Between Illusion And Reality

With the issuing of the 12-point letter ofunderstanding between the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M, or ‘theMaoists’) – and the agitating seven-party alliance, the conflict in Nepalhas entered a dangerous period. This is recognized by all sides. Which waymatters will swing is being portrayed as dependent upon decision-making in thepalace, but of equal moment is what few seem inclined to discuss: the Maoists’‘real game’.

The leader of the legal (Parliamentarian) Marxists, Communist Party of Nepal– United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) General Secretary, Madhab Kumar Nepal, thepublic face of the agreement for the political parties, has put forth his beliefthat the Maoists have "developed a new maturity" in concluding thatthey are unable to complete their "capture of state power through thebarrel of the gun." Conseqeuntly, they are willing to do this peacefully,which means "if the Maoists resort to arms again, those in power will haveto take the blame."

This would hardly seem a stable platform for bargaining with the Palace,particularly given Madhab’s astonishing rider: "If the well-equipped Shahof Iran was uprooted by unarmed people, there is no reason why it can’t happenin Nepal." Why the monarch would be even slightly interested in holding adiscussion based upon such terms, apparently, is because the most importantthing is ‘peace’.

Waving this flag, the political parties have, indeed, stormed back ontocentre stage, making a bargain which is altruistic, Machiavellian, or simplysuicidal, depending on how the cards fall. However this may be, theirlong-running battle with the palace has caused them to play ‘peace’ as thehand that will gain them both power and breathing room from their mortal foes,the Maoists. There is no ‘peace’, goes the stated logic, because there is no‘democracy’; and there is no ‘democracy’ because ‘the Palace’insists upon violence. That this is historical falsification of the first orderwould be apparent to anyone who has even notional familiarity with the politicalhistory of Nepal.

There is insurgency in Nepal due to shortcomings of the system that evolvedduring the democratic era. Those most responsible are the same individuals whohave cut the present deal with the Maoists – not just the same parties butthe same individuals. That this well-documented reality could somehow beblamed upon the Palace was a position that emerged in vibrant form only with the‘Royal Massacre’ that replaced the previous monarch, Birendra, with hisless-popular brother, Gyanendra. The latter’s missteps have served to elevatethe parties to the position they now hold as advocates of a ‘democracy’ theynever practiced, either in power or within their own ranks.

In reality, it is the nature of ‘democracy’ thathas been the issue all along in the present struggle. For the Maoists, thechoice has never been between ‘absolute democracy’ and ‘autocraticmonarchy’, the terms used in the 12-point agreement. It has been betweenparliamentary democracy and ‘people’s democracy’. The former is portrayedas a Western concept. The latter is certainly also a Western concept, but inNepal it is portrayed as ‘Maoist’. (The very Western origin of Maoistideological beliefs is regularly on display at the CPN-M’s public gatherings,where place of honour is occupied by the pantheon of ‘white gods plus one’– Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao).

What ‘absolute democracy’ means for the Maoists, operationally, is theability to knock from the battlefield their only tangible obstacle, themonarchy. What it means strategically is the ability to move beyond the gun tothe ballot at this particular juncture in the struggle. It is what theSandinistas did so adroitly, moving rapidly within ‘democracy’ to solidifywhat they had been after all along – people’s democracy. Apologists go tosome lengths to avoid discussing this aim, but it is the concrete manifestationof the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. It turned out so badly for theChinese that the Maoism espoused by the CPN-M is now completely rejected, aliveonly in South Asia and isolated pockets of Western anarchism.

That the Maoists have no intention of abandoning their strategic goal wasmade clear to cadres in the recent CPN-M leadership meetings in Rolpa. Whetherthey operationally will go the route of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)in Ulster, actually decommissioning their arms, remains to be seen. There aretoo many unknowns, not least the nature of the Maoists’ links with the newlyformed Communist Party of India-Maoist, CPI-Maoist, created through a merging ofthe two principal Maoist insurgencies in India, and aggressively committed toviolence as the only route to political power and social justice. In theirstatements, the two Maoisms have stated clearly that peaceful means are usefulonly so long as they facilitate the violent end.

Ironically, an important role in the emerging Maoist-UMLalliance (with the remaining six parties figuring in as necessary) apparentlyhas been played by members of the Indian ‘legal Left’, a catch-all term forthose Marxists who participate in parliamentary democracy while disclaiming itsultimate legitimacy – the same position taken by the UML in Nepal. On the onehand, Indian Left participation offers some grounds for optimism, since thelegal Left does not engage in insurgency (which is not the same thing aseschewing violence, something PIRA has demonstrated well in the Catholic ghettosof Ulster). On the other hand, it is also grounds for profound disquiet, sincethe ‘terms of reference’, as reflected in the 12-point agreement, are vagueand contingent upon the surrender of the present Nepali Royal Government. Thisonly heightens Nepali nationalist suspicions that what is being set in motion isa ‘Sikkim solution’.

In fact, prisoners taken by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and documentscaptured clearly state that the present Maoist course is ‘tactical’, thatthe CPN-M will not compromise its ultimate goals: political power and‘people’s democracy’. Even a ‘peaceful’ solution, then, depends uponthe monarch and RNA being willing to accept a transition as witnessed inCambodia under UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority), with thetremendous difference being the position of the monarchy. In Cambodia, themonarch became constitutional, but the 12-point agreement mentions only‘absolute democracy’ (which means a departure of the monarchy, not just themonarch). This is not a minor discrepancy, and the manner in which the 12-pointagreement appears to claim there is nothing for Gyanendra save exile, guaranteesthat it will not be considered seriously.

All eyes seem glued to the palace to see the next move. It is not hard todiscern. In a situation where the political parties have committed themselves toobstruction, the Royal thinking should go, political forces must be allowed anoutlet in new political parties. This is easier said than done. The schedulingof local and national elections is a first step; ensuring their success is thesecond; providing local security for the winners is the third. Absent localsecurity, it will all be a paper drill.

If, as seems likely, the conflict continues,counterinsurgency will proceed by using the local elections to restore localconnections to the Centre. Restoration of local democracy must occur behind asecurity shield and be the means for proper governance. Proper governance mustinclude restoration of local democratic decision-making, micro-development, andlocal security. In this campaign, the political parties have adamantly refusedto participate, seeing it as but a thinly disguised means to restore theprevious and reviled panchayat system.

That the government’s approach should be considered controversialdemonstrates the degree to which polarization and mistrust have poisoned theNepali polity. Thus the Maoists have emerged as advocates of ‘peace’, and‘negotiations’ are held up – not least by elements within the foreignpresence in Nepal – as an alternative to waging counterinsurgency. In reality,as stated directly in the RNA’s campaign plan, the goal is thatcounterinsurgency restores legitimate government writ in such fashion and tosuch extent that the Maoists ultimately agree to reincorporation within thepolitical system. The constant saw that ‘there is no military solution’ isjust a demand for inaction. In reality, negotiations are always on the table butmust be used as part of an overall approach to the conflict.

Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Maoists accept the commonunderstanding of ‘negotiations’. To the contrary, evidence supports aconclusion that the point of the current ceasefire is to further the armedstruggle. Maoist exhortations to combatants continue to state that the old-ordercan only be addressed with violence. Fellow-travelers, continues the partyline, will be accepted as long as they are useful, but they will not have ameaningful role in the shaping and execution of ‘New Democracy’.Nevertheless, it is felt by the party that the political parties can play animportant role, "with all forces against the autocratic monarchycentralizing [focusing] their assault against the autocratic monarchy from theirrespective positions, thereby creating a nationwide storm of democraticprotest."

Absent the ‘nonviolent’ delivery of operational victory, however, planshave been laid and are being implemented for the resumption of the Maoistmilitary assault within the overall strategy for the seizure of power. The‘nationwide storm’ only has worth so long as it delivers by ‘politicalmeans’ that which can only be gained at greater cost through violent means. Ifthis is the strategy, operational intent will include demonstrations inurban areas and attacks in rural areas to force the government to fight on twofronts.  The RNA is aware of this to some extent, but it is unclearhow much is being done to prepare.  

There are two pressing government failures that havecontributed to its present situation. The first is the failure to address the informationwarfare side of the equation is causing serious problems. A key aspect ofan information warfare campaign should be to bring the Indian government back inthe game in a positive manner. The impression of ‘failure’ and of‘democracy destroyed’ that has gone unchecked has allowed the legal Marxiststo support the elements of the ruling coalition at Delhi that seek tomeddle in Nepal’s affairs. The issue is rarely stated as such, but there areLeft Wing elements (within India) who view India’s own democracy asproblematic, so they would like nothing more than to ‘act out’ againstwhatever force in Nepal can serve as a surrogate target. To that end,bringing the monarchy to its knees serves their immediate purposes.

This is not in India’s best interests, keenly aware as it is that it has agrowing Maoist problem on its hands within its own borders. The joint statementsand activities of the Nepalese and Indian Maoists, together with an upsurge ofactivities on the ground in India, has led to the center becoming much moreenergized in its approach to the lackluster state anti-militant campaigns. 

It may be noted in passing that most analysts feel that India is central toany solution in Nepal. The notion that a Nepali relationship with China is analternative to one with India is not viable. China is not willing to extenditself in any manner that can substantially assist in the presentcounterinsurgency, whereas India wants to help. It is simply being mired in thesame domestic processes that are hampering Nepal itself.

The second is the failure to implement some sort of solution to the localsecurity dilemma places the security forces in an impossible situation. Theinvariable reason given in Kathmandu (a year ago, as now) for having no localsecurity in place is ‘the EU’.  The problem of foreign donor objectionsto local security mechanisms is known, but local security is as much a matter ofC2 (command and control), transparency and semantics as anything else. TheBritish, for instance, made local security the foundation of their entire Ulstereffort through the ‘national guard’ mechanism of the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR).Likewise, the Colombians, facing the most profound legal challenges to localsecurity in recent memory, have found an effective and sustainable way toprotect areas through local forces.

Further, local security is indispensable.  There is no way toproceed in its absence.  As has been discussed time and again, the preciseform of local security must be determined – it need not even be armedcapacity. But it must be the capacity to inform and/or resist, pendingreinforcement by the security forces.

These, it bears observation, have improved, led by improvement in the qualityof RNA junior and middle grade officers. In many ways, in fact, the seniorservice, the RNA, is not the same force it was several years ago. Tacticaland operational improvement, however, can make no headway in the absence of astrategy for victory.

This highlights the heart of the matter: there still isno articulation of ‘why we fight’, much less a comprehensive state(national) plan for counterinsurgency. There is an RNA plan, and this doesbring along elements of the state at times, but there is no designated commandauthority that can bring together all facets of state power – much less theactual application of those assets. This cannot be the job of the monarch.

Democracy is the issue – upon that there is agreement. Regrettably, none ofthe contenders in the present struggle have demonstrated convincing commitmentto a reality that moves beyond the word. Since the 12-point agreement is not‘the answer’, either, the prospects – absent what would be (for Nepalipoliticians) an uncharacteristic willingness to move beyond generalities tospecifics – are for a resumption of violence at the end of the presentextension of ceasefire.

Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a Political Risk Consultant, Honolulu, Hawaii.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.