Fission Confusion

When US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told CNN he hadn't ruled out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Afghanistan, it was construed in Islamabad as a reflection of Washington's growing frustration at the tardy progress of Operation Enduring Freedom. But it was also taken to be a signal to the stubborn Afghans of the price they would have to pay for their continued support to the Taliban.

Rumsfeld's gratuitous remarks, though, united strategic thinkers, media and military officials in condemning the talk about tactical nuclear weapons. The News, for instance, was scathing in its criticism: "Fighting the human form of terrorism with conventional weapons might be an acceptable option in difficult circumstances but injecting an element of nuclear warfare into a conflict that is already producing too much death and misery is unconscionable. Neither the Pakistan government nor the people will be able to acquiesce to such an idea."

That Rumsfeld's remark coincided with the visit of US Centcom commander, Gen Tommy R. Franks, to Pakistan only heightened the nervousness here about Washington's intentions. The protest against using tactical nuclear weapons goaded the regime to make public its opposition. Indeed, Islamabad's silence on the nuke issue could have only enhanced anti-US feelings and bolstered the jehadis in portraying Washington as an 'amoral' force out to decimate Muslims. Government spokesman Maj Gen Rasheed Qureshi said, "We firmly and categorically reject even the thought of using nuclear weapons tactically or otherwise."

But what provoked Rumsfeld to talk about tactical nuclear weapons? Though the Taliban barely has an organised army to take on the might of the superpower, there is little denying that the relentless bombing of Afghanistan hasn't achieved the desired results—neither has there been a rebellion against Mullah Omar, nor has the Northern Alliance succeeded in making any headway. Says Shireen M. Mazari, director-general of the Institute of Strategic Studies, "The ongoing use of cluster bombs and the impending threat that chemical and perhaps even nuclear weapons may be used means the war against terrorism is itself wreaking terror on an increasing number of Afghan civilians."

Strategic thinkers distinguish between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical nukes have low yields (below 100 kilotons or KT) and are used in battlefields to eliminate a large number of enemy troops with one blow. In contrast, strategic nuclear weapons have yields over 100 KT and are used on vast areas, say, cities. A lower level of devastation or not, Mazari says, "Rumsfeld's remark is certainly an act of desperation and not responsible at all. The Americans don't need nuclear weapons as they have enough conventional ones."

Adds columnist Ayaz Amir, "In its undoubted grief and agony, the US is in danger of forgetting what the Greeks taught: hubris invites retribution. While there's no denying America's distress, it will only help its cause if this distress is not clothed in too excessive an arrogance." Couldn't the US display this arrogance through the use of nukes? No, says former defence secretary Gen (retd) Talat Masood: "The US doesn't have to use tactical nukes as its armoury of conventional weapons is immense. I think Washington has restrained itself from showcasing its conventional military might. For a country like Afghanistan, Washington's conventional weapons can be as deadly as nuclear bombs."

Similarly, Gen (retd) K.M. Arif, who was close to President Gen Zia-ul-Haq, says, "I understand the US had internal debates and the possibility of using nukes was ruled out. The US did consider it at one point." Arif argues that much shouldn't be read into Rumsfeld's remarks as "its (the US') nuclear policy allows it to keep this option open and use its nukes whenever it wants to".

Others also say that 2001 isn't 1945, when the US was keen to end World War II. As of now, it is in no hurry to end its war, nor is there curiosity in studying the impact of nukes. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in Afghanistan at this early stage of the war could have other adverse consequences for Washington. Points out Masood, "You cross a very dangerous threshold and you take the war into a different zone altogether. You also cross the moral threshold: the coalition against terror would split overnight."

Adds Gen (retd) K. Mattiuddin, who has authored several books on Afghanistan, "The US has no need to go in for nuclear weapons. It would exercise this option in the event of a world war, or in case it had to go to war against China." But if remarks about tactical nuclear weapons weren't enough, there soon followed media reports about the US and Israel undertaking military exercises to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear weapons, in the event of President Pervez Musharraf being ousted from power. Qureshi shrugged his shoulders and declared, "These reports are baseless and ridiculous. It shows how ignorant they are of the procedure and have little idea of the system involved to safeguard these nuclear weapons. There is no question of anyone attacking or coming close to them."

But Masood doesn't share Qureshi's optimism. He argues, "I certainly think this can happen in the worst-case scenario. For instance, if power goes into the hands of some radicals, the entire world would be too eager to de-nuke Pakistan." But Arif thinks the media reports were in themselves bogus. "The article on the option of de-nuking Pakistan's capabilities was by Seymour Hersh, an anti-Pakistan Jew. He's just maligning our nuclear programme," he says.

Some others think any attempt to target Pakistan's nuclear capability could have catastrophic consequences. For one, it could split the otherwise united army, with factions competing to protect the nuclear arsenal and plunging the country into chaos.

Mattiuddin, anyway, thinks it wouldn't be easy, even for the US, to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear weapons. His argument: "Our nuclear weapons are not lying ready for someone to come and pick them up. They are not in an assembled state. Nuclear weapons are not so simple; they are not carried away in briefcases. For instance, these weapons cannot be detonated till you know the codes. And second, even if our weapons are neutralised, you cannot take the nuclear knowledge away from us."

What surprised some was Indian defence minister George Fernandes' statement that Pakistani nukes were in fact in safe hands. Strategic thinkers, however, feel Fernandes was only articulating New Delhi's own fears of being de-nuked, besides sending a message to the world that South Asian nations are responsible nuke states.

The 'nuke confusion' received a new twist with Islamabad arresting three top nuclear scientists who had worked at the prestigious Kahuta Research Laboratory. It was again the western media which had hinted at their role in assisting Osama bin Laden to acquire nuclear sinews.Though the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, laughed at the US' paranoia and declared his country couldn't even manufacture glass, the Pakistan government kept a stiff upper lip through the week.

Last week's nuclear confusion, indeed, vividly illustrates the dangers the Afghanistan crisis poses to Pakistan and the many inconceivable turns Operation Enduring Freedom could take.