Readings, Misreadings...

From the time King Gyanendra grabbed power on February 1, 2005, the ministry of external affairs (MEA) had been alone in believing that New Delhi should bolster the democratic movement—even at the expense of incurring his wrath. Consequently, supplies to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) were suspended; the bilateral engagement was reduced to the minimum. All the same, moral support was extended to the political parties.

Though acutely conscious of the need to address the insurgency, the MEA felt the king's direct rule would strengthen the Maoists and radicalise the youth. In this assumption, Nepal's demographic profile was a crucial consideration: with more than half of its roughly 26 million population under 30 years, a generation had grown since 1990—the year when multi-party democracy was ushered in—that had no particular affection for the king. Resumption of arms supplies could anger this generation without enabling the RNA to root out the insurgency, the MEA argued.

But the MEA line was one of the many prevailing in Delhi. The plurality, say sources, made it tough for Shyam Saran to hold the line. One of them said, "If anyone other than Saran had been foreign secretary, it would have in fact been impossible to stay the course."

Influential sections in the government considered Nepal's stability to be of utmost importance, even over democracy. To achieve this stability, the Maoists had to be militarily defeated. This, they argued, could happen only by augmenting the RNA's capability.

The MEA's counterview was that stability was hinged to restoration of democracy, that sections in the government were under-estimating the growing disenchantment against the king. Decisions contrary to popular sentiments could breed long-term resentment against India. This assessment was based on the impressions that ambassador S.S Mukherjee had gathered on frequent countrywide tours.

More important, Mukherjee consistently and forthrightly held to this line during his interactions with Delhi and his interlocutors in Nepal. It made him unpopular at the palace, as his opinion militated against King Gyanendra's wish of India accepting a Musharraf variant of democracy. The Nepali royalists argued that India had more to gain from the monarch than the political parties. "Neither Shiv nor Shyam fell for this trap," said a source in Delhi