming that a majority of Pakistani strategic thinkers want their country to broker peace talks with the Taliban, Curtis warns, “The US must recognise that its objectives in Afghanistan diverge widely from that of Pakistan. The US seeks to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a haven for terrorists, whereas Pakistan’s main objective is to ensure India does not gain influence in the country.” Indeed, the US needs to assert its own vision for the region and not, in its understandable haste to exit Afghanistan, leave the field wide open for patrons of violence to return to their old ways.
