New Digits In The Alphabet Soup

Once again, a major terrorist incident -- this time inJaipur -- has set off a strident and polarised national political debate on'counter-terrorism policy', with parties and leaders pulling out the same tiredold rabbits from their tattered hats. One of these proposals has caughtparticular attention, having been articulated, for the first time, by the PrimeMinister -- though the union home minister assures us that this has been underdiscussion for more than 20 years; this is the prospect of setting up a FederalCrimes Bureau (FCB) to look into a particular set of crimes, identified by theircomplexity, gravity or dispersal across state boundaries, including terrorism.

This has enthusiastically been seized upon by most commentators and, inprincipal, the concept of federal crimes and a federal agency to deal with themappears to be impeccable. The arguments in support of this proposal -- and thefailure of the proposal in the face of the apparent obduracy and cussedness ofthe states -- has been widely documented over the past days, and will not detainus here. 

The issue at hand is that the proposal to create a new setup for federalcrimes reflects an approach that remains fragmented, divorced from the realitiesof the acute institutional deficits and near collapse that afflict existingstate organisations, and the inability to comprehend -- leave alone cope with --the sheer diversity of terrorist activities and operations, of which theoccasional attack is only the most dramatic of many manifestations. 

The FCB proposal has resurfaced urgently out of concerns over the continuedand persistent failure to 'solve' virtually all the major terrorist incidents ofthe past three years, and on the grounds that the states 'botched'investigations, or were not able to efficiently pursue leads beyond their ownterritorial jurisdictions. The FCB, duly empowered and 'naturally' reflecting anefficiency far superior to various provincial units, it is argued, would be farmore effective in investigating these trans-state crimes, and in hunting downterrorists and bringing them to book. If evidence is necessary, look at the longhistory of successes of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

This is a pattern of reasoning that has been recurrent in the creation orconceptualisation of a number of other institutions set up over the past years,blindly imitating foreign -- and particularly US -- models. In the securitycontext, two examples come immediately to mind: the Defence Intelligence Agency(DIA) and the Department of Net Assessment (DNA). Both these have proven to benon-starters, marred by a confusion of mandates and severe deficits in manpower-- including the lack of suitable manpower within the limited contingentssanctioned -- and in resource allocation. 

The National Security Guard (NSG) is another case in point. Set up as farback as in 1984 to engage in high risk counter-hijacking and counter-terroristoperations, it has been able to establish a substantial infrastructure fortraining and research, an excellent pool of trained manpower, and particularexpertise and a database on improvised explosive devices. Nevertheless, itsutility has remained severely limited -- indeed, peripheral -- within thecounter-terrorism efforts in the country, essentially as a consequence ofdeficiencies in conception and design, which saw the country's elitecounter-terrorism group located at a single, centralized establishment, withacute limitation on rapid transportation to the points of engagement -- theareas of terrorist threat or attack. 

The reality is, there is already a multiplicity of agencies concerned withintelligence gathering, investigation and enforcement relating to variousaspects of terrorist activity, and this abundance of institutions has combinedwith an acute paucity of resources in each, compounded by severe difficulties ofcoordination and sharing of intelligence between these, and tremendousduplication of functions and consequent waste of already scarce resources. Thismultiplicity of agencies concerned with intelligence gathering itself suggests asignificant problem of coordination, intelligence sharing and focused responsestrategies. 

An unpublished review by this writer of the state's capacities to monitorhawala and other illegal financial operations by terrorists revealed, forinstance, that there were at least fifteen central agencies variously chargedwith financial intelligence monitoring and enforcement across the country. Eachof these agencies was under-resourced and struggling to maintain a modicum ofefficiency in executing a fraction of its mandate.

Adding FCB to the existing alphabet soup ofintelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies does not hold any promiseof a unique or efficient solution to the current crisis of terrorism, unlessthere is a complete and uncharacteristic reversal of the country's recenthistory of institution building. At best, another shell organisation,overburdened by an ambitious (and largely imitative) mandate, but deprived ofthe means to secure its objectives, would be set up, creating a new drain onnational resources. Building up such an organisation would take years, if notdecades, and it would, at least initially, scavenge its manpower from otherexisting and hard-pressed security, intelligence and enforcement organisations

This, however, is not the only argument against the FCB. A simple 'crimeinvestigation' model envisaged for the projected Federal agency certainly wouldnot work with terrorism -- though such an agency may (as existing state andcentral agencies sometimes do) succeed in solving the occasional terroristcrime. 

Terrorism is a continuous and complex activity involving persistent networks,and effective counter-terrorist action cannot be reduced to the task ofinvestigation -- however efficient -- after an attack. There is a necessaryintegrity of preventive, intelligence and investigative functions incounter-terrorism. Given the complex linkages and the diversity of criminal,collusive and subversive operations -- encompassing the entire gamut offinancial, violent and political crimes -- that underpin terrorism, and theunique threat these activities now constitute for the security and integrity ofthe country, intelligence, investigation, and enforcement can no longer betreated in isolation. 

Effective counter-terrorism involves the tracking and evidentiarydocumentation of a wide range of continuous subversive and criminal activitiesthat only periodically manifest themselves in the theatre of a bomb blast orother terrorist attack. According to recent disclosures, UK's internalintelligence agency, MI5, for instance, created dossiers on over 8,000 'at risk'individuals -- those who, by belief, conduct or association, appeared especiallyvulnerable to extremist mobilisation -- in addition to the surveillance andinvestigation of 1,600 suspects believed to be involved in 200 terroristnetworks and 30 'active plots'. This is the scale and scope of counter-terrorismintelligence and investigative operations under a single Central Agency in acountry as small as the UK. 

What, then, of a federal agency to tackle terrorism andother crimes envisaged under the jurisdiction of the proposed FCB? The solutionlies in taking the most suitable among existing central agencies, expanding itsmandate and legislative cover, and drastically augmenting its resourcecomplement. 

Inevitably, a turf war will break out the moment such a proposal isarticulated. Advocates supporting the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) andthe Intelligence Bureau (IB) can be expected to make persuasive cases as to whyeither of these is best suited for the task (and the concomitant augmentation ofpower and resources), and even more persuasive cases why the other agency isparticularly unsuited. 

Within a purely investigative context, the CBI would appear to be a strongpossible candidate for the undertaking. Despite the severe, and in may casesextremely valid criticisms of the CBI on its record of investigations, andparticularly its politicisation (a criticism that would apply, equally, tovirtually every agency of government today), the fact remains, the CBI is thecountry's premier investigative agency.

As already stated, however, a purely investigative model has little relevance inthe context of the centre's counter-terrorism role, and the necessary functionsa proposed central agency would be required to perform if it is to deal with thewide range of tasks -- with both internal and external dimensions -- that arenecessary if the limitations of state agencies are to be overcome in dealingwith this trans-state and trans-national challenge. 

Within the limited spectrum of existing agencies, it would appear that the IBhas the most proximate resemblance in functions to those that would be requiredby a proposed Federal Agency for Counter-Terrorism. It has nation-wideintelligence operations and has created a very substantial data bank ofintelligence on terrorist organisations and individuals (although its nationaldatabase project has virtually stalled for lack of resources and clarity ofpurpose). Crucially, while the IB is not an investigative agency, a number ofstates credit very significant investigative breakthroughs in major cases ofterrorism to IB cooperation and support. The IB is, of course, tremendouslyhamstrung by gaping deficits in manpower, capacities and resources, and is noteven -- at the present stage -- capable of effectively fulfilling its presentmandate. A massive revamp, expansion and upgradation of the IB has long been onthe cards, and the capacities and functions that are necessary for the efficientoperation of this organisation overlap profoundly with those that would beassigned to the proposed Federal Agency. 

This line of evolution also makes greater sense within the context of prevailingand fractious centre-state relations. Cooperation -- and not conflict -- withstates is necessary, and the IB has been operating in continuous collaborationwith state agencies on the issue of terrorism (no doubt, with some conflict andmutual dissatisfaction), and this mechanism needs to be deepened andstrengthened, even as the IB's mandate is formally augmented. 

Crucially, the reality is that the states are so deeply concerned about theproblem that, if the capacities, technical resources and expertise were createdin a central agency, they would be eager to seek and secure its cooperation inresolving cases of terrorism and in effectively countering the networks andsupport structures of terrorism -- unless political confrontations areengineered over the issue of jurisdiction, or politically partisan allegationsof failure or bias undermine cooperation between central and state agencies.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR); ExecutiveDirector, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the SAIR of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal,