Generalissimo's Grand Farce

It's yesterday once more in Pakistan: there's a general at the helm of affairs, he has declared himself president and, before calling for general elections, vested in his office supreme power to dismiss the federal government and dissolve the popular House. This whimsiness Pakistan associated with Gen Zia-ul-Haq, believing his ghost could not come to haunt the beleaguered nation again.

But it has, and how. Former information minister Mushahid Hussain says acerbically, "Pakistan's fourth military regime is following the military script to the last comma and colon." Not only Gen Pervez Musharraf but even the political parties seemed to have returned to the past. As in Zia's tenure, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto has become the pivot of political activity, plotting her moves from exile and hoping to outwit the military regime adamant on ushering in "controlled democracy".

There is, though, one vital difference between Pakistan's past and present. No longer does the cry of "save democracy" have a popular resonance, discredited as politicians are for their venal ways, poor governance and their inability to transform the lives of people. For three long years, they had been in hibernation, lacking the moral authority to counter Pervez Musharraf's audacity in derailing democracy. And then came September 11, and even those gentle reminders to Musharraf from abroad (read the US and UK) to return to democracy petered out.

Yet, Musharraf's decision to hold elections on October 10, however controlled and managed, has galvanised political parties to exploit the ballot in the battle for democracy—and check his authoritarian tendencies. Says popular political columnist Ayaz Amir: "The political parties have to rebuild themselves and their credibility. This, they will be able to do by putting up a good fight in the coming elections and by assuming an oppositionist (as opposed to a disruptionist) role in the future assembly. The time for politics is not dead. It is only now beginning. It's another matter whether the political class is able to make anything of it."

In other words, the general election seems to have become a new battle arena between those political parties who're opposed to Musharraf, and those who don't mind him as long as he shares power and pelf with them. With the first-past-the-post system in place, the military regime hopes the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) would cut into each other's votebanks and fail to muster a majority on their own.

Apprehensive of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif returning and becoming catalysts in a democratic upsurge, the military brought in a slew of amendments to the Constitution to ensure they couldn't contest the election—and instead faced the grim prospect of cooling their heels in the cooler. Simultaneously, the military regime backed the breakaway faction of Sharif's party—the PML(Q)—to act as the King's party, which could contest elections and still not oppose the concept of "controlled democracy".

But Musharraf could find his gameplan reduced to tatters, what with the PPP (now called Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians) and the PML agreeing to an electoral adjustment, ensuring they don't undermine each other in their strongholds. There's also talk of the PPP and the Jamaat-e-Islami reaching a kind of electoral understanding. Were this to happen, Musharraf could face the combined onslaught of outfits representing the country's entire political spectrum, from secular to right-wing religious parties.

Another vital difference between Zia's times and now is the strident opposition of religious parties to the military regime. Musharraf's U-turn on Afghanistan and Kashmir, his attempts to control religious seminaries and his steadfast support for the US war against terror have goaded these parties to forge a grand alliance under the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).Its election agenda is to enforce Islamic principles in Pakistan, bring down the inflation rate and provide employment to the youth. Till now, they have been on the margins of Pakistan's politics, usually routed in elections because of their extreme ideology and support for the military regime. Their anti-establishment rhetoric could just strike a chord this time.

The MMA will focus on grabbing back urban Sindh, stronghold of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Political analyst Nusrat Javeed predicts, "There'll be violence in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad as lethal Al Qaeda forces join hands with the MMA in a bid to see that Islamists win in these two cities. The MQM will be more than a match for them, with its leader Altaf Hussain's votebank—and arsenal—intact. The PPP will sweep, even improve its standing in rural Sindh."

As mainstream political parties rustle up alliances, the military regime's strategy is to press the formidable administrative machinery in favour of the PML(Q). A prestigious national daily reported that the IG of Punjab Police told SPs that it was their responsibility to ensure victory for the PML(Q), ordering them to respond to "any call, legal or illegal, for help from the PML(Q)". The newspaper then went on to add, "The chief secretary, home secretary and Chaudhary Pervez Elahi, the Punjab head of the PML(Q), jointly conduct interviews of those applying for PML(Q) provincial and national assembly tickets from Punjab."

But to underestimate people's resolve could be one mistake Musharraf might be making. As Mushahid Hussain says, "When people are asked to exercise their choice through the secret ballot, the danger of the script being overturned is most potent. The electorate has an infinite and abiding capacity to spring a surprise during balloting."

The political class, however, has to contend with voter apathy. For one, the electorate knows it is electing a government whose power has been circumscribed. Second, a substantial majority is seemingly indifferent to the call for restoring democracy. Third, no political party has an agenda imaginative enough to spur the electorate.

This is why many think it is crucial for Benazir to return to Pakistan. Obviously, the military regime would drive her straight from the airport to jail or keep her under house arrest. But grassroots politicians feel this could become the catalyst for unleashing people's power—and ensure a substantial turnout at the hustings, besides gathering a sympathy vote for her party. As such, the PPP even now is attracting former military officials with political ambitions. First, it was Gen Saeed Zaidi, considered close to Musharraf in the military, and this week former Air Vice-Marshal Rahim Yusufzai is set to defy the establishment and join the PPP.

Aware of the dangers Benazir could pose, the military regime has opened channels with her, hoping to strike a deal that could provide political space to both Musharraf and her. The precise contours of the parleys are not known, but ultimately any deal depends on what Benazir is willing to concede.

In other words, Pakistan's political actors haven't foreclosed any option: alliances are being forged and negotiations with the military government are under way, each hoping to cross the immediate obstacle before focusing on the nature of democracy. For the military regime, it is imperative to have a broad-based election, for its legitimacy at home and abroad. The political parties are keen on entering Parliament before they begin questioning the president's powers.

A showdown between the military and the political parties is imminent. With Musharraf declaring that neither his election as president nor his amendments to the Constitution, including the right to dismiss the government and dissolve the popular House, need ratification of Parliament, a popularly-elected government is bound to challenge his notion of 'democracy'.