Disturbing Trends: Police System

Crime Against Humanity 
Volume 2 An inquiry into the carnage in Gujarat -- Findings And Recommendations  by Concerned Citizens Tribunal -Gujarat 2002

Disturbing Trends: Police System

1.1. The Tribunal has looked at a lot of evidence on trends in police behaviourespecially related to communal riots.

1.2. Findings and recommendations of several officially appointed judicial com-missions of inquiry appointed by various state and central governments to probe intocommunal violence, the report of the National Integration Council and the sixth re-port of the National Police Commission have all indicted the police for partisanbehaviour towards religious minorities and Dalits in particular and have made recom-mendations to check this disturbing fact.

1.3. This disturbing trend has become more acute in recent years thanks to theunchecked politics of intolerance pursued by the Sangh Parivar.

1.3.1.Justice Shiv Dayal Srivastava’s report on the riots in Jabalpur, Sagar, Damoh and Narasinhapur (MP),February 1961, comments adversely on the laxity in investigation. (See Detailed Annexures, Volume III).

1.3.2. The Justice Raghubar Dayal Commission of Inquiry into the 1967 riots inRanchi, Sholapur, Malegaon, Ahmednagar, Sursand, Jaipur and Suchetpur found the conduct of the police to befar from satisfactory.

1.3.3. The Justice Jagmohan Reddy Commission of Inquiry investigating theAhmedabad riots of 1969 has cited more than half a dozen instances where Muslim religious places adjoiningpolice lines or police stations were attacked or damaged. The argument advanced by the police officers thatbecause they were busy quelling riots at various other places, these police stations were shorn of adequatestrength and hencethese attacks on religious places could not be stopped, did not impress the Commission. It made thisobservation because not a single Hindu place of worship near a policestation was reported to the Commission as having been damaged or destroyed.

1.3.4. Report of the Justice DP Madon Commission of Inquiry into the CommunalDisturbances at Bhiwandi, Jalgaon and Mahad in May, 1970: “Several instances have been proved before theCommission in which police officers and policemen either didnot prevent Hindu rioters from indulging in rioting, looting or arson, or showed com-munal discrimination in dealing with the rioting mobs, or gave incorrect informationto the control room or lodged incorrect FIRs, in order to make out that the personswho had rioted or were responsible for looting or arson in particular incidents were Muslim rioters notHindu, or actively assisted Hindu rioters in burning and lootingMuslim properties.” (See Detailed Annexures, Volume III). The commission’s comments on the SpecialInvestigation Squad of Bhiwandi: “The working of the Special Inves-tigation Squad is a study in communal discrimination.”

1.3.5. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Tellicherry Disturbance, 1971, Justice (retd)Joseph Vithyathil: “236.Through the evidence of the deputy SP, he says that while on patrol duty he had tocurb many among his rank and file who could not restrain themselves whenthey met Muslims on the road. Similar evidence was given by the sub-collector and other witnesses who havetestified saying that while chasing away some Muslims many policemenyelled at them to go to Pakistan. At Mattambaram one or two of them got into the mosque and besides beatingUsmakutty Haji, a very respectable person, broke the tube-light andchandeliers in the mosque. There is nothing to show that there was any justification for this action… I aminclined to think that this was a high-handed act done by some policemen whomade use of the opportunity to exhibit their anti-Muslim feelings.”

1.3.6. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Jamshedpur riots in April 1979,by Justice J Narain, Shri SK Ghosh and Shri SQ Rizvi: “During the course of inquiry by the commission therewere wide-ranging complaints regarding the anti-Muslimbehaviour of the Bihar Military Police(BMP)… the facts and circumstances of the attack on the Muslim bastidid give rise to the suspicion that deliberate or otherwise,firing by the police on the Hindus had no effect. Not a single Hindu could be identi-fied as having beeninjured or killed as a result of 108 rounds fired by the BMP in thisarea over a period of 24 hours; this couples with the fact that when the Hindu attack-ing mob had been drivenaway from the area, 9 Muslims were found dead in their ownhomes… The Commission feels that the composition, training discipline and leader-ship in the BMP leaves muchto be desired…”

1.3.7.. Inquiry report on Meerut Riots, September-October 1982, by Shri NC Saxena,former director, Indian Institute of Administration, Mussourie, to the central Minorities Commission of whichhe was joint secretary: “As regards the first act of violence which led to the riots, the districtadministration tried to give an impression that the riots broke out in Meerut town because the Pujari of thedisputed temple in mohalla Shahgasa wasmurdered on September 6, 1982. The aggressiveness of the Hindus, unlawful activities of the Hindu communalgroup and police inaction prior to the murder of the Pujari wasnot highlighted in either the reports of the district administration or in the national newspapers… Rightfrom the beginning the district administration saw the communalriot as instigated by the Muslims and the Hindu action as retaliation and therefore chose to take stern actionagainst Muslims only… The orders from the senior officers in thedistrict to the police could be summarised in one phrase, ‘Muslims must be taught a lesson’. The PAC andthe police faithfully implemented this policy. Looting and arson,in this context, was considered legitimate and necessary, and was therefore ignored. The districtadministration was very keen to retain the PAC in the district and bitterly op-posed suggestions for getting it replaced by CRPF or BSF.”

1.3.8. The Report (majority) of the Commission of Inquiry into the Bhagalpur Riots of October 1989, signed by Justices RCP Sinha and S Shamsul Hasan and published in 1995, said: “The roleof magistracy was no different from that of the police. In general they were cowardly, communal andindifferent to the sufferings of thecommon man… Admittedly hordes of Hindus, the number going up to thousands, attacked the localities andvillages of Muslim inhabitants, but nobody was arrested inthe process of attacking an area... From the officers to ordinary police constables, and the smallerfunctionaries of the administration, barring a few exceptions, they weretotally infected with an anti-Muslim bias. This is evident from the fact that every unlawful act succeeded,totally uninterrupted by any administrative interference ex-cept in one or two cases… We would hold the SP of Bhagalpur, KS Dwivedi wholly responsible for whateverhappened before October 24, 1989, on that day and afterOctober 24. His communal bias was fully demonstrated by the manner in which he arrested Muslims and by hisextending no adequate protection to them.”

1.3.9. Report of the J Ranganath Misra Commission of Inquiry into the 1984 riotsin Delhi: “The riots occurred broadly on account of the total passivity, callousness and indifference of thepolice in the matter of controlling the situation and protecting the people of the Sikh community.”

1.3.10. Sixth Report of the National Police Commission, March 1981: “(There are)several instances where police officers and policemen have shown an unmistakable bias against a particularcommunity while dealing with communal situations… (Thecomposition of the police) is heavily weighted in favour of the majority community.”

1.3.11. In its report, the National Integration Council, drew similar conclusions:“The most disquieting feature in recent times is the loss of credibility of the police in the effectivetackling of communal disturbances. The charge of partisanship was lev-elled against the PAC during the communal violence at Aligarh. A police force which cannot command the trustof all sections of the community is self-defeating… Police, like the judiciary, must not only be impartialbut must manifestly be so. We have to build up a police system without caste and communal prejudices affectingits roleand performance, a system vigilant, alert and impartial, capable of exercising opera-tional freedom in theruthless suppression of communal riots.”

1.4.The Tribunal therefore observes that this disturbing trend of partisan, communal andanti-constitutional police behaviour has grown over time. Even prior to the Gujarat carnage, the police havealmost always been charged with unprofessional, partisan conduct.

1.5. The issue of police bias has been a subject of nationwide debate in recent yearsunderlining the urgent need to professionalise the country’s police force. 

1.6. Despite the well-documentedfindings of so many commissions of inquiry, that reveal clear and distinct trends, despite the fact that everyfresh communal conflagra-tion provides further proof of police bias, no government has displayed the moralcourageto legislate on a statutory police commission with an independent structure and anindependent grievances cell to investigate complaints against police misconduct.

1.7. It is imperative that steps to reform the police force are placed on the nationalagenda for debate and fresh legislation immediately.