Naga Peace Overtures

The meeting of the leaders of the National SocialistCouncil of Nagaland - Isak- Muivah (NSCN-IM) with Prime Minister Manmohan Singhat New Delhi on December 7, 2004, and their subsequent 'homecoming' in Nagalandafter a self-imposed exile of 37 years, are, at a psychological level,significant movements in the ponderous pace of the Naga peace process - whichcommenced with a declaration of ceasefire by the rebel group and the governmentof India seven years ago.

NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah had earlier visitedDelhi to meet the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2003, andit is a measure of the elephantine gait of the negotiations that nothing muchhas changed since. Each such 'round' of high-level meetings is, nevertheless,greeted with great enthusiasm by the media and by those involved in the 'peaceprocess'.

This time round, though the first encounter between Prime Minister Singh and theNaga leaders was more about atmospherics than 'substantive' discussions, thereis reason to believe that the process may, in fact, soon be pushed forward. Forone thing, Muivah and Swu are not in India just for this meeting, but as part ofan extended programme of 'three or four months' that takes them back to Nagalandfor Christmas and New Year, and then returns them to New Delhi for a'substantive' phase of negotiations. 

At the end of this extended programme, there would be some erosion of thecredibility of the 'peace process', were it not to yield any visible results.However, it remains altogether unlikely that the current round of talks wouldabruptly 'resolve' the 'Naga problem' that has plagued India for 53 years.

In his meeting with Swu and Muivah, on December 7, the Prime Minister promised a"mutually acceptable and honourable solution that can ensure that the Nagapeople live a life of peace with dignity and self-respect." This is, ofcourse, unimpeachable, but it remains far from clear whether the situation inNagaland and the NSCN-IM's vision and agenda will lend themselves to any easyresolution. Nor, indeed, has the mistrust between the negotiating parties beenentirely purged. 

In fact, the Naga leaders were originally scheduled to arrive in Delhi inlate November, but the visit was aborted with allegations by the NSCN-IM that centralintelligence agencies and the Nagaland government were supporting and arming a'rival' Naga group, the Naga National Council (NNC) in a gambit to 'divide theNaga people'. Another suspicion was that the government of India (GoI) wasengaged in secret negotiations with the NSCN's rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K)as well, a charge the government denied. 

Union home minister Shivraj Patil also reportedly advised Chief Minister Rioto 'rein in' his minister who was accused of providing support to the NNC. Onthe other hand, the government has repeatedly accused the NSCN-IM of violatingthe 'ground rules' of the ceasefire, particularly for the movement of armedrebel cadres outside their designated camps and for administering an extensiveregime of extortion.

These, however, are just pinpricks in the expansiveminefield of talks. The real obstacles relate to the 'sovereignty' issue and,most crucially, the demand for a 'greater Nagalim', comprehending 'all Nagaareas'. The 'sovereignty' demand has gradually, though only implicitly - intheir public statements the NSCN-IM leaders remain committed to an independentNagaland, separate from India - been transformed into a claim for 'greaterautonomy'. 

On the Nagalim issue, however, the rebels have remained clear andunrelenting: they are not demanding a 'greater' or a 'lesser' Nagaland; they areonly demanding that all Naga 'homelands' be brought under one political unit. The problem, however, is that these claimed areas are spread over thegeographical territories of the Indian States of Manipur, Assam, ArunachalPradesh and Nagaland, as well as in parts of western Myanmar. 

While the Myanmarese territories cannot be part of any 'settlement' betweenthe Indian government and the rebels, there are compelling constitutionalconstraints on the transfer of the territories of any Indian state without theconsent of the states so affected. Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur have allfairly clearly rejected the inclusion of any of their territories in the"so-called Nagalim". 

In an additional obstruction, Prime Minister Singh's United ProgressiveAlliance (UPA) government is committed to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) thathas specifically rejected the redrawing of boundaries in the Northeast. Therebels are, moreover, claiming wide areas where the Naga presence is, at best,nominal. 

In Assam, for instance, the districts of Cachar, the North Cachar and KarbiAnglong, have been proclaimed as parts of the projected Nagalim. But thepopulation of Nagas (according to the 1991 Census) was just about 5 per cent inthe North Cachar Hills, as little as 0.37 per cent in Karbi Anglong and 0 percent in Cachar. In recent years, there have been deliberate and concentratedefforts by various Naga organizations to alter the demographics of many of theseareas, with efforts to settle a Naga population along the border areas insideAssam, with places like Mariani in Jorhat and Merapani in Golaghat districtacquiring significant Naga settlements. 

There have also been efforts to 'cleanse' Naga dominated areas in Manipur ofnon-Naga concentrations. The Kuki Movement for Human Rights (KMHR), forinstance, has alleged that the NSCN-IM militants had, on November 23, served a'quit notice' to Kuki villagers in Tamenglong district of Manipur, demandingthat the Kukis vacate these areas before Christmas. In Arunachal Pradesh, theNSCN-IM has been involved in concerted proselytizing activities among thetribals in the Tirap and Changlang districts in an attempt to project them as apart and parcel of the anticipated 'Nagaland for Christ'.

Many analysts have, moreover, noted that the Naga identityis synthetic, and of relatively recent origin. The NSCN-IM is dominated by theTangkhul tribe - largely concentrated in the hill districts of Manipur - towhich Muivah belongs, and, in lesser measure, by the Semas, represented by thenominal head of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu. Other tribes have often chafedunder this domination, and many of the fratricidal clashes between various Nagafactions - particularly the NSCN-K and, more recently, the NNC - aremanifestations of divided tribal loyalties. 

Two influential tribal organizations, the Ao Senden and the Sumi Hoho (theapex bodies of the Ao and Sumi tribes), have, further, decided to boycott thereception organized for Muivah and Swu at Dimapur on December 14. Indeed, amongthe imperatives that impel the NSCN-IM's demand for an 'integrated Nagalim' isthe fact that leaders like Muivah and 'Home Minister' Rh. Raising would havevery little tribal following in a 'Nagalim' that excluded the hill districts ofManipur. 

Any meddling with State territories in the Northeast, however, would behighly disruptive, as was clearly demonstrated by the violent reaction inManipur after the ill-advised extension of ceasefire 'without territoriallimits' in June 2001 - which had been interpreted as a covert recognition of the'Greater Nagalim' idea. Several militant non-Naga tribal groups - including,most recently, the Kuki National Army, have threatened a 'bloodbath' in theevent of any territorial reorganization that affects their respective'traditional' lands.

Each of these streams of opposition have long and complex histories that wouldobstruct any easy settlement between the Centre and the NSCN-IM, and many morepolitical entities - including the elected governments of the affected States ofthe Northeast, the most consistently ignored parties in the 'search for peace'in Nagaland - would have to be taken into confidence before any sustainableadvances can be made.

Nevertheless, advances are, in fact, now a distinctpossibility. During their current tour of Nagaland, the rebel leaders would beinteracting with a wide spectrum of the local leadership - including the NagaHoho, the traditional umbrella organization uniting over 30 Naga tribes - togauge 'popular sentiment'. They would certainly hear many and impassioned pleasfor peace, and at least some complaints against the misconduct and extortion byNSCN-IM cadres.

Muivah and Swu have been deprived of such direct feedback for nearly theentire period of their almost four-decade exile, though they had made aclandestine visit to Dimapur in May 1999 - crossing over from Thailand. Duringthat visit, they had consulted with their cadres in an effort to hammer out a'solution' short of the 'independence formula', but failed to arrive at aconsensus.

While the NSCN-IM is anything but a democratic entity, its leadership is not,and cannot be, entirely indifferent to the transformed mood of the people inNagaland who are exhausted by the unending and fratricidal violence, and theirown exclusion from the opportunities of development and the fruits of modernity.Significantly, moreover, both Muivah and Swu are now feeling the burden of age,and there are many who believe that they would be eager to arrive at an earlysettlement, fearing a dissipation of the movement in the event of their demise.

Hammering out an 'honourable' agreement, however, remains a challenge, thoughnot one that is insurmountable. Much of what the NSCN-IM demands by way of'greater autonomy' already exists within, or can be created by minor amendmentsto, the Indian Constitution.

As regards 'Greater Nagalim' the centre can be expected to offer a process,rather than a solution, one that would involve the gradual enlargement ofdialogue and conciliation between all concerned parties and states; one thatwould certainly be protracted but which could, eventually, yield an outcomeuntainted by the bloodshed and exclusionary hatred that has long afflicted theconflicting contentions of tribal groups in India's Northeast. If the Indianstate is to engage in negotiations based on questionable principles with armedinsurgent groups, this is, perhaps, the best that can be hoped for.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for ConflictManagementCourtesy,  the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal