- Warmer language on N-energy cooperation, but no assurances on supporting India in the NSG
- Support for India's role in the Security Council, but UN reform is quasi-dead
- Galloping trade ties but a growing deficit loaded against India
- Exchange of alternative drafts on a framework for resolving the border dispute, but expect no solution in the near future
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On the border dispute, the two sides had nothing new to say officially, expressing their lack of breakthrough by reiterating for the n-th time their intention to "seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution" on the basis of the political parameters and guiding principles announced during Wen's 2005 visit to India. National security advisor M.K. Narayanan met executive vice-minister Bai Bingguo, both special representatives tasked to thrash out a framework on the boundary settlement. Their talks, which went through 11 rounds before the visit, have been limping; one of the challenges for the Indian side was to get momentum for these talks. On the return flight, the PM said "the two special representatives have already set up a working group which is looking at two alternative drafts which should ultimately emerge as an agreed framework".
That sounded like progress, but was it? Explaining what had transpired during the latest border discussions in Beijing, a top government source made three points: one, the Chinese draft retains China's claim over Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, one of the major sticking points in the negotiations. Two, while the guiding principles say the interests of settled populations must be safeguarded, differences have emerged on the interpretation of this principle. India is clear there can be no transfer of settled populations, but the Chinese side seems to want to approach this issue by distinguishing between differing population densities.
Thirdly, China continues to be not too keen on exchanging maps aimed at clarifying the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which it views as a status quoist approach. India, on the other hand, wants to continue with this exercise, to control "incursions" or troop movements—by both armies, incidentally—because of the undefined nature of the LAC. (Only maps of the middle sector have been exchanged.) Does all of this sound like a roadmap for progress? Yes, said the source, because areas of least contention would be taken up first before moving on to more contentious issues, as in the case of the 123 agreement. "We succeeded there, we can succeed here," he says. But, analysts say, it is far from being the first time some of these problem areas have been aired. In fact, reading through past accounts of border discussions, you cannot but be struck by how the vocabulary, both of discord and forced optimism ("accelerating", "gaining momentum", etc) keeps repeating itself over the years.
On the other hand, what is often forgotten, as an official pointed out, is that shots haven't been fired on this vast border since 1975. It is quiet facts like that, rather than the millions of euphoric words generated by prime ministerial visits, that reveal the real gains of the stabilising and maturing Indo-China relationship. They have not just kept peace on the border, but despite a long history of mistrust and suspicion and continuing geostrategic rivalry, they have in recent years built up trade ties, undertaken cbms, attempted to build up military-to-military relations, even if symbolically, and reduced the long gaps that once existed between high-level meetings. As an analyst put it, the best thing about Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Beijing was that it happened.
