Hands Off, Please

Islamabad has been keeping a stiff upper lip even as it hosts the envoys of the deposed Afghanistan king, Zahir Shah. Intermittently, though, it has articulated what it thinks Kabul should have—a broad-based government, and a role for both the 'moderate' Taliban and the Northern Alliance (NA).

Obviously, no one has yet defined who these moderate Taliban are but presumably it excludes all those who hold key posts in the current regime. Observers here compare today's situation to what existed at the time when the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan. Then too, Islamabad had tried to identify "good Muslims" who could protect its interests in Kabul. It's a different matter that successive governments in Kabul post the Russian withdrawal didn't prove as amenable. This bitter experience has convinced many intellectuals to argue for a hands-off policy this time round. Says political analyst M.B. Naqvi: "Heavens be praised that Bush, bin Laden, Mullah Omar have made it possible for Pakistan to get out of Afghanistan without paying too high a price. For a bankrupt state like ours, it was foolhardy to be a king-maker." Others counter such arguments, claiming that since Pakistan is a frontline state in Operation Enduring Freedom, and shares ethnic ties with tribes in Afghanistan, it simply can't countenance an unfriendly government. This, though, doesn't stand to reason. With foodgrains and petroproducts coming from Pakistan, no regime in Afghanistan can afford to alienate it. Even unfriendly Afghan governments of the past, such as Shah's, refrained from creating tension along the Durand Line and fuelling the hostility Pakistan has on its borders with India.

And now even US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his testimony to Congress last week, has denied Pakistan a major role in forming the next Afghan government. Turkey, too, has expressed opposition to a role for moderate Taliban. Otherwise too, 'a made in Pakistan' government in Kabul is bad news, lacking as it would legitimacy among Afghans. Many think Pakistan acted hastily in allowing Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani—a former mujahideen commander who later spoke against inter-ethnic violence in Afghanistan—to hold a conference in Peshawar for cobbling together a post-Taliban alternative. No wonder at last week's foreign office briefing, the most pertinent question was: is Gailani Pakistan's candidate for prime minister in Kabul? The poker-faced spokesman replied blandly: "Pakistan will not make any nominations but our blessings are with the process."

The process of establishing an alternative to the Taliban has gathered momentum ever since the US, unable to trigger the collapse of the Taliban, started shoring up support for the NA. But the NA is expected to only play the role of cannon fodder and fight its way into Kabul, not form a government there. For one, it's a minority formation and can't be seen to rule over the Pashtoon-dominated Afghanistan. Two, its own record in governance between 1992-96 was no better than the Taliban's. And so UN special envoy Lakdhar Brahimi has been sent to the region to work out a sustainable formula. Brahimi himself is realistic, saying: "There is no chance for a future government in Kabul if it is not made in Afghanistan."

But then, who's to ensure that 'a made in Afghanistan' government's writ would run in that beleaguered country? Enter peacekeeping forces. But for all this to happen, the Taliban will have to be first defeated in the battlefield. And President Musharraf could find the going tough if opposition to moderate Taliban becomes an international chorus.