Marginalising India

Bolstered by Pakistan's continuing military support and encouraged by the USA'sdiplomatic support to its military operations against the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE), the Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapakse hasbeen increasingly insensitive to India's concerns over the humanitariancatastrophe facing the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Even while describing Indiaas Sri Lanka's "best friend"—Mr Rajapakse continues with his policyof targeted killings of innocent Tamil civilians through punitive air strikesand the use of heavy artillery and has been trying to bring them down to theirknees through a policy of starving them.

His lack of concern for the humanitarian catastrophe and his indifference toIndia's anxieties in the matter became evident  after  the meeting ofthe representatives of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donors' Conference of2003—Japan, Norway, the European Union and the US—held in Washington onNovember 21, 2006. This meeting, while articulating proforma criticisms of theacts of violence and indiscriminate killing of civilians by the Sri Lankan governmentand the LTTE, came out strongly in support of the Sri Lankan government andshowed a calculated indifference to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr R. Nicholas Burns,was particularly forthcoming in support of the Sri Lankan government during thejoint press briefing by the participants at the meeting. The remarks of Mr Burnsand others at the press briefing have been interpreted by the hard-liners in theSri Lankan government as amounting to an indirect endorsement of the methodsfollowed by the security forces in their operations against the LTTE and asindicating that the Co-Chairs are decreasingly averse to the Sri Lankan government'sefforts to solve the problem of the Tamils militarily. The hardliners have cometo believe that the Co-Chairs are increasingly inclined to close their eyes tothe brutal  suppression of the Tamils.

There has been a revival of the pre-1983 interest of the US Navy in acquiringa presence in Trincomallee and hopes of achieving this with the support of the governmentof Mr Rajapakse should at least partly account for the growing open support ofthe US for Mr  Rajapakse and its disinclination to take a firm standagainst the methods employed by the  Sri Lankan security forces against theTamil population. Trincomallee has acquired a new importance in the eyes of theUS and the NATO forces presently fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan asan alternative naval base for logistic support to the NATO operations inAfghanistan should instability in Pakistan after the next year's generalelections there make the continued use of Karachi untenable.

Mr Burns has showered encomiums on what he described as India's responsibleattitude on Sri Lanka----which is nothing but an euphemism for its inactivism.Even while making from time to time proforma statements expressing themselves infavour of a more active role by India, the US and Sri Lanka seem happy with thepresent inactivism of New Delhi.

When Mr Rajapakse talks of the need for Indian activism, what he has in mindis military activism in support of the operations of his security forces againstthe Sri Lankan Tamils and the LTTE—in the form of more training for the SriLankan Police and Security Forces, supply of military equipment,intelligence-sharing and joint patrolling by the Indian and Sri Lankan Navies toprevent arms smuggling by the LTTE.

He does not want Indian activism in the political and humanitarian fields.While India has never sought an activist role in the political field, the initiativesrecently taken by our Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, for humanitarianactivism under pressure from the Chief Minister, Shri M Karunanidhi, and otherleaders of Tamil Nadu have been given short shrift by Mr Rajapakse. Whilewelcoming the Indian offer of humanitarian supplies, Mr Rajapakse is reported tohave turned down suggestions that these should be routed to the Tamils throughthe International Red Cross and insisted that these should be sent to the SriLankan government, which would decide how they would be distributed.

The Indian predicament in the face of the strong line taken by Mr Rajapakseafter the endorsement which he received from the US was obvious during the pressbriefing held at Chennai on November 24, 2006, by Shri M.K.Narayanan, our PrimeMinister's National Security Adviser, and Shri Shivshankar Menon, our ForeignSecretary, after a meeting with Shri Karunanidhi. Shri Menon was on his way backto New Delhi after meeting Mr Rajapakse in Colombo and Shri Narayanan hadspecially flown from New Delhi for the meeting.

Shri Narayanan told the media as reported by The Hindu of November 25,2006: "We will decide if there is a necessity for it (sending humanitarianaid) at all.  And, if so, we will decide what will be the modalities."

The Deccan Chronicle of November 25, 2006, has reported that when ourForeign Secretary raised the possibility of the humanitarian assistance beingsent through the Red Cross, Mr Rajapakse "said a big 'no' arguing that suchan action would mean damning his government as untrustworthy, apart frominterfering with the island's sovereignty." But, at the same time, he hasissued an appeal to all local and international non-governmental organisations to get involved in the distribution of food.

How to address the humanitarian catastrophe which has been facing the Tamilswithout seeming to support the present leadership of the LTTE, which wasinvolved in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi? That is question of immediaterelevance to India. India should seriously consider organising a meeting of SriLanka, the US, EU, Norway, Japan, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)and the Interenational Committee of the Red Cross to discuss only thehumanitarian aspects of the present situation in Sri Lanka and find out ways ofassisting the Tamils. India should take over the leadership role in mobilisingthe international community on the humanitarian issue.

The strong  support for the Sri Lankan government from the Co-Chairs—particularly from the US —has had two reactions in the Sri Lankan Tamilcommunity—desperation and total disillusionment with the internationalcommunity on the one side and a trend towards a greater radicalisation of Tamilopinion and a greater determination to keep up their armed struggle against the governmenton the other. What impact it will have on the ground situation remains to beseen.

(B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai.)