The Jehad Lives On

Contrary to the General Pervez Musharraf-led government's much-touted claimsof having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafiaand its terror network in Pakistan, a cursory glance over the activities of four'banned' militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back inbusiness, with changed names and identities, operating freely and advocating jehadagainst infidels to defend Islam.

While banning six leading jehadi and sectarian groups in two phases - onJanuary 12, 2002, and November 15, 2003 - General Musharraf had declared that noorganization or person would be allowed to indulge in terrorism to further itscause. However, after the initial crackdown, the four major jehadi outfitsoperating from Pakistan - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openlyas before, though under different names. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Maulana MasoodAzhar, Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and Syed Salahuddin - the respectiveleaders of these organizations - are again on the loose. The pattern oftreatment being meted out to these leading lights of jehad by theMusharraf-led administration shows that they are being kept on the leash,ostensibly to wage a controlled jehad in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

After the 9/11 terror attacks, the four jehadi leaders were placed underhouse arrests in their respective home towns in Punjab, since they were becomingincreasingly vocal in their condemnation of General Musharraf's policy of'slavery to the Americans'. A countrywide crackdown also had to be launchedagainst activists of the jehadi groups who were furious over Musharraf'su-turn on the Afghan jehad. Groaning under American pressure, Islamabadalso had to temporarily stop cross-border infiltration into J&K, whicheventually reduced violence levels in the Valley. Though most of the jehadigroups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait andsee' policy, the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authoritiesto dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. This was chiefly due to the factthat the unholy alliance between the state agencies and the jehadi groupswas quite old and had an ideological basis.

The failure of the Musharraf regime to counter extremist jehadis is,however, inexplicable within the current environment, as Islamabad has handedover more than 500 al-Qaeda operatives to the Bush Administration since the waron terror began. As the political will to dismantle the Islamist extremistgroups that are not on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) 'Most Wantedlist seems to be absent, almost all the major jehadi groups based inPakistan continue to operate and pursue their agenda without any restrictions.General Musharraf, by his own admission, no longer controls the jehadisthat the state had long supported, and the self-proclaimed holy warriors are farfrom ready to call it quits. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishmentcontinues to maintain its long alliance with fundamentalist parties, which sharea common goal with the jehadis: the liberation of 'Occupied Jammu &Kashmir' through jehad.

Had the six-party religious alliance - Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) -not sided with the General to pass the 17th Constitutional Amendment last year,the latter would have been left with no option but to quit the post of ArmyChief by December 31, 2004. But then the military, the mullahs and the jehadisshare a common belief in Pakistan's rightful claim over J&K. Consequently,Pakistan, the most trusted US ally in its war against terror, confronts asurging wave of Islamist fundamentalism. The growing influence of thefundamentalists in the country can be gauged by the fact that the MMA presentlycontrols 20 percent of the seats in the Pakistani Parliament. This means thatthe religious right, which had been a vocal supporter of the former Talibanregime in Afghanistan, has successfully moved from the periphery to the centerstage of national politics. As a result, support for the militant cause has alsogrown within sections of Pakistani society where it never existed before.

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)

Although the ongoing peace talks between India and Pakistan are being taken as abad news by most of the militant outfits waging armed struggle against theIndian forces in J&K, the leadership of one of the most feared jehadi groups,the LeT and its parent organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, are keeping their fingerscrossed. Sources close to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed,say he has been persuaded by the establishment to go low key and to abstain fromissuing statements criticizing the Indo-Pak peace parleys. In return, however,Saeed has been given assurance that no action would be taken against the Jamaat-ud-Dawaand its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and no restrictions onactivities including collection of funds, holding of public rallies or therecruitment of jehadi cadres and their training. The result is that,after a year of hibernation under official pressure, Saeed, who founded the Lashkarin 1988, is again activate and making fiery speeches across Punjab. Saeed'sclose associates claim that young jehadis from various parts of thecountry continue to throng the Lashkar camps at Muzaffarabad in AzadKashmir before being pushed into J&K, though at a limited scale now.

The Lashkar is the only jehadi group operating from Azad Kashmirthat still keeps a comparatively large group of activists at its Khairati Baghcamp in the Lipa Valley. Another Lashkar camp is functional at Nala Shuiin Muzaffarabad from where young militants are launched after being giveninitial training at the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's Muridke headquarters in Punjab.Unlike the past strategy of launching large groups comprising of 25 to 50militants on a regular basis from the camps located on the LoC, Lashkar sourcesdisclose, it has now been decided to keep training militants in limited numbersto launch smaller groups of not more than five to fifteen people, that too, atintervals.

Despite the official ban, banners can easily be seen in the urban and ruralareas of Punjab, urging young boys to enroll with the Lashkar for jehad.These banners usually carry telephone numbers of the area offices. Similarly, Lashkarand Dawa activists can be seen outside mosques after Friday prayersdistributing pamphlets and periodicals preaching the virtues of jehad inKashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Kosovo and Eritrea, besides vowing that theLashkar would plant the flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi. TheLashkar leadership describes Hindus and Jews as the main enemies ofIslam, claiming India and Israel to be the main enemies of Pakistan. Thedonation boxes of the Lashkar and the Dawa, which had initiallydisappeared after the January 2002 ban, have reappeared on public places as wellas mosques all over the Punjab.

After the US State Department included the Lashkar in the list of itsofficially designated terrorist groups in December 2001, apparently acting underthe establishment's directives, the then Lashkar chief, Hafiz Saeed,addressed a press conference in Lahore [on December 24, 2001] and announced thatMaulana Abdul Wahid, who hails from Poonch district in Jammu, would head the Lashkar.While stepping down as Lashkar chief, Saeed said he would lead the Jamaat-ud-Dawa,the new name for the Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad. During the news briefing,Saeed said the changes were aimed at countering intense Indian propaganda thatPakistan had been sponsoring the jehad in the Kashmir Valley, though headded, in the same breath, that his departure from the high office of Ameer ofthe Lashkar was not due to any internal or external pressures, be it Islamabador Washington. A week later [on December 31, 2001], Saeed was placed under housearrest on flimsy charges of making inflammatory speeches and inciting people toviolate law and order. He was then asked to evolve a new role for Jamaat-ud-Dawa,which would be more acceptable to the world. Over the following years, the Dawasuccessfully evaded many official restrictions mainly because it haddissociated itself from the LeT. At the same time, to give an impression thatthe Kashmir insurgency was an indigenous freedom struggle - the Lashkar wasmade to announce in 2002 that it was formally shifting its base to 'Indian HeldKashmir.'

Over the past two years, Hafiz Saeed has taken a number of steps to camouflagehis jehadi agenda and to assume a role for the Dawa which couldhelp evade the category of terrorism. The Dawa has increasingly shiftedits focus on khidmat-e-khalq (social welfare) which is part of its dawat(Islamic mission) just like jehad. While giving more importance to takingits dawat to all sections of the populace, it has considerably expandedthe base of its operations. Giving greater importance to college students aswell, the Dawa leadership recently launched Tulaba Jamaatul Dawa, itsstudent wing, which is working aggressively to take its dawat toyoungsters across Punjab.

Saeed's close circles say the changing focus of the Dawa activitiescoupled with the caution exercised by him have helped their organization survivethe fresh ban Musharraf imposed on several extremist outfits in November 2003.However, explaining Musharraf's decision to spare Saeed's organization,well-informed intelligence sources say the Dawa chief was more amenableto the establishment's control than the leaders of any other jehadioutfit, as he can readily agree to wage a controlled jehad in the Valleywhenever required to do so. Further, his vulnerability has increased manifoldafter a split in Jamaat-ud-Dawa over distribution of the group's assets,that gave birth to a breakaway faction - Khairun Naas (Peoples' Welfare),led by Professor Zafar Iqbal.

These circles are convinced that General Musharraf would neither abandon themilitants nor the military option until there is a formal resolution of thelingering Kashmir dispute. They pointed out that the last time Musharraf hadmade the promise of curbing militancy to the visiting US Deputy Secretary ofState, Richard Armitage, in May 2003, the militants were held back for only acouple of months before being allowed to resume infiltration across the LoC. Andshould the Indo-Pak peace initiative fail; there are those in the militaryestablishment who believe the Lashkar could once again be the frontline jehadioutfit in J&K and Hafiz Saeed the new public face of the militancy there.

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

Acting under the establishment dictum, one of the most dangerous jehadiorganizations operating from Pakistan and active in J&K, the JeM, restyleditself as the Khudamul Islam, claiming it is devoted to preaching Islamand social work. The Jaish chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, who had to bereleased by the Indian government in December 1999 after an Indian airplane washijacked, is one of India's 20 most-wanted men.

However, Maulana Masood Azhar had to face the wrath of the Pakistaniintelligence establishment after his group was found involved in the December2003 suicide attacks against General Musharraf in Rawalpindi. Investigationsinto these attacks later cleared Masood Azhar's name after it transpired thatone of the two suicide bombers - Mohammad Jameel - actually belonged to the Jaish'sdissident group - Jamaatul Furqaan, led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar aliasMaulana Umer Farooq. Much before the suicide attacks, Masood had informed theISI high-ups in writing that Jabbar and 11 of his associates had revoltedagainst him and he was no more responsible for their actions.

That the military and intelligence establishment of Pakistan continues toprotect Masood Azhar is evident from Islamabad's refusal to a request by theInternational Police (Interpol) for taking the Jaish chief into custody.Interpol had been prompted to act at the behest of the US Department of Justice,which wanted charges filed against the Maulana from Bahawalpur and againstSheikh Ahmed Omar Saeed for their involvement in at least two crimes committedagainst American citizens - the 2002 murder of journalist Daniel Pearl and the1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 (with a US citizen, JeanneMoore, aboard). The Americans had maintained that under the US law, they havethe right to investigate crimes against their citizens committed anywhere in theworld.

The Jaish, which was launched by Azhar after being released from India,has largely confined its military operations within J&K. The only recordedinstance of its operations outside Kashmir had been the December 13, 2001,attack on Parliament in New Delhi. Earlier, on October 10, 2001, a month afterthe terror attacks struck the United States, Masood Azhar had renamed Jaish asTehrikul Furqaan. The move was motivated by reports that the US wascontemplating declaring JeM a foreign terrorist. Despite its renaming, the USState Department designated the Jaish a foreign terrorist organization inDecember 2001, compelling Musharraf to ban the group in January 2002. MasoodAzhar got his outfit registered under the new name of Khudamul Islamwithin no time.

The Jaish chief was kept under house arrest for a few months after the9/11 terror attacks, but was subsequently set free. Though Masood Azhar, whileconceding to the ISI's pressure, had directed his henchmen not to target theAmerican interests in Pakistan, there are strong fears in the Pakistaniintelligence circles that the dissident members of the Jaish, who areunknown and have gone underground, constitute the real threat. They are spreadall over Pakistan, and are desperate to avenge the Taliban's fall andMusharraf's U-turn on Afghanistan and Kashmir. Both the Jaish factions - KhudamulIslam and Jamaatul Furqaan, already banned by the Musharraf government- are now openly in conflict.

The murmurs of dissent in the outfit first surfaced when Masood Azhar failed toreact to General Musharraf's policy change on Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorattacks. Several prominent Jaish members favoured retaliatory attacksagainst US interests in Pakistan to pressurize the military ruler againstsupporting the Bush administration. But acting under the agencies' command,Masood refused to acquiesce. As things stand, there are fears that ongoingdisputes over possession of the various Jaish offices, mosques and othermaterial assets could lead to more serious clashes between the two bannedfactions. At this stage, it is difficult to predict which of the two willeventually survive.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and United Jehad Council (UJC)

Led by Rawalpindi-based Yousaf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin, HM is the outfit towatch in the coming months. Of all the militant groups operating in J&K, theHM is the largest, with a 20,000-strong cadre base drawn from both indigenousand foreign sources. The Hizb happens to be one of the most lethal jehadigroups, and controls about 60 per cent of militants operating in J&K.

With India and Pakistan finally agreeing to allow travel across the Line ofControl (LoC) by bus between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad, the Pakistani establishmenthas asked HM Chief Salahuddin to halt, for the time being, all militantoperations against the Indian security forces in J&K. However, the UnitedJehad Council (UJC), an alliance of 13 Kashmiri jehadi organizationsled by Salahuddin, has been restructured and three Pakistan-based jehadigroups, the LeT, JeM and Al-Badar Mujahideen have been brought into theUJC. This new adjustment is called Muwakhaat ('agreement on the basis ofbrotherhood') that is aimed at putting an end to the internal differences amongthe jehadi groups waging the Kashmir jehad.

According to the intelligence sources, reorganizing the command and controlstructure of the HM-led UJC was part of a strategy change to enable Pakistaniintelligence to have tighter control over its running. With the restructuring ofthe UJC, they said, no component member of the UJC would be allowed to launch anattack in J&K, unless approved by the Council. That is why most of thesmaller groups, which had been irritants for the ISI, have been merged to reducethe number of their representation in the Jehad Council from thirteen tofive. Al-Barq, Tehreek-e-Jehad, Islamic Front, Brigade 313 and theKashmiri component of HuM have been merged to form the Kashmir Freedom Force,which would be led by Farooq Qureshi of Al Barq. The Muslim JanbazForce, Al Jehad Force, Al Fateh Force, Hizbullah and Jamiatul Mujahideen (JuM)have also been merged to form the Kashmir Resistance Force which would be led byGhulam Rasool Shah. Similarly, many of the militant training camps have beenmoved from Azad Kashmir to Pakistan in Punjab and the Frontier provinces, withstrict restrictions on the movement of militants. The training camps havereportedly been relocated at Taxila, Haripur, Boi, Garhi Habibullah and TarbelaGazi.

The HM has witnessed four splits since 1990, and all were meant to removeSalahuddin. But the 'supreme commander' has survived and continues to controlthe HM and the UJC, while sitting in Rawalpindi. The Jamiatul Mujahideenof General Abdullah, the Muslim Mujahideen of Ahsan Dar, the Hizb-e-Islami ofMasood and Al-Badar of Bakht Zameen, are the major groups that havediscarded the umbrella of the HM in the past few years. In the words of oneex-intelligence official: "One of the tricks in the book is not to allowany individual jehadi group to become too strong. This is a tried andtested mode of keeping overall control on such groups. Whenever one group isseen as getting too strong or influential, the agencies try to split it andsometimes pit one against the other. And the Hizbul Mujahideen is noexception".

Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM)

Led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil till recently, the HuM has regrouped and isworking in a low-key manner under the name of the Jamiatul Ansar, butinsisting that it has a non-militant agenda.