ROME
The July nuclear agreement between India and the United States has hit some rocks. The rocks are courtesy the non-proliferation lobby in Washington, a small but vocal group of hard-liners wedded to its beloved orthodoxy to the exclusion of the big picture. Their picture is so small, it seems anachronistic in the rapidly globalising world. They are often called the "ayatollahs of non-proliferation," a title they take seriously because they don’t brook the "third way" or the middle path or anything less than their maximalist demands. When they issue a fatwa, agreements are in danger. Their atavism is retarding and counterproductive.
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran is rushing this week to Washington to calm the fires, present a plan for separation of India’s military and civilian reactors and fight off new conditions from being added to the agreement. Saran and Ambassador Ronen Sen will meet Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, to sort out the wrinkles and work out a strategy to convince the US Congress that the agreement is a net gain.
But the non-proliferation lobby has staged a do-or-die battle on Capitol Hill since the July agreement must be blessed by the US Congress to become effective. They want to delay and dilute, if not kill the pact. They are working on congressmen and senators from both parties but the prime targets are the Democrats who are more easily lured to such causes in the mistaken belief that shooting down the Indo-US agreement will be a plus for non-proliferation. It was a disappointment to Indian officials that the first article against the agreement to bolt out of the stable and find print was by written by Strobe Talbott, a Democratic friend of India and Bill Clinton’s deputy secretary of state. That Talbott is a former journalist used to working impossible deadlines doesn’t quite explain it.
Last month, with great fanfare, a group of 18 "concerned" non-proliferation advocates submitted an open letter to key members of the US Congress, raising dark questions about the deal and warning that the agreement does not "justify making far-reaching exceptions to US law." They advised the Congress to seek answers from the Bush Administration before giving the nod. Although the letter bore only 18 signatures, a whole brigade in the think tank-dense Dupont Circle area of Washington is cheering the attack. The letter questioned India’s record, its reliability as a partner, effectiveness of its export controls and finally India’s truthfulness about the declarations it will make on its military and civilian nuclear reactors. You might think the Bush Administration had made a deal with North Korea or for that matter China or Pakistan.
Their questions can hopefully be answered by the two parties to the agreement. But in the meantime, will the non-proliferation pundits please answer the following:
1. Is India a friendly country? If so, shouldn’t it be treated as such?
2. In the post-9/11 world, does the US need more friends or more enemies?
3. Will a new non-proliferation regime that includes India better serve American interests?
4. How reliable are Pakistan and China and based on their record, how can the Bush Administration ensure the A.Q Khan shop is really closed and that China has stopped supplying North Korea and Pakistan with nuclear technology?
5. What verifiable restrictions has the US put in place on Pakistan to prevent a repeat of the A.Q. Khan episode?
6. How does the US verify Chinese and Pakistani compliance to non-proliferation commitments?
7. Name a single country most responsible for spreading terrorism, nuclear technology, extremist ideology and found to have links with nearly all major terrorist attacks in the world?
The list could go on. The huffing and puffing currently on display on Capitol Hill makes one wonder about the tunnel vision of some people clearly frozen in time. The Bush policy makers have made a break from the past or at least tried to so they can slowly steer their strategic thinking to face the dangerous new world and build new alliances. But those unable to see the forest for the trees are trying to hold them back. They sound like a one-song band in urgent need to rapidly expand its repertoire.
As a general observer of beltway banditry, I understand the politics, the finely tuned intellectual assaults on deals made by the rival political party, the need for think tanks to stay relevant by constantly commenting, unzipping and analysing government agreements, the revolving door where yesterday’s officer is today’s New York Times columnist, the desperate scramble for funding to maintain think tank jobs and the exercise of backdoor influence through elected officials. Intellectual debate in Washington is an entrepreneurial business and participants must constantly fight for space. The more "unusual" and vehement the point of view, the more likely it will be on television and on the opinion pages.
But it is still hard to digest the pious attacks on the Indo-US agreement specially when the non-pro lobby didn’t generate anywhere near this level of noise at the real egregious violations of the non-proliferation regime. I refer to the 1990s, a terrible decade for sneaking missiles, run-away nuclear technology, parsing words and winking at US law. It was as if the superpower and its vociferous non-proliferation lobby had gone numb as China busily supplied nuclear designs, M-11 missiles and anything else Pakistan wanted to gain parity with India. Whatever revelations came out in the press were largely thanks to the US intelligence community which resented watching in silence the pilfering of technology while larger political calculations of the White House kept everything in "balance." There were no letters of outrage by the non-pro groups to remind politicians of the law then.
Even A.Q. Khan’s nukes-for-all shocker didn’t elicit the kind of organised effort the Indo-US nuclear agreement is generating. The non-pro lobby was appalled but clearly not enough. Yes, there were opinion pieces expressing shock but one that stayed with me was published in the New York Times. It was written by a senior American South Asia expert who argued for the Pakistani military, saying the world should believe the army when it says it didn’t have any knowledge of Khan’s private enterprise. It pays to hold unusual opinions -- you get the best newsprint.
Except this time, my sense is the ayatollahs have overreached. They have missed the politics of it. Here’s what may happen because American politicians are savvy enough to see the deal for what it is -- an opportunity to encircle China, a real clincher for turning India from a reluctant friend to a real ally, a vote for democracy and a chance to revive nuclear energy as an alternative to oil.
