Explicit Departures

1. Prime Minister: India will not compromise its strategic interests.

A sense of the House resolution states India "has a foreign policycongruent to that of the US, and is working with the US in key foreign policyinitiatives related to non-proliferation." . "such cooperation willinduce the country to give greater political and material support to theachievement of US global and regional non-proliferation objectives, especiallywith respect to dissuading, isolating and, if necessary, sanctioning andcontaining states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups; that are seekingto acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destructioncapability and the means to deliver such weapons."

Further, it states that the US "secure India's full and activeparticipation in US efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary, sanction andcontain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including anuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich or processnuclear materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction."

While these sections are non-binding, taken together with Presidentialcertification and Congress and Senate approval for the 123 Agreement, imposesserious restrictions on India's independent foreign policy.

2. Prime Minister's Statement in Parliament: Full co-operation on civiliannuclear technology, which should include the complete fuel cycle.

Senate: Section 6 prohibits exports of equipment, materials or technologyrelated to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, orthe production of heavy water. The Senate version enunciates the need to furtherrestrict such equipment and technologies to India which means that the currentsanctions on a host of technologies considered as dual use would be still underembargo.

3. Prime Minister's suo motu statement on July 29 last year: "we committedourselves to separating the civilian and strategic programme. However this wasto be conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the United States fulfilling its sideof the understanding. steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon andcontingent on action taken by the United States."

"Before voluntarily placing our civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards,we will ensure that all restrictions on India have been lifted."

Senate and Congress: There is an annual certification clause that can stop theco-operation. More importantly, India has to negotiate its agreement with IAEAbefore the final agreement for transfer of civilian technology is passed by theCongress. The current Bills enable the President to propose such a Bill to theCongress and Senate under the Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of the US,who have to both pass it for cooperation in civilian nuclear energy to takeplace.

a) Section 8 requires annual Presidential certifications (written determinationto the Congress) that India is meeting its commitments under the July 2005 JointStatement, its Separation Plan, New Delhi's Safeguards Agreement and AdditionalProtocol with the IAEA, the 123 Agreement, and applicable U.S. laws regardingU.S. exports to India. [and also that it is cooperating with the US to preventspread of fuel enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries that do notalready have "full scale, functioning enrichment of reprocessingplants" (obvious target Iran). So continued good certificate on Iran is arequirement here] The bill is an important step toward implementing the nuclearagreement with India, but is not the final step in the process. This legislationsets the rules for subsequent Congressional consideration of a so-called"123 Agreement" between the U.S. and India. A "123Agreement" is the term for a peaceful nuclear cooperation pact with aforeign country under the conditions outlined in Section 123 of the AtomicEnergy Act.

4. The March Agreement: US would take necessary steps to change its laws andalso align the NSG rules to fulfil the terms of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal.

Senate: It is now contingent on a unanimous resolution of the NSG on this issue.

"In addition, we require that decisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Groupenabling nuclear trade with India are made by consensus and consistent with itsrules."

5. The original agreement talked of an Additional protocol which the PrimeMinister's statement made clear was an India Specific Protocol not covered underthe protocols for weapon states or non-weapon states.

In the Congress and Senate reading of the Agreement, they have been made intofar more intrusive Model Additional Protocols of IAEA, which are currently, onlyaccepted by some of the countries. India's civilian program will be safeguardedunder this Additional Protocol as a non-nuclear weapons state. Under thisprotocol, IAEA can be used to delve into the past of each of the activities thathave gone to build the civilian facilities, effectively allowing others to useIAEA to find out about India's strategic program and also our technologycapabilities.

6. Assurance given by the Prime Minister on March 7, 2006 was that we areplacing our facilities in perpetuity as reciprocally US is also guaranteeingfuel supply in perpetuity. In case the US defaults on its fuel supply agreement(as it did in Tarapur), it will ensure that other members of the NSG will takeover its obligations.

The Obama amendment to the Senate Bill passed on June 29, 2006, though a Senseof the House Amendment, states in Section 102(6): "The US should not seekto facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by anyother party if such exports are terminated under US law." The House Billgoes a step further. In Section 4(d)-3 it states, "If nuclear transfers toIndia are restricted pursuant to this Act - the President should seek to preventthe transfer to India of equipment, materials or technology from otherparticipating governments in the NSG or from any other source."

7. In the original agreement, India had agreed to work with the US for a FissileMaterial Cut off Treaty (FMCT).

This is now being used to restrict India's fissile material stockpile. This isalso reiterated in the two bills.

Section 103 Declaration of Policy Concerning United States India Peaceful AtomicEnergy Cooperation states:

To achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India andPakistan of all fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclearexplosives devices;

Also the President has to report the efforts it has made with India and Pakistanfor "disclosing, securing, capping and reducing their fissile materialstockpiles"

8. In the original agreement, only IAEA safeguards were considered.

In the Senate Bill, Section 107 End-Use Monitoring Program states that in caseIAEA is unable to fulfil its safeguards obligations the President take Measuresto ensure all material and its use is in conformity with it declared purpose.This includes physical verification and suitable access to be provided by Indiato US inspectors.

9. The military program had no monitoring requirement from IAEA or the US.

In the Senate Bill, Section 108 Implementation and Compliance, the President toreport to the Congress "significant changes in the production by India ofnuclear weapons or in the types and amounts of fissile material produced."Further, under the Additional Protocol, an inventory of uranium from the miningstage has to be provided to the IAEA.